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In this thesis I theorize possibilities for post-liberal forms of political agency. 
Actors seeking to resist, refuse or rework liberalisms’ myths and violence are faced 
with a paradox. How to act against or in-spite-of the terms of political action 
themselves? Engagement with liberal narratives of political agency risks simply 
repeating their logics. Refusals of those logics risk being erased by them, if such a 
refusal is even possible. There seems to be little room for agency either way. This 
problem is further complicated by liberalisms’ diverse local contingencies and, 
nonetheless, the persistence of liberal political rationalities across contexts. 
Monolithic accounts of liberalisms buy into their universalizing logics. Approaching 
liberalisms as endlessly adaptable and malleable, however, misses their significance 
across contexts and echoes liberal voluntarism. Turning from agency to resistance 
offers one way to refuse liberal narratives of political action, but also reduces action 
to a negative and binary relation. How, in this light, might we imagine ‘post-liberal’ 
forms of political agency? How might we navigate and rework this set of problems? 
Taking political agency to be imagined and enacted locally, in situ and in 
practice, I draw on three years of praxiographic fieldwork with actors in higher 
education projects in the Canadian Arctic. In Canada, liberal logics and practices 
have justified and enacted colonization. The liberal settler state has reorganized and 
regulated politics, eroding Indigenous forms of government. Formal education has 
been central to this process and to liberal state-building in Canada. The thesis shows 
how, for those seeking to transform colonial realities, higher education is now a way 
of inhabiting, contesting, and reworking the meaning of political agency itself. 
Working closely with two university-building projects, I show that anti-colonial 
northern educators locate their agency not in one form of action or another, but in the 
dynamic interrelation of multiple forms. These actors are also concerned centrally 
with the ontology and spatio-temporality of particular logics of agency, and they 
theorize and enact these explicitly. I also show how, in response to these challenges, 
late liberal versions of political agency are emerging locally. As I tell this story, I 
examine my own implication in the research problem autoethnographically. I 
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describe how my struggle to resist colonizing academic conventions from my own 
institutional setting co-evolved with the activities of participants. I describe how I 
followed their strategies in negotiating my own agency.  
I argue that in old and new universities and in the Canadian Arctic liberal 
narratives of political agency are latent in unexpected ways. They are also, however, 
often inhabited deliberately and creatively by local actors. These liberal logics of 
action are characterized by specific ontologies and spatio-temporalities, which they 
share with settler-colonialism. Settler-colonialism and liberalisms therefore intersect 
through these logics in higher education. I locate possibilities for post-liberal agency 
on this emerging and late liberal terrain. Post-liberal agency can, I conclude, be 
imagined in the interstices of this multiplicity of forms of agency, in the spatio-
temporal and ontological practices of the everyday, and in the intersection of 
liberalisms and settler-colonialism in the university. My version of post-liberal 
agency is also, I propose, a way of decolonizing research as well as framing and 
practicing academic work and ethics more broadly. 
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I thought about that new American President’s speech, where he 
talked about a ‘Great Society.’ He talked about ‘progress without strife and 
without hatred.’ At the same time he also said ‘to reject any among us who 
seek to open old wounds and rekindle hatreds.’ I wondered if everybody 
realized what he was talking about, and how white people, even here in 
Canada, went by that. I mean about rejecting people and stuff. I knew he 
talked about the blacks or any people that upset the fake idea about a ‘great 
society’. I thought about all the history books and stuff at school and in 
movies. How it was like that, a fake, while really the white people wished we 
would either be just like them or stay out of sight. 
 
Slash, teenage protagonist and narrator, 
(Armstrong, 1998: 36) 
 
Jeanette Armstrong’s novel Slash is a fictional biography of an Okanagan 
Indian in Canada nicknamed Slash. Slash’s life story is a story of politicization. 
Throughout the novel, he becomes increasingly politically active and aware. This 
process is not linear, however, and much of the text is dedicated to Slash’s doubts 
and questions as to what Indian politics even are or should be. What does it mean for 
an Indian to become ‘politicized’ when politics are understood as and regulated by 
the liberal democratic state? When liberal democracy and states came to North 
America with colonizers and justified settler-colonial violence? Slash cycles through 
many possible answers to these questions and does not come to any single 
conclusion. During his life, he watches his elders continue to live traditionally from 
their gradually eroded land without protest. He watches his leaders don suits and ties 
(becoming “brown, white men,” [Armstrong, 1998: 69]). He joins his peers in living 
through racist state-schooling and then through cycles of alcoholism and 
imprisonment. He experiences peaceful and violent protests, endless meetings and 
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frustrations, and more. All the while, Slash tries to find his place in this varied anti-
colonial activity. He also tries to figure out the place for this activity in creating the 
justice and freedom that he imagines for North America.  
 
In the quotation above, Slash responds to a speech that he hears in a priest-
run youth group, the site of much of his teenage learning. In this scene, Slash 
recognizes the liberal dream or myth of equality and peace (“fake ideas”) is built on 
violence, an invisible occupation, and the repression of dissent. But he also 
recognizes that even though he has “seen through” these “fake ideas”, he is still faced 
with a very real choice: assimilation (“be just like them”) or erasure (“stay out of 
sight”). Much of his daily life at school and then later in prison and work is about 
negotiating this choice on an everyday and interpersonal level. He is book-smart and 
wants to learn and succeed at school but because he is Indigenous teachers either 
dumb-down their teaching with him or feel threatened by his success. School has 
changed him enough so that he cannot get comfortable in his traditional home, but 
not so much that he wants to or even can assimilate fully into the dominant settler 
culture. He drinks to forget his own suffering and that of others, but he knows 
drinking contributes to furthering that suffering. He wants to protest the unjust 
imprisonment and violence against Indigenous people but is afraid of being subject 
to it himself. The traditionalism of his elders does not seem like quite enough, but the 
American Indian Brotherhood that is leading Indigenous activism sometimes feels 
too white or too far removed from the traditions that they are supposed to be fighting 
for.  
 
Slash, like all scholars and activists of decolonization, is faced with an 
agency problem. The very reality against which Slash is struggling also sets and 
regulates what types of activities and logics count as political action. Engagement 
with the liberal democratic state risks repeating its colonizing logics. Refusal to 
engage the dominant version of political action, however, risks being erased and 
ineffectual in relation to it. Refusal might not, however, even be possible because 
Slash is already personally entangled with the settler state. There seems to be little 
room for agency either way. Scholars and activists of decolonization, as well as of 
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resistance, transformation and liberation more generally, have long been concerned 
with the problem faced by Slash. This is what Judith Butler calls the “paradox of 
subjectivation”: “the subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not 
produced, by such norms” (Butler, 1993:15).  This problem is also why Audre Lorde 
interrogates the possibilities of “dismantl[ing] the master’s house” with the “master’s 
tools” (Lorde, 1984). In this thesis, I call this problem the ‘erased or erased’ problem. 
From very different theoretical and personal co-ordinates, Butler, Lorde, Slash and I 
are all asking: how can we act against or in spite of something which sets the terms 
and meanings of action itself?  
 
This problem is particularly acute with liberalisms because of their 
prevalence in articulating political agency and freedom in, from and with the West. 
This thesis is about how this agency problem is constituted, negotiated and reworked 
in late liberalism in particular. Elizabeth Povinelli describes late liberalism as the 
“form that liberal governmentality has taken as it responds to a series of legitimacy 
crises in the wake of anticolonial movements, new social movements, and new 
Islamic movements” (Povinelli, 2011: 25). Late liberalism is particularly developed 
in settler-colonial states like Canada because these states have faced ongoing 
challenges from their Indigenous populations. Their responses have involved, 
centrally, the marriage of neoliberalism and multiculturalism, and the reduction of 
difference, actors and action to culture, commodity and law (Povinelli and DiFruscia, 
2012). This marriage and reduction has occurred through the discourses of 
recognition and reconciliation (Coulthard, 2006, 2007; Fraser, 2000; McNay, 2008), 
economic development and capacity building (Bargh, 2007), and the creation of legal 
mechanisms for Indigenous self-determination such as land claims and self-
government agreements (Irlbacher-Fox, 2009).  The function of this marriage and 
reduction has been to enable the “truths” that underpin liberal versions of politics to 
go undisturbed (Povinelli, 2011:26). These truths include liberal narratives of agency 
and the autonomous subjects (Povinelli, 2011:13), juridical or economic power 
(Foucault, 1978, 1991) and linear-progressive temporalities around which they 
operate. This thesis is about how people engage, contest and attempt to rework these 




In this introduction I begin by outlining this problem as it has been 
established by critical and queer theory. Critical and queer scholarship constitutes the 
grounds, imperatives and approaches for the current thesis. I explain why I have 
called the problem ‘agency’, how it manifests in late liberalism specifically, and why 
I have theorized and responded to it with something called ‘post-liberal’ agency. 
Liberalisms present, I argue, a series of dilemmas and paradoxes for the possibilities 
of imagining agency in any other way. In the first section, I also explain why I 
approach this problem empirically by working in the settler-colonial Canadian Arctic 
with anti-colonial educational actors. Liberal versions of politics, settler colonialism 
and universities are, I argue, inextricably entangled and especially so in the Canadian 
Arctic (which, following participants, I also refer to as ‘North’). This entanglement is 
the empirical ground of the current thesis.  
 
In the second section of the chapter, I describe the settler-colonial contexts 
and anti-colonial cases with which I worked “praxiographically” (Mol, 2002:31-33) 
in the course of the project. These were higher education campaigns and projects in 
Northern Canada. I worked particularly closely with two projects, Akitsiraq Law 
School (‘Akitsiraq’) and Dechinta Bush University (‘Dechinta’). Akitsiraq was a law 
school for Inuit that aimed to combine Inuit law with Canadian common law in the 
Arctic. Dechinta aimed to combine conventional university pedagogy with place-
based pedagogy ‘in the bush’. Slash was on Dechinta’s core reading list and students 
and staff returned to Slash’s story repeatedly to make sense of their own anti-colonial 
activities. In this introduction I focus on the broader historical and political contexts 
and struggles within which Dechinta and Akitsiraq are located.  
 
In the third section of this chapter, I move on to outline a further dimension 
of the problem. As an academic actor and a white British person I am implicated in 
the problem I am discussing. I found myself faced with my own agency problem. I 
had to navigate, from a very different direction, the same liberal, settler-colonial and 
academic logics and practices with which Northern actors were grappling. In the 
third section of this chapter, I introduce this ethical and methodological problem as a 
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focus of the thesis. This problem can, I argue, be framed and navigated concretely by 
learning from research participants’ own strategies, and through ‘post-liberal 
agency’.  
1.1 Why agency, post-liberal and settler-
colonialism? 
The central goal of this thesis is to imagine a post-liberal form of political 
agency that reworks and navigates the limits and paradoxes presented by liberalisms 
for political action. In this section, I lay out what these limits and paradoxes are. I 
describe the contingent, mythological and violent qualities of liberalisms, along with 
the limits of resistance and alterity as ways of avoiding the problems of liberal 
political agency. These are the imperatives and challenges for the current thesis. 
These dilemmas are also, I go on to describe, manifested and further complicated in 
the contexts of settler-colonialism, the Canadian North and education. I argue that 
conceptualizing and researching agency empirically and locally is one way to begin 
the task of re-imagining the meaning of political agency in these contexts. While I 
begin by talking about liberalisms and settler-colonialism separately, therefore, this 
is in order to lay the grounds for their connection.  Similarly, while I talk about 
classical liberal, liberal democratic, multicultural and neoliberal rationalities and 
practices I do not mean these are separate and successive forms of liberalism. Rather, 
they are all entangled today in late liberalism. Even post-liberal agency is not ‘after’ 
liberal agency or removed from these dilemmas but rather operates with and on the 
same terrain.   
Liberalisms and political agency  
The terms ‘liberalism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are now used in so many places, 
cases and ways that critics have accused them of becoming meaningless. Kathleen 
Fitzpatrick, for example, denounces the “utterly sloppy and nearly always casually 
derisive way in which the term [neoliberalism] is of late being thrown about” 
(Fitzpatrick, 2012). James Laidlaw and Jonathan Mair argue that the concept of 
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neoliberalism is so overused in academic work that it has become an “obstacle to 
understanding” and “obsession” (Group for Debates in Anthropological Theory, 
2014). In my experience it is true that the words ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘liberalism’ are 
difficult to escape, particularly in the critical and queer traditions in which I work. It 
is also true that these words take on different and shifting meanings, and that their 
referents take on equally different and shifting forms. For me, however, this does not 
make the terms meaningless. Quite the opposite: I would argue that the “obsession” 
of contemporary scholarship with forms of liberalism reflects the persistence of 
liberalisms in social and political life today. The slipperiness of the concept of 
liberalism reflects the adaptability and heterogeneity of liberal logics and practices. 
Liberalisms are as multiple and concrete as the many other features of modern life 
with which they intersect and interact, such as the state, nation and capitalism 
(Foucault, 2004, 2010; Harvey, 2005). It is for these reasons that liberalisms matter 
and that critical and queer scholars, myself included, are indeed ‘obsessed’ with 
liberalisms.  
Here I introduce the contours and salience of the problems presented by 
liberalisms for political action and agency, as established by critical and queer 
scholars. My aim is not to engage with this theoretical literature beyond using it to 
identify a problematic and rationale for the current project. I devote the entire next 
chapter to engaging theory more fully. I also devote space in that chapter to 
considering the liberal logics that are under critique here and to showing how liberal 
narratives of political agency emerge and vary in classical, neo- and late liberalisms. 
For now, however, it should be sufficient to note briefly that liberal logics of political 
agency are often “autological” (Povinelli, 2011:13), juridical (Foucault, 1978, 1991) 
and linear-progressive. This means they assume an autonomous economic or legal 
subject acting deliberately towards a future goal in linear time. This subject acquires 
and wields agency like a tool. Action is often understood in legal, economic or 
institutional terms. My aim here is not to reduce liberalisms to a single story or 
monolithic whole. In this thesis I show that autological, juridical and linear-
progressive narratives of agency are remarkably persistent, but that they also vary 
across the collection of diverse, local and often hybrid practices, myths and effects 
that constitute liberalisms. Nonetheless, I have singled out this narrative of agency 
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here because, as I will describe, it is this narrative that participants in the current 
research were often seeking to resist or rework and which often crept back into 
efforts at acting otherwise. 
Critical and queer scholarship has long been concerned with exposing the 
falsehood of the universal, autonomous, rational and individual liberal actor. Michel 
Foucault, for example, “create[s] a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects” to show, far from being universal, the 
subject has been invented and imagined historically and contingently (Foucault, 
1982:77). Foucault’s contingent subject does not acquire and exercise agency on the 
world, but rather is an agent who is produced by, productive of and inseparable from 
the world. Similarly, Judith Butler uses poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theory to 
argue that subjects and actors are, in fact, created within discourse, not prior to it, 
through “the iterability of performativity” (Butler, 1990: xxiv). Again, for Butler 
agency is not acquired and exercised, but rather occurs in the very process of 
iteration and especially in its interruption or failure. I describe liberal and counter-
liberal accounts of how agency works in depth in the following chapter. For now, 
what is important is that one way critical and queer scholarship has critiqued liberal 
narratives is by saying that agency simply does not work in the ways liberal accounts 
say it does.  
While liberal narratives of agency do not accurately represent the world, they 
still have effects in it. Critical and queer theory has been equally concerned with the 
effects of liberal narratives and the ways in which they control, oppress or are 
violent. There are far too many of these ways to list here, so I will give just two 
examples of particular relevance to the current thesis. John Locke is widely 
recognized as a grandfather of modern liberalism. Locke explicitly rationalized 
slavery and colonialism, tying liberal accounts of politics to the violent dispossession 
and subjugation of Indigenous peoples (Locke, 1980:19; see also Losurdo, 2014). 
Today, neoliberal logics of marketization and privatization continue to drive and 
justify environmental destruction on Indigenous lands (Altamirano-Jimenez, 




Critical and queer scholarship has also shown liberalisms to be hugely diverse 
and, nonetheless, connected and persistent across both time and space. Against 
liberalisms’ universalizing tendencies and claims, Elizabeth Povinelli articulates 
liberalisms as a heterogeneous “symphony” (Povinelli, 2011; see also Richardson’s 
Contending Liberalisms [2001]). That is, liberalisms take myriad, varied and 
adaptive forms. Despite this heterogeneity, or perhaps because of it, liberal logics of 
action repeat persistently and recognizably. Often they reappear precisely in practices 
that seem at first glance, or at conception, to be anti-liberal alternatives (as in Margot 
Weiss’s account of BDSM practitioners’ attempts to create a counter-culture using 
neoliberal practices and logics, for example [Weiss, 2012]). Perhaps this persistence 
is due to the impossibility of an outside (Walker, 1992), exterior (Foucault, 1978:95), 
prior (Butler, 1993:21), or other form of total escape from liberalisms. Liberalisms’ 
heterogeneity, their persistence, and the lack of an outside, together complicate any 
single or straightforward theory of liberalism. They also complicate any single or 
straightforward theory of resistance or alternatives to liberalisms.  
Scholars and activists concerned with political action that does not repeat 
liberalisms’ violence, or by actors not visible (or even existent) in liberal logics, have 
turned instead to the politics of resistance. Positive and productive political agency 
has become so tainted by liberalisms’ myths and violence that critical and queer 
theorists, myself included, have often shied away from identifying action as anything 
more than ‘against’. It certainly feels easier and safer to say that action is not 
something than that it is something. Nobody can be accused of prescription or of 
buying into dominant political logics that way. The turn to resistance is also a 
response to the impossibility of alterity in the form of an “exteriority” (Foucault, 
1978:95), outside (Walker, 1992), or “prior” (Butler, 1993:21). The impossibility of 
escaping modernity, discourse or in this case liberalism has been underscored 
repeatedly by critical and queer scholarship. In the settler-colonial context, however, 
denying incommensurable Indigenous or other forms of difference further totalizes 
liberalisms and repeats one of the core functions of late liberalism (Povinelli, 2002, 
2011; see also Cruikshank [2006] and Nadasdy [1998:25–43] for discussions on 
commensurability and academic knowledge). Nonetheless, the limits of my own 
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liberal location when it comes to imagining post-liberal agency are a recurring theme 
in this thesis.  
I absolutely do not want to discount the necessary work and action that has 
occurred under the banners of resistance or alterity. Nor do I want to discount all the 
very real risks in discussing political agency specifically. These risks are recurring 
themes and obstacles in this thesis. Nonetheless, as Saba Mahmood argues, reducing 
action to the binaries of oppression/resistance, consolidation/destabilization, 
signification/resignification, iteration/subversion or even liberal/alternatives presents 
a new set of problems (Mahmood, 2012:20-22; see also Louis McNay on “the 
dichotomous logic of domination and resistance” [McNay, 2000:155]). Each of these 
pairs is another set of binaries, when binary thinking is one of the targets of queer 
and critical politics in the first place. Binary thinking is a target of these politics 
because it is a feature of modernity and liberalisms. This set of binaries, in fact, 
defines action entirely in direct reference to that which is being resisted, thus 
potentially reinstating rather than challenging its primacy. These binaries also, 
Mahmood argues, foreclose any possibility of “norms” being “performed, inhabited 
and experienced in a variety of ways” (Mahmood, 2012:22). That is, agency gets 
reduced to opposition. Similarly, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick calls purely oppositional 
critical theory “paranoid” and argues that binary theory risks homogenizing both so-
called oppression and resistance (Sedgwick, 2003:123, 123-152). Again, opposition 
is a powerful and sometimes necessary analysis that I do not mean to reject here. 
Rather, I want to highlight its limits. I also want to align the current project with the 
concerns in which the politics of resistance and alterity are grounded, if not with the 
focus on resistance and alterity themselves. As I have said, I go more deeply into this 
scholarship and theory in the next chapter. For now, I mean simply to begin to frame 
the question of agency for the current thesis as being haunted, limited and motivated 
by oppositional thinking. 
In this thesis, I take these points made by critical and queer scholars as 
imperatives and grounds from which to ask: What are the possibilities for imagining 
a post-liberal agency?  These points also indicate a series of either/or dilemmas when 
it comes to understanding and responding to liberal agency: as heterogeneous and/or 
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persistent, as mythological and/or creating effects, as inescapable and/or 
incommensurable with existing alternatives, from within and/or against and as 
resistance and/or positive action. Theorizing post-liberal agency means engaging 
these dilemmas. In this thesis I show how anti-colonial actors in the Canadian North 
are currently reworking and navigating these problems in practice. I argue that we 
can learn from them in order to theorize post-liberal agency.  
It is currently, I believe, uniquely opportune to ask questions about the 
meaning of political agency. We are witnessing an emerging and ongoing set of 
political struggles which are contesting the meaning of politics and action 
themselves. Pussy Riot, Occupy, Anonymous and #idlenomore are some particularly 
visible examples. Critical and queer scholarship has been concerned with these 
struggles too and has been particularly engaged with the ways in which failure and 
negativity might be forms of political agency that do not align directly with liberal 
logics  (Halberstam, 2011; Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011; Edleman, 2004). Concurrent 
to these challenges to liberalism are a series of responses, reassertions and 
adaptations by local liberal orders. These responses included, for example, the 
commodification of sexual difference and individualization of sexual agency (Weiss, 
2012), the pursuit of happiness (Ahmed, 2010; see also Berlant, 2011), self-help 
(Rose, 1998:156, 166; see also Rimke, 2010) and environmental governance 
(Pellizzoni, 2011), to name just a few. The land-claims, self-government agreements, 
truth and reconciliation commissions, and discourses of cultural recognition with 
which late liberal settler-states have met Indigenous demands for self-determination 
and decolonization are also examples of these responses and the focus of this thesis 
(Povinelli, 2002; Coulthard, 2007).  
Povinelli calls this “terrain of struggle” “late liberalism” (Povinelli, 2011). 
This struggle is constituted by attempts to enact non-liberal forms of political agency 
and by liberalisms’ adaptations and reassertions in response. That is, late liberalism 
is characterized by actors contesting the meanings of political action and agency. I 
therefore take late liberalism as a unique and pressing site for examining how 
liberalisms work at their shifting and varied limits, as well as locating possibilities 
for reimagining or reworking political agency beyond those limits. As such this 
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thesis is as much a contribution to understanding how liberalisms work today as it is 
an attempt to re-imagine political agency.  
My approach to conceptualizing and researching political agency in the 
current thesis is empirical. I draw the premise that agency can and should be 
researched empirically, locally and in situ from two sets of literature. The first 
literature is critical international relations scholarship, which shows how the meaning 
of politics is socially constructed. What counts as politics is, this literature 
demonstrates, imagined and regulated contingently and practically. This happens in 
the very activities of politics themselves and is closely entwined with ideas and 
practices of social order more generally. Critical international relations scholars have 
been especially concerned with documenting how politics are articulated and 
regulated as the nation, sovereignty and the state. This scholarship follows Foucault, 
who argues that what counts as politics is not fixed, but rather is tied to particular 
rationalities and historical moments as well as to wider societal processes (Foucault, 
2004, 2010).   Jens Bartelson, for example, shows how the state and sovereignty have 
emerged historically as sites of politics (Bartelson, 1995, 2001). Rob Walker (1992) 
and Karena Shaw (2008) show how the state and sovereignty continue to regulate 
ideas about what count as politics. Roxanne Doty and Cynthia Weber both show how 
sovereignty and the state are performed in everyday micro-practices and how politics 
are regulated as and by them (Weber, 1995; Doty, 2007; see also Biersteker and 
Weber, 1996). In this thesis I take late liberalism to be one such historically and 
contingently constituted mode of politics. In order to understand late liberalism I 
draw on accounts of scholars who approach politics and liberalism in the Foucaultian 
way described here.   
The second literature to which my empirical approach is indebted is that of 
critical theorists who show that agency too is contingently constructed and 
meaningful. Quoting Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood explains: “…the meaning of 
agency must be explored from within the grammar of concepts within which it 
resides… we should keep the meaning of agency open and allow it to emerge from 
‘within semantic and institutional networks that define and make possible particular 
ways of relating to people, things, and oneself’” (Asad, 2003:78 in Mahmood, 
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2012:34). Agency in this line is something which occurs and can only be understood 
locally, contingently, in situ and in practice. This approach to agency aligns with 
queer studies and critical anthropology, both of which are committed more generally 
to working with actors to understand their worlds, rather than analyzing, representing 
or interpreting them (Weiss, 2011). I review scholarship which approaches agency in 
this way in Chapter 2 and show how these epistemological and ethical rationales for 
studying agency empirically have demonstrated their capacity for generating new 
theoretical understandings of social life. For these reasons in this thesis I approach 
political agency empirically as it is understood, manifested, negotiated and contested 
in its specific and everyday locations. I now turn to why I do this in the context of 
settler-colonialism, the Canadian Arctic and higher education.  
Settler-colonialism  
This thesis is about agency in late liberalism. It is motivated by liberalisms’ 
violence and mythology and by the desire to think critical and queer action beyond 
resistance. This task is complicated by the challenge of recognizing liberalisms’ 
heterogeneity while also taking seriously their commonalities and persistence. The 
thesis is also empirical because it takes agency to be constituted contingently and 
locally. For all these reasons, the thesis is a study of how political agency is 
manifested and contested in and around the late liberal settler-state and the politics of 
decolonization specifically. More specifically still, the thesis is an account of a 
movement to create a university in the Canadian North.  This is the empirical ground 
for the thesis because, as I describe now, settler-colonialism, the North and education 
all combine to constitute a unique and acute version of the agency problem in late 
liberalism. They also offer, I found, compelling ways of rethinking the problem and 
therefore contributing theoretically to the critical and queer project to rearticulate 
political agency more broadly.  
Patrick Wolfe defines settler-colonialism as the simultaneous destruction of 
Indigenous peoples and construction of settler states and societies (Wolfe, 2006; see 
also Strakosch and Macoun, 2012). In the first instance, what Wolfe calls the “logic 
of elimination” involves the removal of indigenous people from their lands (Wolfe, 
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2006:387). Elimination happens either physically (as in genocide or relocation) or 
socially by the eradication of the difference and therefore existence of Indigenous 
peoples (as in cultural assimilation) [see also Smith, 2005:36]. At the same time the 
construction of settler-colonial states, societies and power relations occurs through 
the very same processes that enact this elimination. For example, the processes of 
settling or colonizing Indigenous land through agricultural, military, legal, religious 
and economic activity all work simultaneously to eliminate Indigenous people 
physically or culturally by confining them to reservations or absorbing them into 
those institutions. These same activities also work to create the settler institutions and 
identities of which they are part.  
Central to the logic of elimination is the reorganisation and regulation of 
multiple, varied Indigenous modes of government in order to replace them with 
dominant settler, state and liberal forms of government (Maaka and Fleras, 2005; 
Tully, 2000; Smith, 2005; Alfred, 2005). This also means replacing the forms of 
being, knowing and acting that are attendant to modes of government. Indigenous 
people have repeatedly faced the ‘erased or erased’ agency problem: act on the terms 
of the liberal settler state and be assimilated, or refuse them and be erased. Classical 
liberal notions of progress, rationality, enlightenment and civilization motivated and 
legitimized early colonial contact and forced cultural assimilation (Shaw, 2008). 
Later, neoliberal logics of the market and economy fuelled and authorized the 
exploitation and commodification of Indigenous lands and cultures, as well as the 
incorporation of Indigenous peoples into the market as workers (Bargh, 2007). 
Today, as “liberal governmentality… responds to a series of legitimacy crises in the 
wake of anticolonial… movements” late liberal logics neutralize Indigenous claims 
to different modes of politics and order by reducing them to “culture”, making them 
commensurable with the settler-state, and channeling challenges through state 
mechanisms for inclusion, recognition and liberal-democractic self-determination 
(Povinelli, 2011:25; see Coulthard [2009] for more on Indigeneity and recognition; 
see McNay [2007] and Fraser [2000] for these functions of recognition in general). 
The account I give in this thesis shows that in the Canadian North, settler-
colonialism and late liberalism are two sides of the same coin and are organized in 




Liberal logics are especially visible in the Canadian Arctic. The North is 
imagined as variously a space of exploration and discovery, the home of the 
Indigenous other, in need of economic development, an abundance of natural 
‘resources’, a strategic site of security and sovereignty, and is increasingly governed 
by state mechanisms for Indigenous politics (Grace, 2007). Education has been the 
central technology through which liberal paternalism and liberal progress have been 
implemented, the settler-state has been built and maintained, citizens have been 
produced, and Indigenous peoples have been assimilated into liberal democracy 
(Miller, 1996; Steckley and Cummins, 2001; Henderson, 2008). Late liberal logics 
have also been driven by Northern events and Indigenous peoples. As I describe 
below, this includes negotiating the world’s largest land claim agreement 
(Loukacheva, 2007), as well as locating Indigenous agency in Indigenous people’s 
rights to sell, manage or profit from land and natural resources (Bargh, 2007). Today, 
as I learnt from my fieldwork experience, the North is full of white do-gooders, 
adventurers and prospectors of various kinds and is therefore reminiscent in many 
ways of an early frontier town. Colonial frontier settlements were where early 
liberalism was imagined and enacted, but also where liberal logics met their limits 
and others.  
 
Settler-colonialism therefore presents a version of the agency problem for 
those seeking to transform colonial realities. Liberal forms of politics, on the one 
hand, offer voice but risk further colonization and assimilation. Refusing those 
forms, on the other hand, risks erasure and ineffectiveness. This has, in turn, 
produced a fierce debate amongst scholars and activists seeking to act against 
colonialism as to what that action should look like. Participants in one cluster, the 
‘resurgence paradigm’ (their label), argue that late liberal (and all state) forms of 
political action are inherently colonizing and assimilating (Allen 1998; Alfred 2005; 
Smith 2005; Irlbacher-Fox, 2009). Those in the other, the ‘constitutional’ or ‘liberal’ 
paradigm (my labels), argue that these politics are in fact a socially constructed entity 
and therefore open to social intervention and potentially Indigenous inclusion 
(Borrows, 2002, 2010; Ladner, 2005; Assembly of First Nations, 2014). In fact, 
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scholars and activists in the constitutional paradigm argue that Indigenous people 
have already had roles in shaping the late liberal state. The Government of Canada 
also situates itself within the constitutional or liberal paradigm. It seems like there is 
no room for anti-colonial action either way. As Slash says, “the white people wished 
we would either be just like them or stay out of sight” (Armstrong, 1998:36). 
This is where the ‘post’ of post-liberal agency comes in. Post-liberal agency 
is the question mark around which I attempt to theorize a form of agency that is 
motivated by and takes into account the realities of late liberalism that I have 
described in this section. These realities include those critiqued and documented by 
critical and queer scholarship, as well as those of settler-colonialism and the 
Canadian North. ‘Post’ serves a number of functions in this task. It signals a desire 
for some other form of political agency than that offered by late liberalism. This 
desire is motivated by critical and queer accounts of the violence and mythology of 
liberalism, as well as the struggles of anti-colonial actors in the politics of 
decolonization. At the same time, ‘post’ captures the persistence and inescapability 
of liberalisms. ‘Post’ is not non-liberal or anti-liberal as these would return to an 
outside or to binary thinking again. Instead it indicates some relationship to 
liberalism that is more than simply opposition.  
 This use of ‘post’ is more than a theoretical commitment, however. It also 
resonates with the ways in which actors in my fieldwork theorized what they were 
doing. Rather than locating their own agency as either in liberalism and the state or 
in authentic Indigenous alternatives (which may not even be possible), Northern 
educators frequently understood their agency to work in more than one way 
simultaneously. They also located their agency in the interstices or relations between 
multiple forms of action or narratives of decolonization. ‘Post-liberal’ is intended to 
capture these multiple and relational forms of agency at work in the late liberal 
context of my research. The ‘post’ that I learned from the activities and perspectives 
of participants in this research therefore responds to but is not fully determined by 
liberalisms. It takes seriously the risks and imperatives of the dilemmas I described 
above but does not buy fully into their either/or logics. 
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I want to make two brief notes of clarification regarding my use of the term 
‘post-liberal’. First, I use ‘post’ in the way in which, in my reading, it is used by 
poststructuralist and postcolonial scholars: not to mean ‘after’ liberalism, but to mean 
‘in response to’ and ‘embedded in’ liberalism. Of course, ‘post’ does signal ‘after’ in 
everyday usage, and this carries some risks and tensions for the current project. 
These risks are exacerbated because, following Northern educators, I am concerned 
in this thesis with the colonizing functions of linear-progressive temporalities and 
narratives of decolonization. I discuss these tensions around temporality throughout 
the thesis. Second, scholars in Peace and Conflict Studies use the term ‘post-
liberalism’ to describe what is happening in post-conflict settings where liberal state-
building or liberal peace-building has been attempted and failed or been challenged 
(Richmond, 2011; see also Richmond and Mitchell, 2011). The Canadian North is 
not conventionally understood as a ‘post-conflict’ setting. The North does, however, 
share much in common with places that are understood as such.  While this thesis is 
not located in or speaking to Peace and Conflict Studies directly, my approach is 
certainly aligned with its ethical and epistemological commitments, and I do draw on 
this scholarship at times to better understand state-building and development in the 
Canadian North.  
The single aim of this first section is to give readers a sense of the layers and 
complexities of the agency problem that is under scrutiny in the current thesis. How 
to imagine political agency beyond liberal logics, when those logics have long 
defined and regulated the meaning of political action? What possibilities, as well as 
traps, are presented by the “paradox[es] of subjectivation” (Butler, 1993:15) in late 
liberalism? These questions are motivated and complicated by critical and queer 
theorists’ accounts of liberalisms as violent and mythological as well as contingent 
and persistent. They are motivated and complicated by the necessities and limits of 
focusing on resistance or alterity. Rather than fix this problem in any given moment 
or form, I have shown some of its many iterations across contexts. In this thesis I 
argue that engaging with the specifics of these iterations in the settler-colonial 
Canadian North, where the agency problem is uniquely and acutely manifested, can 




1.2 Contexts and Cases 
Maybe that schooling wasn’t good for you. Maybe you’re spending too much 
time down in the village. Maybe you want more and more to be like some of them 
other boys down there. Maybe you think they are happier than you or that they are 
luckier than you. Well, that ain’t true. They are pitiful because they have nobody to 
teach them good things. Their moms and dads are all pitiful. They got broken spirits 
from going to residential school. Lots of them died when they came home, from 
drinking and T.B. sickness. The ones that made it okay, made it learning how to 
please the priests and nuns and rejecting everything Indian. They were praised for 
that. That’s how they are. They put the white man way up high above Indians and 
listen to them, and try to please them. We pity them. 
 
 Slash’s dad to Slash after Slash quits school,  
(Armstrong, 1998:52) 
 
 This is one of many passages from Slash about the significances and 
complexities of formal, state-run education in Indigenous life in settler-colonial 
Canada. Throughout the book, Slash describes how his understanding and hatred of 
colonial power as well as his uneasy sense of self are both formed in school. Slash 
sees school as way in which colonization happens and the settler state is produced. 
At the same time his own subjectivity and perception of this process are in part 
contingent on his experience in school. In this section, I introduce this entanglement 
of formal (higher) education, political action, and decolonization as the empirical 
context for the current thesis.  I show how formal education embodies Patrick 
Wolfe’s “logic of elimination” (Wolfe, 2006:387). I also show how education is one 
way in which the late liberal state is constituted performatively (as described by 
Weber [1998] and Doty [2007] above). I argue that both of these functions of 
education involve articulating and regulating political agency as liberal agency. 
These functions also make formal education an ongoing site of anti-colonial action. 
This action includes, I argue, attempts to contest or rework the meaning of political 
agency itself.  
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State-funded and run education was introduced by colonizing powers in 
Canada. The initial and explicit aims of early residential schooling were to civilize 
and assimilate savages, to shepherd them into inevitable cultural extinction, to 
reshape them into citizens – to “kill the Indian in the child” (Government of Canada, 
Hansard, 2008; see also Llewellyn, 2002: 255). Indigenous children were forcibly 
removed from their families and communities and taken to residential schools. In 
these schools, European norms, religion and languages were enforced, while 
Indigenous languages and traditions were banned (Miller, 1996). Formal education 
itself, in fact, is a European cultural practice that was imported into Canada. 
Indigenous pedagogies are generally not separated out into a specific time, space, or 
into disciplines, but rather embedded in daily life and guided by elders and the 
material environment (Tester and Kulchyski, 1994). The Government of Canada 
recognizes that “90% to 100% [of residential school students] suffered severe 
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
2014). Today, the former students of residential schooling frequently suffer from 
post-traumatic stress disorder and alcoholism, beginning a cycle of violence which is 
still felt strongly in Indigenous communities.  
 
These functions of education were central to the colonial reorganization and 
regulation of politics around the liberal state. Scholars of nationalism have 
documented the roles of formal education in imagining emerging nations and states 
(Hearn, 2006:80-84; Guibernau, 2007:30-31; Gellner, 2009:33). Foucaultian 
educational scholars have shown how formal education produces individual citizens 
and workers (Ball and Juneman, 2012: 140). Education in the Canadian North 
specifically made Indigenous people more amenable to liberal state governance (e.g. 
by giving them surnames or insisting they live in houses rather than nomadically 
[Tester, 2006]). Education in the North also channeled “appropriate” Indigenous 
individuals into government (Henderson, 2008:58). In fact, the generation of 
Indigenous activists who first became ‘politicized’ in the terms of the state met and 
organized in residential schools, using the understandings, language and tools they 
had acquired there.  
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The aim of assimilation has officially been dropped from education policy. 
However formal education in Canada remains a product of this history and is treated 
with skepticism in Indigenous communities.  Due to its role in connecting Indigenous 
peoples and state politics, it also remains a key site of Indigenous politics (whether 
resisting those connections or facilitating them). Today, many Northern and 
Indigenous activists and leaders say formal education is necessary in order to 
empower Indigenous people to participate in the legal, bureaucratic and 
governmental structures they have created towards the end of self-determination. 
They are trying, at the same time, to Indigenize and formal education. Coupled with 
the colonial history of formal education in Canada, the use of educational strategies 
in pursuit of decolonization makes education a tricky and paradoxical area of activity 
in Canada.  
  
Participants in the current thesis were navigating these historical and ongoing 
functions of formal education in the Canadian North. In researching this thesis I 
worked with actors in higher education in particular. I chose higher education for two 
key reasons. In the North, higher education is currently the object of an intense 
contestation: a movement to create a university in the North, and a struggle over 
what a university in the North would even look like. This contestation is an 
opportunity to see the stakes, fault lines, limits and possibilities of political action in 
education. At the same time, because of their maturity and age, higher educational 
actors tend to be more explicit in theorizing their politics and what they are doing. 
Their need to do so is heightened in the context of the current contestation and their 
positions of still-imagining a university. There is not already an institution with a 
local colonial history as there is with schooling. I go into detail as to the rationales of 
my case selection and my analytical relationship with them in Chapter 3. I now give 
some background to this higher education movement, and to the fieldwork sites and 
contexts for the current thesis. I show how these sites are microcosms of the debate 
over decolonization in late liberalism that I describe above.  
 
In 2009, the Walter Duncan Gordon Foundation (‘the Foundation’) 
commissioned and published a report titled, Dialogue Towards a University in 
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Canada's Far North (Stevenson, 2010). The Foundation is a national philanthropic 
organization which, at the time, claimed to be concerned with promoting Canadian 
sovereignty and security in the North, via the development of Northern communities 
(it has since called its use of “security as a bargaining chip” a “failure” [Lajeunesse, 
2013:2]).  The movement for a Northern university had been gaining momentum 
since 2008, and the Foundation sought to consolidate this movement, map its 
progress, and point to future directions. In November 2010, the Foundation hosted a 
conference by the same name (the Dialogue) in Yellowknife, the capital of the 
Northwest Territories. The conference brought together a range of interested parties 
from Territorial Governments, Indigenous organizations, academia and educational 
projects and initiatives, with the aim of discussing what a Northern university would 
look like and what action could be taken in pursuit of one. When I talk about the 
creation of a Northern university or Northern higher education, I am talking about 
the cluster of events, actors, ideas, activities, projects and interactions I describe in 
this section. There is still no permanent university in the Canadian Arctic.  
 
Post-secondary education in the North has historically been the domain of the 
Territorial Colleges. Territories and Provinces are the units of Canadian federalism. 
The Territories, which make up Northern Canada, are deemed by the Federal 
Government not yet sufficiently developed to have the same level of powers and 
autonomy from the Federal Government as the southern provinces. The Territorial 
Colleges are dominated by vocational courses. Hairdressing and jewellery making 
are, for example, particularly popular courses at Nunavut Arctic College (jewellery-
making is in part an Inuit traditional practice and therefore differently meaningful to 
hairdressing in the context). More recently the Colleges have been attempting to 
expand into more academic courses, collaborating with degree-granting programs 
and taking on some university-like functions such as publishing books by and for 
Northerners. In our interview, the then President of Nunavut Arctic College told me 
that it was the expectation and intention of the Colleges that they would expand to 





The main sessions of the Dialogue were led by representatives of the 
Governments and Colleges. A second group of attendees, however, organized what 
they called a “visioning session”. Participants in the visioning session were education 
activists from across the North, including from the Akitsiraq Law School Society, the 
Illiturvik University Society (activists in Nunavut working for a university), and the 
individuals who would later create Dechinta Initiatives. These actors are the primary 
participants in the current thesis. The Colleges and Governments were, however, 
excluded from presenting at this session. In a later interview, one of the session’s 
organizers explained to me that this decision had been controversial and had 
provoked hostility from the Colleges towards these smaller projects and actors. She 
explained that the rationale for this was that, being state-backed, the Colleges already 
had a platform that others did not. She also explained her own reticence around the 
Colleges leading the conversation around a university or attempting to become a 
university themselves. The Colleges’ close relationships with Government and their 
emphasis on vocation did not lend themselves to the critical thinking and 
decolonization she hoped a university would enable and inspire. She was worried 
that the colleges were mainly oriented to producing docile workers and citizens, 
much like the more well-meaning and benign versions of colonial schooling. This 
opinion was repeated to me across my interviews with participants in the visioning 
session.  
 
Tensions between the Colleges and alternative visions of education also 
persisted across my interviews and fieldwork engagements. In fact, implicit and 
explicit struggles and conflicts between different educational actors were 
overwhelming features of my fieldwork experience, especially over who or what was 
the most Northern, most Indigenous, most decolonizing, and what kinds of 
relationship with the state were most appropriate. Frequently I found myself being 
pulled in multiple directions, with interviewees denigrating other educational 
projects. Locally, then, what Northern post-secondary education should look like and 
who gets to articulate it was highly contested. It is these local actors and 
contestations that I worked with in my fieldwork. Through this work I learnt that the 
contestation was so heated because its stakes were what politics, decolonization and 
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self-determination actually meant – who can exist, speak or act and how. As actors 
configured and reconfigured the relations of state, Indigenous politics and education 
in their activities and our conversations, they theorized their own political action and 
agency, in and in relation to the agency problems presented by the late liberal settler-
state and formal education.   
 
Education in the North is a small field and many actors play multiple roles. It 
was impossible to draw lines around any single case, and I interviewed a range of 
actors and stakeholders in Northern education during my fieldwork. As I said above, 
however, I worked particularly closely with two projects: the Akitsiraq Law School 
and Dechinta Bush University. Both of these projects were part of the visioning 
session and highly critical of the dominant paradigm of formal education in the North 
and of education’s roles in colonialism. The two projects were created by groups of 
Northerners forming a Society, which than partnered with a Southern university to 
deliver an accredited, “Northernized” (Akitsiraq Law School Society, 2012) degree 
program, “run by Northerners, for Northerners” (Dechinta Initiatives, 2012), in the 
Arctic. Both Dechinta and Akitsiraq sought to redirect the legitimacy and resources 
of Southern institutions to Northern ends and values, and to give Northern students 
access to university credits that they might not otherwise have. They were engaging 
explicitly with and attempting to rework the theory and practice of power and 
government, as well as the form and production of knowledge. They are also shared 
in common majority Indigenous populations, vast landmasses, remoteness, colonial 
histories, cold and snow, mineral resources and similar economic and governmental 
set-ups, amongst many other things. 
 
Despite all these commonalities, Dechinta and Akitsiraq were also distinctly 
different. Dechinta was in the Northwest Territories, on Dene land;
 
Akitsiraq was in 
Nunavut, on Inuit land. Each land had its own set of cultures and traditions, as well 
as politics and relations with the Canadian state. Dene are “Status Indians”, governed 
by the 1879 Indian Act. The Indian Act originally excluded Indians from citizenship 
and organized them into “Bands” with councils and chiefs, with the intention that 
these state-recognized governance structures would replace previous Indigenous 
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ones. What has actually happened is that there are now competing political 
authorities in Indigenous communities (Irlbacher-Fox, 2009:13-18; see also 
Dickerson, 1992). Alongside these Bands, in 1970 Dene created the Dene Nation and 
the Indian Brotherhood of the NWT, both of which articulated a nationalistic and 
somewhat adversarial case for Dene self-determination and possibly independence 
from the settler state (Watkins, 1977). In 1969 a white paper proposed the abolit ion 
of the Indian Act (and therefore Indigenous difference in law in Canada). Indigenous 
activists responded with a “red paper” and with intensified activities which drove the 
eventual creation of land claims and self-government policy in Canada (Cairns, 
2000:67). Engaging with this new legislation, NWT Dene fragmented into several 
regional legal campaigns for land claim and self-government agreements (Irlbacher-
Fox, 2009:13-18). Today, there is a tiny 50.4% Aboriginal majority in the NWT 
assembly, although not all of this is Dene. This minority exacerbates the need to 
assert aboriginal or national rights beyond majoritarian democracy in order to secure 
the legitimacy of Indigenous voices. For all these reasons, divided and aggressive 
politics are often the context, norms or necessities of Indigenous politics in the NWT. 
That is, they align more closely with the resurgence paradigm of decolonization.  
 
Inuit in Nunavut, on the other hand, have never been Indians legally. They 
have been recognized as Canadian citizens since the beginning of the Cold War, 
when having citizens in the High Arctic became strategically useful for asserting 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty and that area came under international scrutiny (Tester 
and Kulchyski, 1994). Arctic colonization, and a formal relationship between Inuit 
and the state, occurred during this period, much later than in the NWT. As such, 
organized Inuit politics (activism and resistance in recognizably state terms) have 
also emerged later and have mobilized Inuit inclusion as citizens and Canadians, as 
well as lessons from prior Indigenous and state activity elsewhere. Inuit have 
negotiated one big land claim (the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement [Government of 
Canada, 1999]) and a parallel political accord rather than multiple claims. In 1999 
the political accord split the Northwest Territories to create the Territory of Nunavut. 
This split changed the constitutional configuration of Canada. The new Territory of 
Nunavut had an 86% Inuit population.  
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Nunavut’s new elected public Government in its capital, Iqaluit, reflected this 
majority. Inuit control the government by virtue of their electoral majority. The 
Agreement, negotiated and signed as a contract with the Crown, assigned ownership 
and management of much of Nunavut’s lands and natural resources to Inuit. The 
Agreement’s implementation has since been overseen by Nunavut Tungavik 
Incorporated. The Agreement also contained cultural clauses: according to Article 23 
Nunavut’s public service must be population proportionate (i.e. 86% Inuit) and Inuit 
culture and values must be implemented in all areas of governance. In all these ways, 
Inuit politics are often unified, conciliatory and practiced through Canadian 
nationhood and citizenship rather than against it. That is, they align more closely 
with the liberal and state paradigm of decolonization. 
I do not want to suggest that different relationships with the Canadian state 
are the only reasons for differences between these two locations. I especially do not 
want to ascribe agency only to the state by excluding more inward-looking reasons, 
such as culture or tradition, for the forms that politics and identities take. Inuit and 
Dene participants in the current project repeatedly pointed to cultural differences and 
historical conflicts between the two peoples as in part driving their choices of 
political action (they also highlighted similarities and complexities between the two 
peoples and regions). Of course, internal identities, norms and traditions will have a 
great sway on how both groups practice politics. I am not, however, in a position to 
know or say what these internal features are. It is the entanglement of liberal logics 
of action, the state, colonization and education – not Indigenous culture – that is 
under scrutiny in this thesis. 
These contexts and differences between Nunavut and the NWT run through 
Akitsiraq and Dechinta themselves. Akitsiraq was conceived of and created by a 
group of legal professionals in Nunavut called ‘the Akitsiraq Law School Society’. 
Their aim, they state, is “to graduate competent Northern lawyers” and “to create a 
critical mass of Inuit lawyers in Nunavut” (Akitsiraq Law School Society et al, 
2007). They see themselves as “lawyer-making in the Canadian Arctic” and “making 
Inuit lawyers” (ibid). The Akitsiraq Law School was therefore, at first glance, a 
‘working within’ type of approach to politics: qualifying Inuit to practice law will 
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provide them with tools and enable them to work within the state system towards 
social change and Northern and Inuit self-determination. In my encounters and 
interviews and in the classroom there was very little ‘us and them’ or fighting talk, 
few sharp lines, and a pride in being Canadian and in the roles that Inuit have played 
in Canadianness. In fact, the Akitsiraq Law School Society locates the Law School 
right at the heart of late liberal logics and mechanisms of self-determination. The 
letter, spirit and logic of the Land Claim, they argue, mandate the qualification of 
Inuit lawyers to take up roles in the new Government. The drive for self-
determination itself requires it. Thus far the Society has assembled and run only one 
full cohort of the program, from 2001 to 2005. They were ready to launch a second 
cohort in 2010, but the Government of Nunavut withdrew its crucial portion of the 
funding in 2009. Since 2009 the Society has been working to demonstrate its 
rationale for Akitsiraq to the Government and general public, as well as hosting other 
legal education events and short courses. Its members also participate in discussions 
and an ongoing campaign for more post-secondary education and a university in the 
Canadian North. 
 
Dechinta, on the other hand, is grounded in a sharp critique of colonization 
and how it is entwined with the settler-colonial state and university knowledge. 
Dechinta explicitly aims to both practice and teach or theorize decolonization and 
indigenous self-determination. The bush university is therefore much more openly 
political than Akitsiraq and uses a more aggressive language. One of its slogans, for 
example, is “arm yourself with knowledge”. Like Akitsiraq, Dechinta is also 
struggling for funding and also running other sorts of courses – primarily short 
courses on Indigenous leadership with high fees to generate funding. Dechinta is 
also, however, managing to continue running semesters in a very precarious way. 
Students at Dechinta read the scholarship in the resurgence paradigm that is skeptical 
of the possibilities of late liberalism for Indigenous agency. The authors in the 
resurgence paradigm teach at and have driven the creation of Dechinta. Akitsiraq, on 
the other hand, has been shaped and taught by scholars in the constitutional, liberal 




These differences also inform the daily pedagogical arrangements and 
practices of the two projects. Most Akitsiraq programming resembles the classroom-
based learning that most readers of this thesis will be familiar with. It happens in 
Nunavut’s capital Iqaluit in a room at Nunavut Arctic College, at desks, with a 
whiteboard and a lecturer standing at the front. It requires reading and writing – 
perhaps especially so due to its focus on law. Akitsiraq is aware and critical of the 
links between conventional pedagogy and colonialism and does differ in its unusual 
community-determined admissions criteria, its demographic, its emphasis on oral 
communication, its location, and its Elder-in-Residence. I discuss these in Chapter 5.  
 
Dechinta, on the other hand, is located in the bush and looks very different to 
a Southern university classroom. Students live on-site for six weeks and instructors 
are flown in. Throughout the day, students might hunt, fish, or make camp, led by 
two local elders. Weather is a significant determining factor here. Each course is co-
taught between a university professor and an indigenous elder or other local leader – 
combining indigenous and academic knowledge. ‘Courses’ are not separated out 
from life or each other, however, but are woven into each other and into the day. 
Students read texts, like Slash and also much of the decolonization theory I draw on 
in this thesis, and write assignments. They then relate these reading and writing tasks 
to their practical and lived experience in the bush. This combination of bush and 
university practices is not remotely a smooth synthesis of pedagogies, and I discuss 
its tensions and their significance in Chapter 6.  
 
When I talk about the projects in this thesis, however, I am talking not just 
about their programming, but at least as much about their advocates, their 
organizational and institutional set-ups and processes, and participants’ hopes and 
aims. These parts of the movement for a Northern university often happened outside 
the classroom. Participants explained, analyzed and promoted their projects in 
publicity, in bids for funding and recognition, in board rooms and meetings, in 
emails, and in coffee shop conversations. It is in these contexts outside of classrooms 
that participants most often, openly and fiercely discussed how they understand their 
own projects as modes of decolonizing political agency and action. It is in these 
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institutional and informal settings that I worked primarily, and in which I participated 
as a PhD researcher, research assistant, tutor and friend, during multiple trips over 
the course of three years. In these ways the current project resembles both an 
institutional ethnography (Smith, 2005) and an educational ethnography (Ball, 
1994:1-13). My approach is primarily informed, however, by praxiographic (Mol, 
2002:31-33), genealogical (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984) and autoethnographic 
methodological traditions, which I describe in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
My aims in this section are two-fold. First, I introduce the empirical contexts 
and cases for the current thesis. My hope is that the reader is now able to imagine, at 
least in part, what I mean when I say ‘Akitsiraq’ or ‘Dechinta’, and also to have 
some sense of what Indigenous politics in northern Canada involve. My second aim 
is to show that these contexts and cases are iterations of the late liberal agency 
problem I described in the previous section. The functions of education in producing 
and regulating the meaning of politics has, I have argued, made education a key way 
in which anti-colonial and Indigenous actors are seeking agency as well as contesting 
the conditions for their own political action.  The resurgence and constitutional 
paradigms can both be seen to weave through Northern Indigenous politics in general 
and higher education specifically. Dechinta and Akitsiraq might be seen as aligning 
with the resurgence and constitutional paradigms of decolonization respectively. 
Ultimately, however, neither project is fully determined by this division. Both 
projects are, for example, participants in the visioning session and opposed to the 
state’s hold on the Colleges. They interact with each other and perceive each other as 
allies across the contested divide between state and resurgence modes of politics. 
This is one tiny and introductory instance of the central argument of this thesis. 
When faced with the problem of their own agency, participants in Northern 
education do not subscribe fully to one form of agency or another. Although they 
have leanings, they are not wholly aligned with either liberal or resurgence narratives 
of anti-colonial political action. Instead, they articulate and practice a multitude of 
different forms all in relation to each other.  
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1.3 Ethical action dilemmas  




What should we do?  
Asked frequently, and in many different settings, it is important to understand 
that, as an honest, engaged question, there is nothing wrong with it. However, if the 
question is a dishonest one, then it only serves to perpetuate all the negative aspects 
of colonial Settler society… 
Here, the more direct question is actually, ‘How do I restore comfort to 
myself? 
(Barker, 2010 :321) 
The roles of academic research in colonization, and visa-versa, are well-
documented. Academic researchers have repeatedly romanticized, homogenized and 
denigrated Indigenous peoples (Francis’s [1992] Imaginary Indian catalogues these; 
see also Berkhofer’s [1978] White Man’s Indian). Political theorists have theorized 
the meanings of politics and social order against Indigenous others (as in Locke 
[1980:19] and Rousseau, [1968]). Politically authoritative disciplines like Politics, 
History and International Relations have excluded Indigenous voices and truths, 
relegating them to fiction in Literature or culture in Anthropology. This exclusion is 
exacerbated by the dominance of written over spoken forms of knowledge. 
Indigenous ontologies and epistemologies are often oral. The spoken word is more 
than a practical way of creating a text but also captures cyclical and diffuse 
conceptions of time. These temporalities are linked to an emphasis on the changing 
seasons, which provide the backdrop to much Indigenous life and are the focus of 
much Indigenous history (Gill, 2002:89). This approach is often dismissed by non-
Indigenous academics and politicians as unreliable and inaccurate, with the changing 
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of times and dates between tellings of a story ostensibly invalidating them as modes 
of knowledge production (Godard, 1990:149; Hoy, 2001; Shoemaker, 2002).  
Indigenous ways of knowing, being and speaking have therefore been 
excluded from academic knowledge and the political knowledge that academia 
informs. At the same time, academic knowledge forms often align with autological, 
economic, juridical and linear-progressive liberal logics of action. Academic 
knowledge forms are autological when they assume that knower (actor), knowing 
(action) and knowledge (outcome) are separable. They are linear-progressive in this 
sense as well as in their emphasis on writing and enlightenment. They are juridical in 
their bureaucratic contexts and emphasis on formal qualifications as well pedagogy 
as ‘knowledge delivery’. Academic knowledge forms are economic, as Joanna 
Williams (2013) describes, when education is articulated and operates as a market 
commodity. When I examine the daily spatio-temporalities of Akitsiraq and Dechinta 
in Chapters 5 and 6, show how all these colonizing and liberal aspects of 
pedagogical, administrative, research and knowledge practices connect in the 
everyday realities of universities.  
This historical entanglement of academic work and colonization is the subject 
of many critiques and histories. I do not wish to repeat it here. Rather, I first want to 
point out that the way in which universities and colonization are entangled implicates 
me, a white academic, in the problem I am studying. This implication is further 
complicated in the current thesis by the complicity of academic norms in liberal 
logics of politics and action. I am working, therefore, within the entanglement of 
liberalisms, colonization and universities. I am connected in this way with research 
participants. I discuss the entanglement of liberal agency, academic work and 
colonial power empirically in Chapter 3. In this section I explain that, for these 
reasons, one of the aims of this thesis is to explore the ethics of doing research with 
and in Indigenous communities, especially for non-Indigenous people. I argue that 
research ethics can be conceptualized as researcher agency, and that researcher 
agency must be understood in relation to the current neoliberalization of higher 
education (McGettigan, 2013; Brown and Carasso, 2013; Williams, 2013) and its 
intersections with colonization. I propose that the relational and multiple approach to 
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political agency articulated by Northern educators offers a concrete model or practice 
for doing ethical academic research. Following participants, I am also consistently 
concerned with the spatio-temporalities of the action of the research process, hence 
highlighting their significance above.  
My brief description of colonizing academic conventions above implies that 
research is performative. Research in part “enacts or produces that which it names” 
(Butler, 1993:13). The performative potential of research means that researchers 
must recognize that what they do will have effects and, I believe, be concerned with 
the politics and ethics of those effects. However, in order for knowledge to be 
performative it cannot simply state a desired reality. Knowledge must resonate 
sufficiently with an existing reality in order to be effective (Butler, 1993).  
Performative research ethics therefore involve a careful balance or relation of the 
real, the desired and the possible. This balancing act was a constant struggle for me 
in researching and writing this thesis. I wanted to resist and rework the colonizing 
academic conventions of which I am part. Yet I also wanted anti-colonial arguments 
and Indigenous politics to get taken seriously as politics in the authoritative 
disciplines of politics and IR. This meant appealing to those same colonizing 
conventions for legitimacy. Legitimacy was a problem faced by Northern educators 
too, which I explore in depth in Chapter 5. As one Akitsiraq Law School Society 
member put it, “We want legitimacy, but we don’t want too much”. 
Whether to pursue legitimacy or to refuse convention was the first of a series 
of either/or binary choices I was faced with in the first year of my PhD. That year I 
also became especially preoccupied with whether I should face ‘out’ towards the 
Indigenous, anti-colonial, non-liberal and alternative projects and communities I 
encountered, or ‘in’ towards myself and the colonizing liberal institutions I am part 
of. I was particularly concerned not to claim to represent anyone, not to judge the 
success of their efforts at self-determination, and not to deconstruct or expose them 
in any way. Not only was this not my place to do, but from a performative 
perspective, deconstructing decolonization struggles seemed to be to weaken rather 
than support them.  I was also concerned not to appropriate Indigenous realities for 
my own ends. So I turned inwards: I could speak for myself and I could deconstruct 
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the late liberal state. This, however, erased Indigenous action and agency from the 
picture and re-centred the white liberal subject and context, which after all is what 
that early colonial work had been busy constructing. For a while I decided I could 
not do the project at all. Next I decided I had an ethical obligation to do the project as 
a person who benefits from colonial, liberal and state forms of power, and who 
would reinscribe them simply by ignoring them. Returning to the project, I decided I 
had to focus squarely on Indigenous agency – that this would affirm that agency, and 
open up possibilities rather than close them down.  
This description of my thinking and shifting orientation in my first year is an 
autoethnographic snapshot of a central theme of the thesis. Like anti-colonial actors 
in the North my decisions seemed at first to be framed by these binaries. Ultimately, 
however, my intention is that the value and effects of this thesis are not in one 
approach or another, but in the dynamic relations between them. I also found myself 
faced with some of the same liberal conditions for action and authority in the 
university. The same neoliberal logics that are reordering Indigenous communities 
(Altamirano-Jimenez, 2014; Bargh, 2007) are also reordering academia in the UK 
and globally (McGettigan, 2013; Rodger and Brown, 2013; Williams, 2013). In this 
way, I found my ethical problem co-evolved with the agency problem faced by 
participants. I followed participants’ approaches in navigating my own agency as a 
research in an academic context that I shared with them. For these reasons my 
methodology has an autoethnographic component and I document my ethical 
struggles throughout the thesis.  
Through this documentation I highlight the uses and limits of existing ethics 
strategies in Indigenous contexts. These include the widely used post-structuralist 
practices of positionality, identity, reflexivity, introspection, silence and deference. 
My work is very much informed by the same spirit and critiques from which they are 
drawn, and I used all of them at some point in the course of my research. However, 
when read through the context of Northern higher education and its participants’ 
critiques of late liberalism, these strategies were also shown to be sometimes aligned 
inadvertently with the logics they sought to refuse. I conclude that post-liberal 
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agency can provide a new and productive framework for thinking about and 
practicing research ethics more generally.  
1.4 Thesis narratives 
The form of the thesis mirrors its substantive emphasis on interconnection 
and relation, as well as my ambivalence regarding linear-progressive academic 
conventions. These conventions and my reservations are noted above and elaborated 
in Chapter 3. Structurally, the thesis works two ways. You can begin here and work 
your way through to the end through successive and chronological elements of the 
research process: literature, background, methodology, the cases and analytical 
discussion.  I have written it this way in order to perform my own grasp on and 
intelligibility within academic norms and to demonstrate this thesis is worthy of 
legitimacy in the form of a PhD. I discuss the intersections of this strategy with the 
spatio-temporalities of liberalisms and ethics more fully in Chapter 3. 
At the same time, threads of agency weave between contexts, people and 
events, and can therefore be picked up and followed as they weave back and forth 
throughout the text. No chapter or section manages to contain or fully cohere a single 
type of action. Each breaks down and draws on or spills over into the next. One 
overall effect of the thesis in either reading is to show that, for higher educational 
actors in the Canadian North, there are multiple forms of agency at work and that 
these are variously co-constituted, connected and interacting. Another effect is, 
following participants’ concerns, to illuminate the specific ontological and spatio-
temporalities of particular versions of agency, and their relations. What I mean by 
this should become clear in the rest of this section.  
In Chapter 2, I review current critical and queer literature that draws on 
Michel Foucault and Judith Butler in theorizing and documenting forms of agency, 
both liberal and otherwise. This is the primary intended audience for this thesis and 
the primary literature it draws on. I describe exactly what I mean when I say 
‘liberalism’. Liberalism is not a fixed theory or structure, but a heterogeneous, 
persistent and adaptive set of events, processes and practices, as I indicated above. I 
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show how others have critiqued liberal narratives and paradoxes of agency, as well 
as how they have responded or created alternatives to it. Finally, I highlight the 
shared empiricism of these scholars and its rationale, locating my own project in this 
same methodological and theoretical tradition. 
Chapter 3 is an account of what I did in the course of the research. My 
methodological approach is what Anne-Marie Mol calls “praxiographic” (Mol, 
2002:31). Praxiography combines an ethnographic sensibility and ethnographic 
practices with a critique of representational ethnography and a reconceptualisation of 
research as discursive praxis. My praxigraphic work within the movement for a 
Northern university allowed me to be attentive to multiple constitutive elements of 
local and messy realities and to follow them where they led,  through documents, 
policy, practices, norms and people. Bruno Latour describes this as “following the 
actor” (Latour, 2007:11-2). Praxiography also allowed me both to think the 
theoretical problem of agency through this empirical context and, ultimately, to see 
that this division was false – that the theory and practice of politics and of 
decolonization especially are co-constituted and inseparable. Crucially, this empirical 
work exposed the significance of place, ontology and multiplicity to the actors 
involved. These were not my starting points but are now central to the argument I 
have made. In Chapter 3, I describe how I came to the specific cases as well as how I 
travelled in the North, conducted interviews, reviewed public and private archives, 
and participated in Akitsiraq and Dechinta in a range of formal and informal ways. I 
also explain how my approach to research ethics evolved in the course of these 
activities, and what their implications are for how I theorize ethics in this thesis.   
Chapter 4 begins the work of tracing how anti-colonial action articulates and 
contests political agency.  I describe the politics of decolonization in Canada, 
including how they have come to be so contested and polarized. I describe two 
narratives of colonization and decolonization – liberal and resurgence – arguing that 
the emergence of these differences hangs on different accounts of agency and their 
histories. My telling of this story is inspired in part by Foucault’s genealogy 
(Foucault & Rabinow, 1984:76-97). The people and books I describe in Chapter 4 
are simultaneously the theoretical, political and empirical contexts for the thesis. The 
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projects I worked with are situated in this political context and draw on these 
thinkers and theories. Authors from the decolonization scholarship supported the 
creation of these projects, teach on them and develop their theories through them. 
They also sat in courts and occupations and participated in anti-colonial politics more 
generally. There is no clear line between theory and practice in this thesis. This 
reflects the ontological approaches of its participants, as I describe in Chapter 7.  
Chapter 4 therefore provides context and begins to document struggles over the 
meaning of political agency empirically. It also shows how these struggles are 
framed theoretically in the decolonization debate as either liberal or anti-liberal, but 
also how this division begins to break down in practice.  
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 begin with ‘late liberalism’ and ‘place’, and with 
Akitsiraq and Dechinta, respectively. In Chapter 5, I describe  how advocates for a 
Northern university and members of the Akitsiraq Law School Society understood 
and enacted self-determination and difference in late liberal terms, and with them 
autological, strategic and state-bound forms of agency and action. In Chapter 6, I 
describe how participants in both Akitsiraq and Dechinta located their own agency in 
place-based forms of authority and knowledge. This division, however, quickly 
breaks down. Neither chapter sustains a single narrative. Each keeps spilling over 
into the other, undermining the distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘otherwise’.  
This is the crux of the thesis. Even between seemingly opposed and 
competing accounts of agency, there are relations. These relations are often mutually 
enabling. Frequently, one slips or fails, facilitates or co-constitutes with, the other. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 I indicate where a thread or aside which begins in one gets picked 
up in more depth in the other. It might then occupy a few paragraphs or whole 
section, itself with threads and asides which lead back to the other chapter again. 
These relationships between chapters represent the relationships between the 
different ways in which participants in Northern education negotiated the terms of 
their own agency. The two chapters should therefore be imagined as entangled and 
can be read laterally, in either order. I hope that to some degree this effort and failure 
to divide the chapters as well as their connection in these ways captures both the 
weight of the liberal/non-liberal binary and its own limits and false promises. 
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To close, in Chapter 7, I centre these connections themselves, teasing them 
out. I focus particularly on their ontological dimension, and on how participants in 
Northern education are especially concerned with agency on an ontological level. In 
the story I tell throughout the thesis, agency is: 1. Multiple. It is as multiple as the 
moments at which it occurs because its meaning is situated in these moments. In any 
one context, such as those in which I worked, there may be more than one form of 
agency at work. 2. Relational and dynamic. By this I mean that each version of 
agency is related to another form of agency. In fact, meaning, and further forms of 
agency, are located in the relations and interstices of multiple forms of agency. These 
relations are not static or fixed, however, but are dynamic and emergent. 3. 
Ontological and especially spatio-temporal. That is, there is an ontological 
component to any account of agency, and a specific-spatio-temporality. These 
components can be taken as sites of agency or struggle, as well as of relationality, in 
themselves.  In fact, spatio-temporal norms and practices were particularly focused 
and deliberate sites of action for participants in the Northern education projects I 
worked with. 4. In addition, these ways of thinking about agency further 
problematize how we think about our own agency as researchers in universities.  
The implication of all this for thinking about decolonization, is I suggest, is a 
critique and reframing of the either/or way in which the problem is posed: both ways 
are necessarily connected. We can look to anti-colonial activities seemingly in 
opposition beyond those in this thesis and ask whether and how they might also co-
constitute or interrelate. This might in turn open up another set of political 
possibilities as well as moving the question away from ‘which’ and towards ‘how’. 
Anti-colonial actors are, I show, navigating and reworking the problems constituted 
by liberalisms for imagining post-liberal agency. They are doing this in practice by 
relating multiple forms of agency. They highlight the risks of latent liberal logics, as 
well as the possibilities of inhabiting those logics creatively. They show the 
ontological and spatio-temporal contours of liberal narratives of agency. This, in 
turn, points to ontology and spatio-temporality as sites of agency itself, for contesting 
the meaning of agency, and for further interrogating narratives of political action. 
Finally, in the Epilogue, I return to the question of ethics and action in the neoliberal 
university. The forms of agency I articulate in this thesis are, I suggest, also ways to 
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understand and practice academic work, including but not limited to anti-colonial 
research ethics. All these features of agency are, I argue, ways of navigating the 
dilemmas identified by the critical and queer literatures with which I began above. 
As such, they are grounds from which to imagine post-liberal agency. 
Notes on Terminology 
The terminology used in this thesis is inseparable from its object of 
discussion. Laden and clumsy language around Indigeneity is a legacy of the 
constructed, politically charged and contested histories of the words Indigeneous, 
Aboriginal, native and Indian.  It is a testimony to this legacy that despite the large 
body of literature in the area, the language necessary to deal with the nuances of the 
situation is still absent. Any existing term is insufficient, while the boundaries 
between the terms hardly exist. In the course of my fieldwork, I encountered people 
who shunned any catch-all category in favour of their specific nations or 
communities (such as Dene or Inuit). I encountered arguments that there are 
commonalities across a catch-all category, or strength and leverage to be gained 
through using one single term. Some participants denounced settler words like 
‘Indian’ and ‘Eskimo’, while others still identify strongly with them and the weight 
of colonial history. Inuit sometimes jokingly identify with the ‘E numbers’ tattooed 
by the state for identification on their arms. Alongside all this, any of these words 
might be capitalized to show that Indigenous is a proper noun, an identity, 
nationhood, or an imagined community. The resurgence paradigm uses ‘Indigenous’, 
almost exclusively. Alternatively the lower case can be used to naturalize and fix the 
quality indigenous. The Canadian Federal Government has issued its own 
proclamation on terminology: Aboriginal with a capital ‘A’ (Communications 
Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs, 2002). The variety is endless and each variation 
comes with its own politics and significance.  
In this thesis I use the terminology of the source I am discussing, in reference 
to the specific categorization of that source, wherever possible. For example, I use 
‘Indian’ with reference to settler sources, and ‘Aboriginal’ when referring to those of 
the current Canadian state. I always use the words an individual participant identifies 
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with, as I have done with the fictional participant Slash above. Often, however, when 
talking about a group of people this simply is not possible. In these cases I use 
‘Indigenous’. I use the capital ‘I’ for the reasons described above. Additionally the 
word ‘Indigenous’ is increasingly the norm in academia, with which I am to speak. 
‘Indigenous’ also distinguishes my narrative from that of the Canadian or colonial 
government, which both use different terms (my hunch is this is also the reason for 
its prevalence in academic work). If I am honest, perhaps this also reflects my own 
leanings towards the resurgence paradigm – if for no other reason than to hold 




2. Agency beyond resistance 
 
…all forms of politics require and assume a particular kind of a 
subject that is produced through a range of disciplinary practices that are at 
the core of the regulative apparatus of any modern political arrangement…. 
How does a particular conception of the self require and presuppose different 
kinds of political commitments? Or to put it another way, what sort of subject 
is assumed to be normative within a particular political imaginary  
 
(Mahmood, 2012:33). 
  This chapter is about what I mean when I say ‘liberal agency’, ‘late 
liberalism’ and ‘agency’ in this thesis. When I say ‘liberal agency,’ I mean a specific 
cluster of logics and practices, in which agency is understood as autological, juridical 
and linear-progressive. The chapter is organized in three sections, each building 
substantively and theoretically on the next. In the first section of this chapter I 
describe how these logics and practices operate and repeat as well as vary in what 
Elizabeth Povinelli calls “late liberalism” (Povinelli, 2011:25). These logics and 
practices include the universal subject and rational action of classical liberalism, the 
economic power and values of neoliberalism, and the reduction of difference to 
culture and law of late liberalism.   
In discussing these three accounts of political action and their entanglement 
my intention is not to give a comprehensive account of liberalism (a project I am not 
sure is wholly possible, but has been attempted elsewhere [e.g. Losurdo, 2011; 
Richardson, 2001]). Rather, it is to identify and illustrate the logics I call liberal, with 
which participants are grappling on the ground, and to which I return repeatedly 
throughout the thesis. It is also not my intention to use the term ‘liberal’ as 
pejorative. While I will show that it is the case that liberalisms are bound up in 
violence (particularly colonial violence), it is not my aim to pass judgment on the 
strategies of participants in this thesis, liberal or otherwise. Nor is it to speculate on 
what kind of violence might come with alternatives.  
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In the second section I turn to critical and queer critiques of these liberal 
versions of agency as mythological and/or violent. I draw primarily on Michel 
Foucault (1978, 1982, 1997, 1991; Foucault, Rabinow & Faubion 2000) and Judith 
Butler (1990, 1993). I am less interested in why liberal narratives of politics and 
action are ‘bad and wrong’ (this seems now to be a given in critical and queer 
studies), and more interested in the theoretical and epistemological shifts that either 
drive or are effects of these theorists’ critiques. I read Foucault and Butler as 
empiricists. In calling them ‘empiricists’, I do not mean they are representationalists. 
Rather, I mean they look to people and practices outside of books and abstract 
theory, and they approach agency as embedded, situated, practiced and therefore 
varied and contingent. Their ‘critiques’ are in fact accounts of agency practices that 
undermine the liberal narrative (not abstract criticisms). These accounts show that 
liberal agency is an idea or theory of what agency is and also an inseparable 
collection of materials, practices, knowledge, people, relations and processes that 
constitute the conditions for action at any given moment. It is the theory and 
epistemology of this literature which become the grounds and methodology of the 
current thesis. At the end of the second section, I use Saba Mahmood (2012) and 
Karen Barad’s (2007) engagements with Foucault and Butler to expand their 
conceptual and methodological approaches and make them more resonant with the 
settler-colonial contexts in which I worked.  
Foucault and Butler have inspired countless scholars to expose the 
persistence and contingency of liberal forms of agency across multiple contexts, as 
well as to locate, follow and relate resistant or alternate forms of action (myself 
included). In the third section, I review some of this work, turning to the central 
audience for this thesis. I review scholarship which attempts to articulate non-, anti- 
or even post- liberal forms of political action and which theorizes agency 
empirically, in situ and in practice (Cvetkovich, 2012; Halberstam, 2011; Povinelli, 
2011; Mahmood, 2012; Weiss, 2011). I then re-read that same scholarship, to show 
how liberal forms of agency are diverse and adaptive – as well as re-appearing, 
persistent and latent, in unexpected moments. This field is populated by studies 
(generally ethnographies, but not always) of people doing things in specific contexts, 
and of how those people understand their activities and contexts. The current thesis is 
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one such study and, I believe, contributes a pressing site of investigation to the 
conversation.  
2.1 Late liberalism  
The aim of this section is to make clear what I mean when I talk about late 
liberal agency in this thesis. I describe late liberalism as an entanglement of classical 
liberal, neoliberal, and liberal democratic logics and practices. I argue that 
autological, juridical, economic and linear-progressive rationalities emerge and 
persist across these varied and contingent liberalisms. Today these rationalities 
constitute the meaning of political action and agency in late liberalism. While I do 
locate liberalisms and ideas about political agency as emerging historically and over 
time, I do not aim to give a comprehensive account or history of liberalisms (such 
accounts, to the extent that they are possible, have been attempted elsewhere [e.g. 
Losurdo, 2011; Richardson, 2001]). Rather, it is to identify and illustrate the logics, 
norms and practices that I call liberal in this thesis and with which people are 
grappling in Northern Canada. This section is therefore a touchstone for the thesis as 
a whole and I refer repeatedly back to it with the words ‘liberal’, ‘autological’, 
‘juridical’, ‘economic’ and ‘linear-progressive’ throughout the thesis.  
I have borrowed the term “late liberalism” as well as much of my 
understanding and use of the term from Elizabeth Povinelli’s Economies of 
Abandonment (Povinelli, 2011). Late liberalism is, Povinelli describes, the form 
“liberal governmentality has taken as it responds to a series of legitimacy crises in 
the wake of anticolonial, new social movements, and new Islamic movements,” 
(Povinelli, 2011:25). It is, she says, the present form of “European and Anglo-
American governance,” which has “neoliberalism and multiculturalism,” as “two of 
its key pillars,” (Povinelli and DiFruscia, 2012:76). Late liberalism is, I argue here, 
the terrain of struggle with which northern educators operate.  
Elizabeth Povinelli is writing from Australia which is a settler-colonial state 
like Canada. Povinelli’s story is about much more than Indigenous politics and about 
much more than Australia, but it is these that are of interest here.  In Australia, 
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Povinelli describes how “liberal governmentality,” has responded to Indigenous 
challenges to its legitimacy by creating late liberal mechanisms for Indigenous self-
determination (Povinelli, 2011:25). These mechanisms include the political rhetoric 
of cultural recognition, as well as legal and economic codification or 
commodification culture and Indigenous subjecthood. The function of the emergence 
of these forms of self-determination is, Povinelli argues, to “make a space for culture 
to care for difference without disturbing key ways of configuring experience – 
ordinary habitual truths,” (Povinelli, 2011:26; see McNay [2007] and Fraser [2000] 
for these functions of recognition beyond settler-colonialism).  
Povinelli shows that when Indigenous peoples have asserted their own modes 
of politics, being and knowing against those of the neoliberal settler-colonial state, 
the state has responded by reducing Indigeneity and Indigenous difference to culture, 
commodity and legality. Culture, commodity and legality do not ultimately disrupt 
the neoliberal state, but extend and project its logics. Instead late liberal forms of 
governance protect the neoliberal and liberal forms already at work in the settler-
colonial state from threats to their logics or “ordinary habitual truths,” (Povinelli, 
2011:26). This is another expression of the agency problem addressed by this thesis: 
becoming intelligible within the terms of late liberalism for Indigenous people means 
becoming reduced to its logics. Late liberal logics are, I will show, also the logics o f 
colonization.  
I turn now to examine some of the historical emergence of the late liberal 
present I have described thus far. To do this I take liberal theorists and events as 
some of liberal agency’s many constitutive practices. I also draw on scholars who are 
critical of liberalism as secondary sources who have already documented those 
practices and their effects empirically.  Late liberal logics of action are autological, 
juridical, economic and have specific spatio-temporal dimensions. I focus on these 
aspects of liberalisms and their entanglement here. The “autological subject,” is the 
universal, autonomous and strategic subject of classical liberalism (Povinelli, 
2011:13). This actor is autonomous in the sense that he exists prior to the world and 
to his own action. His action and its object are separable from him. He acts 
deliberately or rationally towards a particular end. His agency is power that is held or 
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exercised. I am using ‘he’ here to indicate that the liberal subject is gendered 
(McNay, 2000:1-30). All these aspects of autological action are divisible and are 
organized through forwards-motion in linear time. This actor might be chained, his 
capacity reduced, but he can also be freed, emancipated or enlightened.  
Autological action, as described here, is embodied in Enlightenement social 
contract theory. I take the hugely varied thinkers of Hobbes (1996), Locke (1980) 
and Rousseau (1968) as exemplary of social contract theory). An already-existing 
social contractor (the actor) enters into a social contract rationally and deliberately 
(the action) in order to protect his own interests by creating society (the outcome). 
Often this is to escape the state of nature (the prior), further extending linear time. 
Even when the social contract or state of nature is imagined as a thought mechanism 
rather than a reality, this imagining still relies on the logics of linear and progressive 
time. Of particular relevance for the current thesis, these enlightenment logics of 
action have been and continue to be articulated against an Indigenous other or 
outside (see examples below).  
Also of importance for the current thesis, the autological actor within 
classical liberalism underpinned the emergences of the nation and state. The nation 
and state, in turn, began to become synonymous with ‘politics,’ and autological 
actors became citizens (Shaw, 2008). State, nation and citizen were all opposed to 
Indigeneity, making colonialism, state and liberalism entangled historically. For 
Hobbes (1996), Locke (1980) and Rousseau (1997), for example, the romantic or 
barbaric Indigenous “savage” (Hobbes 1996:85) was part of the rationale for the 
creation of the state, and an opposite against which the civilized European subject 
was imagined. For these scholars the savage, real or imagined, was ‘prior’ to 
civilization, and civilization represented progress.  
 Even if the prior, progress and civilization existed concurrently, they were 
understood as related successively in linear time. For Locke, the barbaric nature of 
this “savage,” justified colonialism and slavery (Locke, 1980:19). Locke wrote this 
justification into his theory of private property and natural rights (ibid).  Today, 
judges and politicians still use Hobbes and Locke to justify ongoing settler-
colonialism in Canada. Karena Shaw (2008) documents this use by judges. Thomas 
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Flanagan, a scholar and Conservative politician, uses Locke himself (Flannagan, 
2008:42). These are just a few ways in which the autological actor and colonialism, 
as well as property and the state, have emerged in inseparable relation with each 
other.  
In his Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey (2005) shows how 
autological action and actors have since informed and become reduced to economics 
in neoliberalism. In fact, all rationality and value has been narrowed to the free 
market and its associated processes and values of privatization, marketization and 
productivity (as well, of course, as state regulation) [Harvey, 2005]. If we are good 
we will earn money which means success, and if we earn money and success this 
means we must be good. This economic good and system of measurement and 
explanation functions in similar universalizing and progressive ways to the good of 
civilization, but it is also substantively different. It narrows the realities attendant to 
neo liberal forms of governance and the functions of the state to economics 
(Foucault, 2010). Actors in neoliberalism are still autological, but are now also 
specifically consumers, investors, workers and so-on. Again, in neoliberal logics the 
economic worker or consumer might chose to work or buy rationally, acting in linear 
time. They might also have more or less agency in the form of capital. Subject, 
action and outcome are here all understood as fixed and separable. 
As Povinelli describes, neoliberalism is not external to late liberalism. 
Neoliberalism is, in fact, one of late liberalism’s key pillars. What neoliberal logics 
mean for Indigenous communities is that all Indigenous successes, failures, voice and 
agency get reduced to economic logics. For example, they can self-determine by 
selling their lands or resources (their relationship to land being articulated, by the 
state, as property). They can protest by suing their governments (as the national Inuit 
organization does [see Chapter 5]). They can be compensated for colonial wrongs 
financially (as they are by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission). Indigenous 
people are also in need of economic development (I discuss this at length in Chapter 
5). At the same time, ongoing settler-colonialism is being justified in these same 
classical liberal and neoliberal logics (Altamirano-Jimenez, 2014; Barge, 2007). 
Rights to development and/or resource extraction on Indigenous lands are being sold 
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by governments, while more and more service delivery to Indigenous communities is 
being privatized.  Concurrently paternalistic intervention is being justified on the 
basis of the lack of economic development (this echoes the civilization argument) 
[Smith, 2005]. In all these ways, autological neoliberal logics of political action run 
through the late liberal state narratives of Indigenous self-determination, and bind the 
liberal state with settler-colonialism. Again, this leads directly to the agency 
dilemmas of anti-colonial actors in the North.  
Finally, in late liberalism, the autological actor becomes the cultural or legal 
subject. Someone is Indigenous by virtue of their recognition as such by the state. In 
the Canadian North, for example, the state recognizes people as Status Indians 
(Dene), Band Members, Inuit, Inuvialuit and Aboriginal. These are all overlapping 
legal categories. The burden of proof is on the Indigenous person in order to claim 
the rights granted to them by the Canadian state. Indigeneity in this line is not a 
different way of being or acting, but simply a cultural practice that can be codified 
and implemented in law. In the North, culture is observed, written-up as lists of 
principles, and then applied in the work of government. The Government of 
Nunavut, for example, has a list of eight Inuit principles it seeks to implement in all 
its areas of operation (Henderson, 2008:190; see Chapter 6 for a full discussion). 
Culture can only be, in this light, that which is commensurable with liberal logics. 
Making difference commensurable by reducing it to culture is, as I have explained, a 
key tenet of late liberal governmentality. At the same time, power and agency are 
understood as human rights and institutional capacity. Like culture, rights and 
capacity are held and exercised like objects by individuals (Kulchyski, 2013 
[Kulchyski also argues these individuals are implicitly European]). Human rights are 
recognized and granted by state and international institutions. Capacity is the ability 
to act within the terms of those same institutions. As well as being autological, this 
conceptualization of power and action as state tools that can be acquired, held and 
exercised is what Foucault calls juridical (Foucault, 1978:89-91). In all these ways, 
the threads of autological agency run through classical, neo and late liberalisms. In 




Following educational actors’ concerns in the current thesis, I want to 
highlight the forms of spatio-temporality at work in this account. Povinelli uses the 
phrase “chronotope of late liberalism” to draw attention to late liberalism’s spatio-
temporal contours (Povinelli, 2011:25-29). The “chronotope” is theorized by Mikhail 
Bakhtin who describes it as the “interconnectedness of time and space” (Bakhtin, 
1982:84). Bakhtin is talking about novels, but I am talking more generally. The 
chronotope is the particular way in which forms of spatiality and temporality are 
understood, enacted and connected at any given moment (Bakhtin, 1982:85). This 
spatio-temporal configuration creates meaning and possibility. This includes, 
Bakthin explains, what forms of actor, action and agency are at work, or could be. 
The chronotope of late liberalism is therefore the spatio-temporalities that are at 
work in late liberalism, around which it operates and which enable its constituent 
actors and action.  
Povinelli is concerned particularly with the temporalities of the “endurance 
and the endurant,” [2012:31] in the chronotope of late liberalism. Here I build on 
Povinelli’s account by engaging the linear-progressive temporalities I have described 
thus far. I show how these work across liberalisms and combine with and organize 
stagnant, universal notion of space. This is again exemplified by John Locke. 
Locke’s (1980) ideas about temporal progress and forwards-moving civilization 
justify imperial spatial expansion and practices of land occupation and cultivation by 
settlers in north America. Linear chronological clock time is, more generally, an 
organizing logic of western modernity (Harvey, 1989; Adam, 1998; Levine, 2006). 
Space, on the other hand, has been reduced to an object or commodity (Harvey, 
2003). These versions of both time and space are universalized (understood to be the 
same everywhere and always).  
In this thesis I argue that the chronotope of late liberalism is also the 
chronotope of settler colonialism. The same spatio-temporal logics drive and 
underpin the settler colonial state as those that underpin colonization. It is this 
chronotope that is the target of the actors in place-based education projects that I 
describe in Chapter 6. This fleshing-out of the spatio-temporal relationship of settler-
colonialism and late liberalism is one of the contributions of the current thesis. So are 
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its implications: the chronotope of settler-colonialism and late liberalism suggests 
that a post-liberal agency might involve paying attention to and reworking its spatio-
temporalities. I go further into this account of the chronotope of late liberalism in 
Chapter 6, drawing on participants’ own accounts of these spatio-temporalities. I also 
argue that participants point to one way in which this reworking might be done.  
The presence of these multiple interrelated forms of liberalism is particularly 
visible in the Canadian North. The Northern cities feel very much like I imagine an 
early frontier town would: with plenty of do-gooders, gold-seekers and adventurers 
and a sharp division of prospecting white incomers, government officials and poorer 
Indigenous people. This looks like early, classical liberal colonialism: civilizers, 
progress-usherers and explorers. They are also mired in neoliberal imperatives and 
realities: the commodification and exploitation of land, particularly through mining, 
and the creation of Indigenous subjects as financial beneficiaries and workers around 
these emerging projects and logics. Finally, as Indigenous peoples in Canada, Inuit, 
Dene and Metis in the North are also participants in the containment of difference as 
culture. All of these things are happening now, simultaneously – all are iterations of, 
but not reducible to, the forms of liberalism I described above. 
Before I conclude this account of late liberalism and late liberal agency, I 
want to reiterate that I take politics and agency to be locally and contingently 
constituted. This means that I do not seek to posit a universal or fixed account of 
what agency is, liberal or otherwise. Juridical and autological forms of agency are 
persistant, but not inherent. They are resonant and related across contexts, but not 
unified (Latour describes how this happens in practice [2007]). Liberal agency, then, 
manifests both as stories and in practices. These include but are not limited to 
political theory, governments, activism, state institutions, social norms and all the 
moments and events that constitute life within late liberalism. Liberalism is, in this 
thesis, therefore not a political ideology or theory (although it certainly includes 
theories) but a related multitude of ways of delineating and regulating politics itself.  
Povinelli calls this “a symphony of liberalisms” (Povinelli, 2011). When I say liberal 
agency in this thesis, then, I invoke its chronotope, its histories and its juridical and 
autological forms, but I also recognize its countless variations and variability.  
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2.2 Critiques  
This section is about how Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, as well as 
others who follow them, have challenged the liberal account of agency as autological 
and argued instead that it is heterogeneously and contingently constituted. They have 
shown both that the liberal narrative of political action is false and that it is a very 
real way of organizing people, lives and thought. On this latter point critical and 
queer scholars have shown how politics defined by and around the liberal and 
neoliberal state necessarily oppress or exclude certain groups of people and forms of 
life, from queer people (Wingard, 2013), to Indigenous people (Shaw, 2008), to 
disabled people (Soldatic and Chapman, 2010; Grover and Soldatic, 2012). This 
means that resistance and self-determination for these groups expressed in liberal 
terms (“the emancipatory model of agency” [Saba Mahmood discussing Judith 
Butler and Seyla Benhabib [Mahmood, 2012:20]) holds not only false promises, but 
also the risk of repeating the violence they seek to transform. While these critical and 
queer critiques of the accuracy and ethics of liberal narratives of agency are 
important (and in part motivate the current thesis), this section focuses on how these 
scholars problematize agency and begin to articulate accounts of subjectivity and 
action that challenge the liberal logics described above.  This problematization 
enables the specific empirical accounts of post-liberal and latent liberal agency that I 
go onto describe in the following section, and  contribute to with this thesis. I begin 
with Foucault because critical and queer scholarship is so indebted to his work. With 
the exception of Foucault, however, for the rest of this chapter I limit my review to 
authors who are currently participating in an ongoing conversation about liberal 
agency. After I introduce Foucault’s work on agency, I discuss Butler’s development 
of it. Finally, I use Saba Mahmood (2012) and Karen Barad’s (2007) engagements 
with Butler to make Butler’s (and Foucault’s) approaches more resonant with the 
settler-colonial and Indigenous contexts of the current thesis.  
Foucault’s critique of liberal agency is two-fold. First, he shows how the 
autological subject of liberal agency is far from universal, but has emerged 
historically. Inspired by Foucault, I described some of this historical emergence in 
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the previous section.  In what Foucault (1982) describes as his “history of the 
subject,” he looks similarly to historical moments and processes to show how 
particular forms of subjectivity come to be understood and articulated locally. He 
also shows how these forms of subjectivity are tied to the modes of government at 
work at the time. For example, in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault 
discusses the Christian confessionalism that he sees as having become a central 
feature of modern life. Confession began with Christianity but its logics now operate 
in all areas of life (Foucault, 1978). We have become obsessed, he argues, with “the 
infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself” (ibid:59) and “the obligation to 
confess is now relayed through so many different points…that we no longer perceive 
it as the effect of a power that constrains us” (ibid:60). The concept and act of 
confession, he explains, produces the subjects that supposedly confesses: “The 
confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of 
the statement” (ibid:61). The subject that confession assumes, and in fact produces, is 
single self who can be freed or rid of ones guilt and sins through self-reflection, self-
knowledge and ultimately confession. Here, Foucault illustrates the relation of 
knowledge to subject (subjects are known and knowable) and therefore knowledge to 
power more generally. I draw on this relation in Chapter 3 when discussing 
Indigenity, the state and the politics of recognition. He also suggests that confession, 
and with it the autonomous subject, have become naturalized. 
To take another example (and to show how Foucault’s analysis works across 
contexts), in What is an Author? Foucault (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984:101-120) 
gives a similar account of “the author function”. The author function is, he argues, 
the production of the unified individual author-subject as an effect of the attribution 
of a body of writing to a single person. While this subject is related to the subject of 
confession, it is also historically specific in that it serves a disciplinary purpose: 
allowing writers to be regulated, identified and punished for the transgression of law. 
In this way, the author is produced by this rationality of governance, but is also a 
nexus of law, policing and knowledge. In his accounts of confessionalism and the 
author function, then Foucault shows that the subject does not precede forms of 
government and power in the form of human capacity, but is produced through and 
with those forms. As Saba Mahmood summarizes,  “the set of capacities inhering in 
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a subject – that is, the abilities that define her modes of agency – are not the residue 
of an undominated self that existed prior to the operations of power but are 
themselves the products of those operations” (Mahmood, 2012:17). This subject 
looks like the autological actor of liberalism, but is produced very differently. For the 
current thesis, its entanglement with modes of government is particularly relevant. In 
the next chapter I describe how Indigenous subjectivity has emerged similarly with 
the late liberal settler-colonial state.  
Foucault is notoriously pessimistic about the possibility of escaping these 
modes of government, but he is nonetheless concerned with resistance and, in my 
reading, agency. Resistance, he argues, is always present. In fact, it is co-produced 
with the processes of subjectivation described above: “Where there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power” (Foucault, 1978:95).  Importantly, this is not a 
theory of resistance or agency as such. Rather, it is a call to look for their specific 
operations at any given moment – and always in relation to the operations of 
government and power.  
In my reading, Foucault does precisely this. He looks for forms of agency that 
relate to dominant narrative and modes of action at a given moment, and that rework 
them, but do not escape them. For Foucault, “ethics” understood as “technologies of 
the self” are one such practice (Foucault, Rabinow & Faubion, 2000: 225). 
Techniques of the self are practices, techniques and knowledge that permit 
“individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others, a certain number 
of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being” 
(ibid). Of course, this could look like the confessionalism described above. However, 
in Foucault’s account, these can also be technnologies for self-transformation. 
Foucault reminds us, however, that this form of agency is “never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power” (Foucault, 1978:95). The subject is a mode of 
government, after all, but can act on that mode by acting on herself, and can act on 
herself by acting on the mode.   
To take another example (and one I return to late in the thesis), in What is 
Critique, Foucault describes Reformation Protestant’s “critique” as another moment 
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of agency or, as he says, of “not being governed thus” (Foucault, 1997:28-30). To 
resist the dominant arts of government of the church, Foucault’s Reformation 
Protestants do not reject the god, biblical texts or truth status through which those 
arts govern. Instead, they re-configure their relations within and against the 
government of the church to shift authority from the priest to the text and its reader. 
Foucault’s Protestants therefore emerge through, work with and strategically 
mobilise the dominant terms and arts of government – in ways which make them 
intelligible and desirable in those terms whilst also questioning and destabilising 
them and their dominance. This creates a critical space from which some alternate 
version of politics and authority are then articulated – and with them alternate agents. 
The agency of critique for Foucault is therefore a reconfiguration of existing forms of 
government and knowledge, from within those forms, to change the forms 
themselves. It is a form of refusal, of “not being governed thus, by that, in that name, 
for those ends,” which nonetheless draws some strength and intelligibility from that 
form – from “thus”, “that”, “that name” and “those ends” (Foucault, 1997:28-30).  
This is more, however, than a simple rejection. It creates ‘new’ forms of government 
and subjectivity, in the form of Protestantism. This is another scenario in which 
action and agency do not align with the dominant terms of action, actor and agency 
(this time those of the church).  
Critique is a particularly useful way of thinking about action in the context of 
education and research because it makes the nexus of knowledge and modes of 
government central and explicit. It captures, for me, the type of governmental refusal 
for which anti-colonial activists are reaching. I will therefore return to it in Chapter 
6. I want to emphasize here, however, that Foucault is talking about knowledge in 
practice not simply in scholarship (even Butler’s [2001] version of critique is 
concerned primarily with critical scholarship). He is also enacting a particular 
relationship of scholarship to practice which has informed thinking about ethics in 
the context of my research. That is, he takes the actions of protestants and creates a 
narrative which further disrupts the meaning of action. Critique is happening in the 
practices of protestants and in Foucault’s story as well as in the relations of the two. I 
also want to emphasize the uncertainty and indeterminacy of Foucault’s critique:  
“Critique... is an instrument, a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor 
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happen to be, it oversees a domain it would want to police and is unable to regulate” 
(Foucault, 1997: 25). This uncertainty sits especially uncomfortably with liberal 
emphases on strategies, goals and deliberation – with the knowable, or the desire to 
know within action. This refusal to be certain or a necessary uncertainty, along with 
ambiguity and ambivalence, are all recurring themes of the activities I encountered in 
my fieldwork.  Later in the thesis I argue that they might be one quality of post-
liberal agency, too.   
Foucault’s account of the ways agency and actors are co-produced with 
modes of government informs Judith Butler’s account of the gendered subject in 
Gender Trouble (Butler, 1990). Butler is particularly concerned with the ongoing 
practices of subjectivation in daily life. Gendered subjectivation occurs, she argues, 
through discursive “iteration” of gendered norms. There is no “original” norm or 
gender, only ongoing references to one. Similarly, there is no pure individual subject 
to ‘free’.  The subject can only exist or act in and in relation to heteronormative and 
performatively constituted emerging gender norms. Yet it is precisely in this 
reference and iteration, she argues, that resistance and even change are possible. That 
is, not by destroying gender, or freeing some pre-gender subject, but by gender 
failing to reconstitute itself or being reconstituted in a way that undermines its 
legitimacy or exposes its contingency. That is, norms are stable through repetition 
but each iteration is also open to disruption. Butler points to two opportunities for 
resistance and transformation within these logics: subversion (practicing gender 
norms in a way that exposes its contingent production), and resignification (gradually 
changing the meaning of a given word or object). She posits drag as one such real-
world practice that only makes sense with reference to the gender binary but which 
nonetheless undermines its stability, working both through and against it. In this 
sense, Butler describes her account of “the iterability of performativity” as “a theory 
of agency” (Butler, 1990: xxiv).  
Butler later goes onto emphasize what, reading Foucault, she calls the “the 
paradox of subjectivation,” (Butler, 1993:15). That is, the norms that a person would 
resist, are also the same norms that enable or produce their personhood. The very 
processes on or against which a subject might seek to act are the processes that 
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enable that action. This problem recurs throughout scholarship and activism 
concerned with resisting and transforming existing power relations: action only 
becomes possible, effective or intelligible through drawing on and therefore 
repeating those power relations themselves. Stories of resistance or change are 
frequently stories of this problem and its engagement and negotiation. As I outline in 
the previous chapter, the current thesis is particularly concerned with versions of this 
seemingly paradoxical problem. It is concerned with how it manifests in the 
Canadian north, as the late liberal settler state, and how educational actors there are 
resolving and rearticulating it in practice.  
Foucault and Butler have inspired a huge body of literature on queer forms of 
resistance as well as inspiring queer politics in action. This includes the scholarship 
reviewed below, and indeed this thesis. They have also, however, been highly 
contentious amongst scholars and activists of resistance. Here, I turn to some 
accusations made against Foucault and Butler by scholars who share their political 
goals of resistance and transformation. I do this not to undermine their accounts, but 
ultimately to strengthen it and develop them for use in the current thesis. I discuss the 
accusations of Butler and/or Foucault repeating binary thinking, being overly 
linguistic, androcentrism, extending liberal logics, and being overly deterministic or 
structuralist. I do not find these accusations convincing (why I do not is not 
important here) but they do expose some of the stakes and fault lines in discussions 
of agency more generally, which are relevant to the current discussion. I draw, 
therefore, on two scholars who draw extensively on Foucault and Butler themselves, 
Saba Mahmood (2012) and Karen Barad (2007). Their critiques are therefore 
particularly nuanced and advanced versions of critiques that get made from all 
angles, post-structuralist and otherwise.  My aim is not to evaluate anything but to 
flesh out a language for talking about agency from this perspective in the rest of the 
thesis. 
Saba Mahmood (2012) argues that by focusing so fully on the ways that 
norms might be resisted, subverted or resignified, Butler homogenizes normalization 
itself and therefore repeats a binary either/or way of thinking about power. Agency 
can be located not only in resistance, Mahmood suggests, but in the different ways in 
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which norms themselves are embodied, inhabited and practiced. She shows this 
through an account of the agency of women in the Egyptian Islamic revival as they 
inhabit and embody norms in various ways: “Norms are not only consolidated and/or 
subverted, I would suggest, but performed, inhabited, and experienced in a variety of 
ways.” (Mahmood, 2012: 22). Far from being passively determined, the women 
actively and creatively follow and enact norms in varied ways. Patriarchal Islam is 
no more homogenous or determined than the feminists that critique it. Butler’s focus 
on resistance and subversion would, Mahmood argues, have obscured the potential 
for agency within norms themselves. It also risks repeating binary thinking by 
locating agency always in opposition. Mahmood explains that to assume that agency 
only happens when it leads to some political end or goal would reinscribe the 
strategic, autological, rational-acting version of agency described above. This is of 
great significance to the current thesis because, as I show in Chapter 5, even when 
participants engage liberal logics they often do so reflexively and creatively. It is also 
helps identify and avoid equating all agency with liberal agency, or articulating 
participants as victims of liberal narratives.  
Butler’s emphasis on the linguistic and words as constitutive of bodies and 
identities has been accused of obscuring the roles of materiality and the non-human 
in her account of performative discourse. Karen Barad (2007:145-146) argues that 
Butler and Foucault both focus too exclusively on the human, to the exclusion of 
non-human animals, cyborgs, machines, quantum physics, and other material 
realities. Scholars in Science and Technology Studies, and New Materialists have 
shown that much more than words and humans matter when it comes to 
understanding political life (Haraway, 1991; see also Coole and Frost, 2010). 
Indigenous communities, in fact, frequently assign agency to the land, weather, 
plants, animals and so-on, as well as their critiques of liberal ontology (I describe all 
this at length in Chapter 6). They also assign significance to these things as forms of 
government. As such, in this thesis, I have left open what might count as an agent, as 
well as what might counts as the ontological components of agency and government 
more generally (I discuss this further with regards to methodology in Chapter 3). For 
this reason, I would say this project is closer to Foucault’s eclectic ontology than 
Butler’s discursive one. 
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Finally, Butler has been accused of repackaging a liberal version of agency-
as-choice in Gender Trouble – of creating what Butler herself calls a “wardrobe” of 
gender (Butler, 1993:21), from which actors can simply choose their gender and 
other aspects of their realities and subjectivities. This wardrobe version of “doing 
gender” and performativity in general is liberal and autological in the sense that 
agency is understood as a capacity for choice that can be exercised, even though the 
reality of gender and indeed subjectivity might be constructed discursively. Butler 
explicitly rejects this criticism in Undoing Gender (1993). It is not, she says, that 
“there is a ‘one’ who is prior to gender, a one who goes to the wardrobe of gender 
decides with deliberation which gender it will be today” (Butler, 1993:21). In this 
statement, Butler rejects autological agency. Her critics flag, however, the risk of 
liberal logics creeping back into accounts which claim or aim to reject them. This 
risk is a central theme of the current thesis and very present, I argue, in the politics of 
decolonization.  
Mahmood (2012) identifies another potential instance or risk of autological 
agency in Butler’s concept of subversion. Subversion can be read, Mahmood argues, 
as a strategic redeployment of hetero-patriarchal tools to queer feminist ends. 
Strategy in this goal-oriented sense aligns with liberalism and obscures possibilities 
for agency which do not work to achieve feminist goals. By removing the aim or 
achievement of goals and ends from our analysis of action, Mahmood argues, we can 
see many more forms of agency than subversion or resignification (such as that of 
the women in the Egyptian mosque movement described above). I return to this 
potentially strategic and autological logic of subversion throughout the thesis. This 
connection of liberal action with efforts at acting otherwise, via strategy, is one of the 
slippery connections between modes of agency that I describe in Chapter 5 (and then 
further complicate through the roles of ambiguity in Chapter 6).  
In this section, through Butler and Foucault, I have set out a way of following 
agency in practice and in situ, and as neither determined by nor separable from the 
broader forms of government of which agency is part. In this way, Butler and 
Foucault both account for and depart from the liberal narratives of agency I described 
in the previous section. For them, agency is located, as Foucault describes of critique, 
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in the relationship between “that which repeats and that which transforms”, instead 
of determinism or a structure/agency opposition, we see “dynamic interplay” 
(Foucault, 1997). This relationship is the object of the current thesis. I have also, 
using Mahmood and Barad’s critiques, shown that this relationship can involve 
human and non-human, textual and non-textual components. Finally, I have argued 
for being attentive to the agential possibilities of liberalisms, as well as latent and 
creeping liberal logics and binaries in forms of action which seek to resist them.  
2.3 Alternatives 
I now turn to empirical studies of both non-liberal and agency inspired by the 
critiques outlined above. I devote most space to efforts to identify instances of 
agency that do not align with liberal logics, because that is the aim of this thesis. 
First, I turn to Saba Mahmood’s (2012) fieldwork with women in the Egyptian 
mosque movement. Then, I describe recent theories and accounts of “radical 
negativity” in affect studies (“radical negativity” was the title of a 2014 conference in 
this field). Finally, I consider Elizabeth Povinelli’s (2012) fieldwork with Australian 
Indigenous movements. Each account shows one way of articulating and engaging 
the paradox of subjectivation and tells us something different about the possibilities 
for both liberal and non-liberal agency (and their relations) in different locations. 
None of these accounts would be possible within theory alone as each draws on 
practice, on actors, and on actors’ accounts of themselves. I have chosen these three 
because, although there is a lot of literature concerned with resistance and action of 
various kinds, these three use the words ‘agency’ and ‘liberal’ to describe what they 
are doing. I have chosen them also because each has an implication for the current 
thesis. Mahmood (2012) demonstrates the necessity and potential in disaggregating 
agency from resistance and politics, as well as the possibilities for agential 
embodiment of liberal logics. Halberstam (2011) and Povinelli (2012) show the 
difficulties in identifying alternate forms of agency from within liberal academia, 
particularly when non-liberal forms of agency are unlikely to share liberalism’s 
insistence on markers of permanence, success and measurability.  
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As I noted in the previous chapter and earlier sections, the key insight 
Mahmood (2012) draws from Foucault and Butler is that agency must be researched 
empirically. Mahmood argues that if, “…the ability to effect change in the world and 
in oneself is historically and culturally specific (both in terms of what constituted 
‘change’ and the means by which it is effected), then the meaning of sense of agency 
cannot be fixed in advance, but must emerge through an analysis of the particular 
concepts that enable specific modes of being, responsibility and effectivity,” 
(Mahmood, 2012:14). She is concerned specifically with Muslim women, who are 
the subject of much feminist debate and are assumed by liberal feminists (she says) 
to be largely lacking agency. Mahmood therefore looks to Muslin women in the 
Egyptian mosque movement to see how they understand, articulate and practice 
agency, in context and in relation to the power/knowledge nexus of which these 
women are part. That is, she seeks to understand it primarily in relation to patriarchal 
Islam, the Islamic revival and Western imperialism – not some universal feminist 
goal. Looked at in this way, some instances which would be interpreted as passivity 
or subordination through the “emancipatory model of agency” (Butler, 1990:136) are 
in fact moments of agency from a local, situated point of view.  
 
In doing this, Mahmood also demonstrates the necessity of a disaggregation 
of agency, resistance and politics. She argues that by equating agency with the ‘ends’ 
of particular political goals (such as legal equality) liberal feminism has effectively 
erased both Muslim women’s own understandings of what they are doing, and an any 
possibility for action that is non-strategic and therefore non-liberal. It is possible, she 
shows, for women to be agentic in ways that do not align with a liberal feminist 
emancipatory project. By focusing on agency rather than resistance in this way, 
Mahmood offers one way of avoiding totalizing the subordination/reistance binary. 
In all this, she speaks to the very same concerns (women’s agency) of the feminists 
she critiques. Mahmood analysis is central to the rationale and approach of the 
current thesis.   
 
In a different vein, scholars in affect studies have theorized radical negativity 
and “public feelings” (this is the title of an ongoing research network) as potential 
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forms of agency within liberalism. In the Queer Art of Failure, J. Jack Halberstam 
describes failure, forgetting and mediocrity as forms of agency – that is, actions 
which are devalued and erased within the discourse of “success” so central to 
neoliberalism (Halberstam, 2011). In fact, he argues that inaction may be the only 
form of agency within a discourse where action itself is so highly prized and 
articulated. Reading Fanon, Halberstam argues that suggests that in this way, the “the 
subject refuses the knowledge offers and refuses to be a knowing subject in the form 
mandated by Enlightenment philosophies of self and other” (Halberstam, 2011:14). 
Here Halbertsam points to the possibilities of non-liberal agency in perhaps the 
unlikeliest place of all – in not acting at all. Relatedly, in Feminist Killjoys Sarah 
Ahmed (2010) has theorized grumpiness, unhappiness and rage as offering 
possibilities for agency. These “killjoy” affects contrast with liberalism’s insistence 
on happiness as a moral imperative (an imperative which condemns, she notes, 
women as “killjoys” for speaking out against their own oppression). Similarly, in No 
Future Lee Edelman (2004) makes a similar case for rejecting the future and even 
hope, as these too are closely bound up in the linear and progressive temporal logics 
of liberalism. This last point is particularly pertinent to the current thesis, in which 
participants are concerned with the kinds of temporalities underlying certain forms of 
politics.  
Finally, drawing on Heidegger and on Foucault’s heterotopias, Elizabeth 
Povinelli describes “potentiality,” as “a certain moment, or condition, in the life of 
alternative social projects – those moments, or those conditions in which a social 
project is neither something nor nothing,” (Povinelli, 2011:8). Povinelli is interested 
especially in the relation of “something” and “nothing,” in “this indeterminate 
oscillation – the virtual space that opens up in between the potentiality and actuality 
of an alternative social project” (Povinelli, 2011: 8). She argues that “the possibilities 
of new forms of life dwell and are sheltered within the variation between the force of 
existing and the power of acting in these intensified zones of being and not being” 
(Povinelli, 2011:10). What distinguishes the agency of potentiality from the 
chronotope of late liberalism is, Povinelli argues, that liberal agency is necessarily 
something fully realized, enduring and persistent. Potentiality on the other hand 
might eventually fail, vanish, or be assimilated. Only in liberal logics does this 
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ending reduce its potency or significance. Povinelli’s “potentiality,” has been 
especially helpful to me in moments when I have been unsure whether something 
‘counts’ as existing, being, or convincing within the (liberal) terms of academia that I 
share with the research participants. Like these participants, and like Povinelli’s 
social projects, I am reaching, grasping and imagining for non-liberal agency, more 
often than I am theorizing it with certainty.  Perhaps the conditions for theory or 
certainty are too strongly liberal to do so. Perhaps, as Povinelli suggests, the non-
liberal or post-liberal might necessarily fall short of or refuse these things, including 
being almost unrecognizable or convincing in academic contexts, or almost non-
existent in the world.   
I now return briefly to thinking about liberal forms of agency. By looking at 
the affective and “lived experience of neoliberalism” (Cvetovich, 2012), scholars like 
Margot Weiss (2011), Anne Cvetovich (2012), and Sarah Ahmed (2010) show the 
ways in which liberal agency is materialized heterogeneously and locally. In Weiss’s 
case this materialization happens through BDSM practices, for Cvetovich it happens 
through medicalized depression and for Ahmed it happens through the imperative to 
be happy. These scholars also show how the everyday of liberal agency resonates 
and relates across multiple locations. Liberal forms of agency appear in the current 
thesis in a similarly varied and everyday but still persistent way.   
When combined with the texts reviewed above, these accounts of agency 
make visible the impossibility of talking about either liberal or alternate forms of 
agency without also talking about the other. Ahmed (2010), for example, began with 
happiness, but developed an account of the killjoy as a potentially non-liberal agent 
in the process (as described above). Weiss (2011) finds possibilities for agency at the 
very edge of the neoliberal (in her account) BDSM scene, in race play.  Cvetovich 
(2012) finds possibilities for agency in politicized accounts of depression as the 
condition of life within neoliberalism, and also in non-medicalized responses such as 
knitting or tooth flossing. Similarly, all the texts above which begin with accounts of 
non-liberal forms of agency, also end up articulating the specific, local forms of 
liberalism to which their alternatives relate.  
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In The Promise of Happiness, Ahmed (2010) examines what she argues is 
one of the most universalized drives and desires: happiness. She identifies the forms 
of subjectivity that are foreclosed by this drive, and how narratives of happiness – 
including the happy family, happy worker and happy citizen - work to create and 
uphold forms of governmentality and power relations. Ahmed follows experiences, 
practices and articulations of happiness and unhappiness across differently classed, 
racialized and gender texts and settings, to show how the promises of happiness are 
aligned with the promises of liberalism. She is particularly concerned with moments 
of what she calls “affect alienation”: the experience of the “gap between the promise 
of happiness and how [we] are affected by objects that promise happiness,” (2010: 
42) or “feeling at odds with the world or feeling that the world is odd,” (2010: 168). 
The promise of happiness works to hide or perpetuate neoliberalism’s violence, she 
argues. Often the imperative to be happy masks unhappiness and injustice. For 
example, when the feminist at the dining room table fails to find a sexist joke funny 
and/or refuses to laugh at it, she feels alienated internally and becomes a “kill joy” 
externally. Happiness, laughter and joking in this instance are used to reinscribe a 
form of unhappiness (sexism) and then police or discipline its exposure. For Ahmed, 
as I described above, this also means non-liberal agency might be located in the 
refusal to smile, laugh, nod, to be happy or to value happiness uncritically. All these 
practices offer ways for a subject to exist or act that sit uneasily with liberalism’s 
imperative that we try to be or can be happy. Here we see the interrelation of liberal 
and non-liberal logics of action.  
Similarly, in her ethnography of the San Francisco BDSM scene, Margot 
Weiss (2011) traces what she calls “the circuits” of power between the culture and 
practices of BDSM practitioners, and the politics and economics of neo-liberalism 
and imperialism. She shows how the language of individual and civil liberties and 
privacy with which BDSM practitioners politicize (or depoliticize) their sexual 
practices and community aligns with that of neo-liberalism and racism, despite 
public and academic perceptions of BDSM as a marginal or transgressive sexuality. 
According to Weiss, the BDSM actor is white, male, affluent: an autonomous 
subject, able to make choices and actions that are understood to be removed from the 
power structures and relations in which they are in fact embedded. Claiming that 
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practices such as the slave auction or male dominance can be removed from social 
and political context as “just play”, for example, in fact enable the structures of 
dominance in those contexts to continue to operate without reflection or challenge 
(Weiss, 2011:17, 151). Conversely, Weiss shows how understandings in “the scene” 
of domination and submission between black and white practitioners as always race 
play, remove that same liberal subjectivity from black people. Weiss traces some of 
the ways in which BDSM practitioners are constituted as actors, not prior to BDSM 
practices and norms, but through them. These subjects are tied into the logics of 
neoliberalism through the constitution of an experienced and skilled expert 
practitioner through the buying and mastering of sex toys, the hosting and attendance 
of paid parties, and the attendance or delivery of classes on BDSM techniques – as 
well as through the regulation of who can or does practice BDSM. Sexuality here can 
be bought, acquired, learnt and exercised. Weiss underscores the neoliberal nature of 
this version of sexuality by showing how the same activities of power exchange, 
sadism and masochism became rearticulated from the Leather scene into the BDSM 
scene as the socioeconomics of San Francisco changed. This is an illustration of what 
Foucault and Butler (see previous section) describe as the co-production of forms of 
subject and government, once again in a local and everyday manifestation.  
In this way, Weiss’s text carefully relates economic processes and personal 
practices using “circuits” to avoid the hierarchy implied by structure and agency, or 
local and global. She shows how one moment of action (say, in a play dungeon) 
relates to another (say, in city planning) circuitously. Weiss is interested in the 
everyday but not in forgoing broader contexts and processes. Weiss also shows how 
liberal logics can creep back into action in unlikely places, even when that action 
claims to be counter-hegemonic. It is counter-intuitive, she argues, that she should 
find BDSM to be so conventional, so commodified, individualized and marketized. 
This last point is especially relevant to the current thesis. She identifies some of the 
persistently liberal logics of so-called counter-cultural action. These are the ways 
autological accounts of agency have assimilated and commodified resistance. This 
last point is, of course, a feature of late liberalism (although Weiss is discussing 
neoliberalism) and the object of much of Chapter 5 in which I discuss the possibility 
of ‘choosing’ non-liberal agency.  
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Finally, Ann Cvetovich (2012) uses an autoethnographic account of her own 
depression to show how the experience of depression is also the experience of life in 
neoliberal, capitalist society. That is, depression is a cultural, social, economic and 
therefore “public feeling”, or “cultural mood”, rather than an individual, medical or 
internal fault (Cvetovich, 2012:1-5).  The neoliberal narrative of depression suggests 
that depression is about individual psychology. Sometimes, as an illness, it is not the 
individual’s fault. At other times, when the individual fails to do something about it, 
the individual becomes personally responsible. The liberal narrative of depression 
suggests that the liberal subject can choose to act to cure herself of this illness as an 
individual. Instead, Anne Cvetovich shows how the mundane, everyday reality of 
depression is actually just the mundane, everyday reality of life in the neoliberal 
university context she works in and the capitalist society she lives in.  She traces the 
concurrence of neoliberal life and depression through various moments of her own 
life. She shows, for example, how her experiences of the supermarket and the 
academic job market are simultaneously experiences of depression and of 
neoliberalism (Cvetovich, 2012:45-46).   
Depression as a Public Feeling is more than a critique of the medical model 
of depression. It is also an attempt to rework the agency available to the depressed 
person and to Cvetovich herself. For Cvetovich, liberal agency is once again a 
violent illusion. Depression is not, in this account, an individual problem with an 
individual solution. The very thing (individualization) that is being touted as a 
solution is in fact the ‘cause’. Depression as a Public Feeling captures this duel 
nature and critique of liberalisms that is common to critical and queer scholarship as 
it works in micropractices and in the everyday. Cvetovich also attempts to locate 
other forms of understanding and hope in “slow living” (mindfulness), empathy, art, 
knitting and weaving, as well as in the critique of depression as a public feeling itself 
(Cvetovich, 2012:155-202). She is careful, however, to point out that these are 
sometimes the same techniques offered to depressed people and used to individualize 
their suffering by neoliberalism.  
My aim in reviewing these texts about forms of liberalism is to show that the 
logics of liberalisms change, adapt and persist. That is, they are just as contingent as 
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anything else. I also want to show that in changing, adapting and persisting, they can 
appear in unlikely forms, including radicalism, and including what at first glance 
looks like anti-liberalism. I also want to show that it is nearly impossible to talk 
about one part of the problem without talking about the other. Even when Weiss or 
Cvetovich set out to show how the objects of their study are liberal they cannot help 
but point to liberalism’s limits and how it might be possible to act some other way. 
Vice versa, the same is true for those scholars I take to be concerned with non-liberal 
forms of agency. When Halberstam sets out to celebrate failure, for example, he 
generates a pretty clear account of the functions of success and measurement in 
neoliberalism in that celebration. These three points inform and are elaborated in the 
current project. This last point, on the inseparability of agency from liberalism, is 
particularly salient in my efforts at imagining post-liberalism.  
Conclusion  
This chapter provides the theoretical context for the current thesis. The first 
section on agency in late liberalism outlined liberal agency as autological, juridical, 
economic and linear-progressive. These heterogeneous liberal logics are part of the 
object of this thesis, and are engaged by participants in the Akitsiraq Law School in 
particular (as I describe in Chapter 5). In the latter two sections, I used critical and 
queer literature to problematize these liberal narratives as illusory, violent,  
contingent and varied. This critical and queer literature begins with Foucault and 
Butler, and builds in their critiques of liberal forms of government and subjectivity to 
produce empirical accounts of the local workings of agency, both liberal and 
otherwise. All of the critical and queer texts I review above offer slightly different 
formulations of this problem of agency and give different empirical accounts of its 
‘resolution’ by identifiying potentially ‘non’ or ‘post’ liberal action. This variety 
reflects, primarily, scholars’ different empirical grounds.  
It is the commonalities of these critical and queer accountswhich form the 
basis for the current thesis. First, all these accounts engage some version of what 
appears in Butler’s Bodies that Matter as the “paradox of subjectivation” and in this 
thesis as a debate around the possibilities of the settler-colonial state for 
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decolonization (Butler, 1993:15). That is, all of the scholarship documents actors 
attempting to act simultaneously against, to transform and within something which 
sets the terms for action itself: “the paradox of subjectivation (assujetissement) is 
precisely that the subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not 
produced, by such norms,” (Butler, 1993:15). This is, in fact, a key framework in my 
discussion of decolonization in Canada in Chapter 4.   
Second, as I have reiterated, this body of scholarship demonstrates the need 
and possibilities for discussing agency empirically, locally and in relation to the 
specific power/knowledge nexuses or modalities of government in which they are 
embedded. Ethnography is used by most of these scholars and shown by these texts 
to be particularly suited for the task at hand, for reasons I explore  in the next chapter 
when I discuss my methodology. Despite or even through this empirical approach, all 
of the scholarship maintains the tension between theorizing or articulating agency 
and practicing or identifying it. This does not necessarily map onto a distinction 
between book theory and street theory – the scholarship has a tendency to blur or 
level the two.  This includes recognizing the embeddedness of the scholar in the 
situations they seek to understand.  
Third and finally, all of the scholarship attempts to move away from binary 
thinking by giving creative and productive accounts of agency as more than 
resistance. That does not necessarily mean that they escape the binary, and its 
persistence is a recurring theme throughout this thesis. Although most of the texts I 
describe focus on either liberal or non-liberal forms of agency, and define their 
object accordingly, none manages to talk about one without the other. They all show, 
therefore, the interrelation of liberal and alternate forms of agency.   
The literature reviewed in this thesis has therefore begun to create a language 
for thinking and talking about agency. My aim is not, however, to transplant this 
language to northern Canada (for example, by calling education “resignification,” or 
“subversion,” whether or not it is these things). My aim instead is to contribute to 
this language, by contributing an account of northern educators’ action. With this 
account, I propose that post-liberal agency, multiple relational forms of agency, 
decolonization and higher education are all necessary and productive areas for 
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expanding critical and queer understandings of politics and action. I now turn to 
draw on the concerns and approaches of the literature reviewed in this chapter to lay 




3. Space, time and research 
methodology   
 
 
I want to subvert method by helping to remake methods: that are not 
moralistic; that imagine and participate in politics and other forms of the good in 
novel and creative ways; and that start to do this by escaping the postulate of 
singularity… To do this we will need to unmake many of our methodological habits 
including: the desire for certainty; the expectation that we can usually arrive at more 
or less stable conclusions… the belief that as social scientists we have special 
insights that allow us to see further than others into certain parts of social reality.... 
But, first of all we need to unmake our desire and expectation for security.  
(Law, 2004:9 [emphasis added]).  
 
In September 2009 I participated in an induction week for new doctoral 
students at my university. As a new PhD student I sat through multiple presentations 
on the doctoral and research process. The staff and senior PhD presenters repeatedly 
turned our attention to timelines. They told us that we should use the first year to 
develop our research methodologies and skills, the second to do data collection, and 
the third for data analysis and writing up (although if we were really good, they said, 
we should be writing the whole time). This would get us to the end of a PhD in three 
and a half years (we now know this is a rarity). One induction week presenter 
welcomed us and told us: “A PhD is essentially muddling through as best you can for 
three years… and then imposing a coherent narrative at the end.” This comment 
stayed with me and has been of exceptional utility during my time as a doctoral 
student. 
The comment resonates strongly with John Law’s (2004) After Method: Mess 
in Social Science Research in which Law argues that research methodology is at core 
a way of managing mess. The social world is messy, Law says. Social science 
research methodologies are ways of making mess make sense by producing tidy 
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accounts of social life. Because knowledge is implicated in the performative 
construction of reality, he argues, social science research therefore attempts to make 
reality neater: “methods, their rules, and even more methods’ practices, not only 
describe but also help to produce the reality that they understand.” (Law, 2004:5). 
The underside of this function of research methodology is that some aspect of messy 
realities must be eliminated and excluded in the process of social science research 
and, in this logic, also from the world. The comment above shows one way in which 
we do this: our research processes are often a good deal messier than the linear and 
coherent narratives we must tell in order to demonstrate our competence and 
authority in academia.  
This chapter starts where John Law leaves off. I take it as given that reality is 
messy and that research is a performative process of ordering. Throughout the 
chapter, I give an account of what I did in the research process and why and, in doing 
so, show that how this ordering matters in the context of researching with and in 
Indigenous communities. In the first section, I return to the contingent, embedded 
and empirical way of thinking about agency I described in the previous chapter. This 
approach to agency, I argue, is best materialized methodologically in the form of 
“praxiography” (Mol, 2002:31-33). Praxiography is a hybrid of praxis, practice and 
ethnographic approaches to research. Like ethnography, it is a framework for 
multiple methods practices. I describe how praxiography enabled me to co-articulate 
the research problem with participants and to recognize my own embeddedness in 
the research problem. I also explain how praxiography allowed me, crucially, to 
engage the spatio-temporal and ontological concerns of the participants. My 
embeddedness in the problem and participants’ ontological and spatio-temporal 
concerns are two key elements of the critique of the spatio-temporalities of the 
research process that I develop in this thesis.   
In the second section, I describe how I came to the case studies I worked 
with. The thesis is only loosely organized around the case studies (the smaller 
projects of Dechinta and Akitsiraq within the wider movement for a Northern 
university, with the wider still decolonization debate). I describe how, in the 
research, I used participant observation, interviews, documentary analysis and 
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autoethnographic methods. My primary aim in this section is more practical and 
pedestrian: to help the reader imagine the places and activities I discuss in the thesis 
as well as to situate myself and my own agency in the picture.  
In the third section, I explain how I have come to tell the story you are 
reading now. I return to the linear and progressive PhD narratives presented to us in 
induction week. I contrast these with my more cyclical research experience in which 
I moved repeatedly between field and desk, object and method, and theory and 
practice throughout. Ultimately, participants showed me that the divisions between 
these orientations were false in the context of the current thesis. They also showed 
me that maintaining the pretense of these divisions aligns with colonizing spatio-
temporalities. In all these ways, while this chapter serves the functions of 
transparency and justification of a conventional methodology chapter, it also 
constitutes autoethnographic data and analysis. The chapter therefore begins to 
theorize agency through and in higher education research.     
3.1 Praxiography 
 …attending to the multiplicity of reality is also an act.  
(Mol, 2002:6) 
If agency is a local, embedded and contingently constituted phenomenon as I 
argued in the last chapter, then researching agency requires a methodology that 
engages with local contexts and meanings. That methodology must be attentive to 
multiple constitutive elements of reality (including documents, policy, practices, 
norms and people) as well as being responsive to participants’ own concerns and 
meanings. In this particular project, that methodology also needed to be appropriate 
to the practicalities (and impracticalities) of working in the Arctic for a researcher 
based in Scotland. It must, finally, offer ways of conceptualizing and navigating my 
embeddedness as a researcher in the research problem. The version of praxiography 
that I borrowed from Anne Marie Mol met all these needs in the current project 
(Mol, 2002:31-33). Praxiography combines an “ethnographic sensibility” (Pader, 
2014:194) and ethnographic methods practices, with a critique of representational 
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ethnography and a reconceptualisation of research as discursive praxis. Praxiography 
enabled me to develop the research problem and arguments in conjunction with the 
fieldwork and its participants. It also provided a way of theorizing and navigating the 
inevitable implication of the research in the research object, especially by combining 
ethnography’s empirical potential with a rejection of its colonizing conventions. In 
this section I describe the praxiographic methodology of the current project, as well 
as its genealogical and autoethnographic dimensions. I first describe the shape of the 
project through a discussion of its similarities and differences with conventional 
ethnography. I then describe some tensions involved in doing praxiographic research 
in the Canadian Arctic.   
Research design and methodology  
Praxiographic research looks very much like ethnography. Praxiography is 
ethnographic in the sense that it involves “being there” (Geertz, 1988:1), interacting 
with the people and places involved, talking, listening, and seeing, “hanging out and 
hanging about” (Woodward, 2008:536), as well as collecting documents. 
Praxiography also involves the rich, everyday details generated by being reflexively 
and attentively in a place and carrying that way of being through the analysis and 
writing processes or “thick description” (Geertz, 1973). All these elements of 
ethnographic research are present in the current project. In my case, “there” meant 
Ottawa, Iqaluit, Victoria, Yellowknife and Blachford Lake. “There” meant (but was 
not limited to) the buildings, cities and land on which the projects were located. The 
social and environmental features of “there” (I call these ‘place’), were of 
fundamental importance to participants and were woven into the fabric of their 
accounts of action. “There” therefore mattered greatly and place is central to the 
argument in this thesis.  “There” was not, however, a single location because the 
object of the research (agency) was not the setting itself. The current project is 
therefore “multi-sited” (Marcus, 1995). I “followed” agency wherever the actors or 
documents I encountered pointed (Latour, 2007).  
The current project is also ethnographic in that I avoided predetermining 
precisely how the research process would unfold in favour of a more grounded, 
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intuitive and collaborative approach. This included how I arrived at the research 
problem, methods and cases themselves.  I began with a crude and general approach 
and problem: a desire to research political agency and an understanding of agency as 
contingently meaningful. I could not know precisely what the research would involve 
until I began engaging with political agency in a local context.  My problem and 
methodology therefore sharpened through my research, and vice versa. A fuller and 
more honest account than I have time for here would show how this process began 
before the PhD. My intellectual commitment to the meaning of political action and 
my engagements with Indigenous politics and the Canadian North had in fact co-
evolved for several years previous.  
This flexible, reflexive and reciprocal relation of problem and field helped me 
refine the problem in the way I have posed it thus far. It led me to Butler’s “paradox 
of subjectivation,” (Butler, 1993:15) and Foucault’s “critique,” (Foucault, 1997). 
These two accounts of the dilemmas of political agency were particularly resonant 
and have helped me enormously in articulating the problems faced by anti-colonial 
actors as well as their relevance to other struggles (see Chapter 2 for a full 
discussion). I therefore moved repeatedly between the field and the literature, each 
time narrowing my theoretical focus and further articulating my account of the 
contestation over a Northern University. This enabled me to see that the stakes of 
that debate were who could or would act politically and how. My more concrete 
research practices were also developed in this cyclical and open-ended way. As I 
describe below, I let the cases I worked with emerge through my engagement with 
the field. I let my methods emerge similarly. For example, I planned initially to 
centre interviews. It turned out, however, that participation generated the richest data 
and that interviews were fairly limited in their potential for the current project. I 
adapted my methods and analysis accordingly.  Perhaps most importantly, this 
openness this left space for the ontological contradictions and inconsistencies that 
turned out to be characteristic of the field.  In all of these senses and for all these 
reasons, my methodology was ethnographic.  
At the same time, my methodology was necessarily distinct from classical 
ethnography in a number of key ways, for both ethical and ontological or 
77 
 
epistemological reasons. I use Mol’s word “praxiography” to mark these distinctions 
and to try to distance myself from some elements of conventional ethnography (Mol, 
2002). I was not researching or representing a culture or a people of any kind. I 
especially wanted to avoid any pretence or aim of knowing, interpreting or 
representing Indigenous peoples or culture. This was motivated primarily by ethics. 
This sort of ethnography, along with its representational, essentializing and 
homogenizing thinking, have been central to colonization (Wolfe, 1999). I wanted to 
make colonization an object of the project, not repeat or buy into it. This rejection of 
the representational logic of conventional ethnography and social science also 
follows from the way in which I took knowledge to be productive of the realities it 
describes. I was embedded already in colonial power relations and I became 
increasingly involved in specific communities and practices through the course of my 
research. I therefore replaced ethnographic representation with discursive 
engagement, encounters and interventions (Law, 2004:45; Mol, 2002:31-33).  
Instead of representation I aimed to produce knowledge in collaboration with 
the people I encountered. This echoes aspects of Participatory Action Research, 
which aims to work ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ or ‘for’ participants (Reason and 
Bradbury, 2001). Nonetheless the limits (and sometimes myths) of collaborative 
research in my specific context meant that this is not a Participatory Action Research 
thesis. Collaboration places high demands on participants. In my experience in the 
North, collaborative research proposals were also sometimes perceived to be less 
developed and therefore less authoritative, convincing or legitimate.  These two 
points meant I often got better responses when I approached potential participants 
with clearly defined and structured requests, rather than asking them to do this work 
with me. For these reasons, while I conceive of my whole thesis project as ‘with’ 
rather than ‘on’ the people and communities involved, I also recognize the different 
ways in which they and I have participated. I am the sole writer of this text, for 
example, despite the many people who have participated in other ways in its 
production.  
Approaching agency praxiographically in these ways allowed me to see and 
to articulate a central feature of life in the projects I worked with: the existence and 
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interaction of multiple ontologies and epistemologies, and their relations with 
multiple forms of agency. This focus was not an initial aim of mine but became 
increasingly necessary throughout fieldwork. Working in political education projects, 
participants frequently and explicitly discussed knowledge, ontology and 
epistemology and how these related to forms of politics or government. Participants 
were less concerned with the truth of ontology and more concerned with its effects. 
They therefore did not fully reject or accept any particular ontology, but engaged and 
combined multiple ontologies self-consciously and strategically. I devote the whole 
of Chapter 6 to this multiplicity of ontologies at work in Northern higher education 
and this account plays a crucial role in the way I theorize post-liberal agency in this 
thesis more generally. My praxiographic approach made this local reality and its 
significance visible and possible. This builds on Anne-Marie Mol’s “politics of 
what,” in which Mol recognizes the political significance of ontology in a similar 
way (Mol, 2002:172). Unlike in Mol’s study, however, in the current thesis 
participants theorize and practice the politics of ontology explicitly themselves.  
Praxiography also allowed me to see and engage a second concern of 
participants: the collapse of the distinction between theory and practice. Again, this 
was not an initial concern of the thesis but quickly became one following 
participants’ own concerns with unsettling this division. At both Dechinta and 
Akitsiraq, students would read and implement scholarly texts in their everyday lives, 
while the authors of those texts created the projects, taught on them and then went 
onto write more books. They made no clear distinction between talk about political 
action and enactments of political action (in fact Dechinta describes itself as both 
teaching and doing decolonization). This tension is familiar to post-structuralist 
researchers who connect theory and practice by saying that “discourse produces the 
effect that it names” (Butler, 1993:2). In the current project, however, I am more 
interested in how the inseparability of theory and practice is at odds with the 
temporal conventions of academic research. The process prescribed in my induction 
week assumed we could separate out ‘parts’ of knowledge and its production and 
organize them progressively in linear time. Praxiography allowed me to follow 
participants’ critiques of this version of knowledge and its alignment with the 
chronotope of late liberalism and settler-colonialism. These positions of participants, 
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in turn, underlined my use of praxiography which, according to Mol, itself seeks to 
undermine the distinction between theory and practice (Mol, 2002).  
Finally, as I have said previously, praxiography also helped me conceptualize 
and navigate my own entanglement in the object of research. This entanglement was 
exacerbated by the blurring of field and theory, by the cases themselves being 
university projects, and by my increasing involvement as a participant in their 
activities. As I described in the Introduction, scholarly knowledge has informed, 
legitimized and enacted colonization (Smith, 1999; Kovach, 2010). It was further 
complicated in that scholarship is directly implicated in the reorganization, 
delineation and regulation of realms and modes of authoritative political action 
particularly (see Chapter 4). In the Canadian North, for example, exclusion from 
formal education has been used to exclude unqualified Indigenous people from state 
forms of government by educating (creating) and channeling “the appropriate type of 
Inuk” into politics (Henderson, 2008:54). If academia is implicated in colonization, I 
am forced to recognize my own role in it too. Praxiography helped me conceptualize 
and navigate this problem.  
I discuss the ethical dimension to this at length throughout the thesis. Here I 
wish to note its epistemological implications. I avoided analysing the ‘truth’ or 
‘worth’ of what people said. In particular, I did not take a position in the debate over 
whose approach to decolonization is the ‘right’ one. Instead, I tried to work with 
participants to understand what agency means for them, in theory and in practice, and 
then related these meanings and practices to the research problem of non-liberal 
agency in my analysis (this also served the ethical function of not speaking ‘for’ 
participants). In letting go of representational claims, I also let go of the conventional 
markers of wholeness and legitimacy in conventional ethnography. In my 
interactions with ethnographers, I found these markers to be defined primarily in 
terms of amount of time or degree of immersion in a research setting. I did not spend 
an extended period of time in a single setting. The time I spent in each location, and 
doing fieldwork, was informed by: practical constraints (the expense of life in the 
Arctic where a loaf of sliced bread costs $20), access opportunities (which I describe 
below), and the comparatively (to ‘full understanding’) limited aims of gaining some 
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insight into some ways some people were articulating and practicing decolonization 
in their everyday lives. I attempted to isolate practices and moments, for which no 
sense of a comprehensive whole was possible or necessary.  
Similarly, my ‘sampling’ was not intended to be representative of the 
populations I engaged. Although I began by taking broad snapshots (e.g. trying to 
interview everyone who had graduated from the Akitsiraq Law School) it became 
increasingly apparent that the best people to help me think through the problem of 
agency, were the people who were themselves explicitly politicising and articulating 
their projects as forms of action, including identifying the tensions between the 
liberal and other logics and practices available to them. My fieldwork became 
weighted towards these people and, as I explained in the Introduction, on possibility 
and optimism, rather than constraint, domination or pessimism. This means I can and 
do not claim to represent the projects as wholes. This is not to say that I did not take 
participants’ realities seriously in and of themselves. I hope that what I say about the 
projects resonates with and would be recognisable to their participants. I am also 
keen to avoid ‘using’ data purely for ‘my own’ aims, and therefore tried to contribute 
in as many ways as I could to the successes of the projects in their own terms. The 
words you are reading now are primarily an attempt to theorize post-liberal agency 
through Northern education and decolonization. The production of these words as a 
practice, however, meant much more. This included, for example, my efforts to 
contribute to the projects, as I describe below.  
Before moving onto describe the daily details of putting my praxiographic 
approach into practice, I want to highlight two other methodological traditions that 
appear in the thesis: genealogy and autoethnography. Both sit comfortably under the 
umbrella of praxiography, but both are also particular ways of thinking and it is 
worth highlighting how they connect with my broader praxiographic approach here. 
Genealogy is a way of exposing the contingencies of the present and showing how 
the present has come to be (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984; see also Veyne, 1997). 
Genealogy is not an effort to tell a comprehensive or causal story of the past. 
Foucault’s genealogies are collections of moments, events and processes from across 
history which together are just enough to denaturalize objects that we take for 
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granted in the present and show how they come to be constituted (like, say, the 
liberal subject). This thesis is not a genealogy. The thesis is more concerned with an 
ongoing present than Foucault was, as well as being much narrower in its scope than 
Foucault’s work. Nonetheless, there are genealogical moments and arguments 
scattered throughout the thesis. My discussion of the emergence of late liberalism in 
the previous chapter was genealogically informed, as is the entire next chapter on the 
politics of decolonization in Canada. While I do not offer a genealogy of political 
agency, its genealogical emergence is evidenced by my historical engagement and 
very much informs the way I describe participants as inhabiting and contesting their 
own agency in the present.   
I also utilize some elements of autoethnography in a similarly selective way 
throughout the thesis. Autoethnography examines the researcher’s own experiences 
as instances of broader cultural and social processes in which the research is 
embedded (Ellingson & Ellis, 2008; Ellis, Adams & Bochner, 2010). This is more 
than reflexivity because it is not just about my presence in researching an object ‘out 
there’ (political agency), it is also about the many ways in which that object operates 
‘in here’ (in my experience and activities in and beyond the research project). While 
reflexivity is primarily an ethical strategy, autoethnography is a method of 
addressing the substantive aims of the thesis. As I have described repeatedly, I share 
many of the same conditions and challenges as participants are facing (although, as a 
white British researcher, I approach them from a very different angle). I therefore use 
my own experiences and practices in liberal and academic contexts as ‘data’ with 
which to theorize post-liberal agency.    
In the description of my methodology so far I have described how 
praxiography has interacted with an empirical approach to agency and the Canadian 
North throughout the course of the project. I have described how praxiography 
combines practice with ethnography as well as how this particular project includes 
genealogical and autoethnographic moments. My aim in this section is to show the 
emergence of a research methodology in the process of the research itself instead of 
preceding it.  This cyclical emergence contrasts with more conventional research 
temporalities, such as those presented in induction week. Conventional research 
82 
 
temporalities, I describe below, align with liberal logics of action and settler-
colonialism. I now turn to describe how I put my praxiographic approach into 
practice.  
3.2 Case studies: selection, access, methods 
But Akitsiraq is so unique. How will you be able to generalize?  
 
Akitsiraq’s Northern Director  
 
The empirical ground of this includes the decolonization debate, the 
movement for an Arctic university, Dechinta and Akistiraq, as well as my own 
research experience. These are strategically selected cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006). They 
are also, as I described in the introduction, inseparably entangled. In this section I tell 
the story of my selection of and practical engagement with these cases. I describe 
how and why I came to work with the cases that I did. My first aim in telling this 
story is to help the reader imagine the local contexts for the current thesis. My 
second aim is to show why education, university education, Dechinta and Akitsiraq 
are such compelling sites from which to explore forms of political agency.  
Education and a university in the Canadian North  
From the outset of the project, I knew that politics and agency were 
constituted in practice and in the everyday (see Chapter 2). I also knew that the 
politics of decolonization offered imperatives and opportunities for researching 
political action (see Chapter 4, Shaw [2008] and Beier [2005]). I therefore needed a 
setting which offered me the opportunity to engage people and practices oriented to 
decolonizing action in everyday ways. Due to the inseparability of settler-colonialism 
and late liberalism, it is likely that any activity in a settler-colonial context would 
offer insight into the possibilities for agency within late liberalism. I was interested, 
however, in the possibilities for imagining post-liberal agency in particular. I was 
therefore keen to find a setting that might be at, outside or pushing at the limits of 
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liberalisms. Such a setting would, in its orientation against liberalisms, offer the most 
potential for imagining post-liberal agency.  
Having worked previously with Indigenous communities, it was clear to me 
that the most appropriate setting would be in education. Education is central to the 
settler-colonial state (see Chapters 1 and 4). More generally, as Stephen Ball (2013) 
describes, education produces people (including citizens, consumers and workers) 
and organizes daily life, as well as constituting simultaneously the state and 
capitalism as modes of government. Education produces, authorizes and transmits 
knowledge (including governmental knowledge) [see Chapters 1 and 4]. Education 
has therefore also been central to strategies and practices of anti-colonial action. My 
intention in drawing on Ball here is to show that the significance of education is not 
unique to the Canadian North. Ball identifies these functions of education globally 
and in the UK specifically. Nonetheless, in the Canadian North these functions are 
also colonizing. Education has created the colonial state in place of Indigenous forms 
of governance and attempted to assimilate Indigenous peoples into the dominant 
culture (Miller, 1996; Alfred, 2005; see Chapter 4).  
I also knew the setting would be Northern, and I began in Nunavut. I already 
had a growing academic interest in Nunavut, had published a paper on it and had 
begun to make connections with people who lived or were connected with it.  This 
was because Nunavut is the biggest land claim globally (Loukacheva, 2007), and 
therefore the biggest ‘win’ in late liberal and state terms. I had therefore become 
interested in Nunavut and the North more generally as a sort of test ground for what 
was possible and what was not within those terms. To avoid the problem of imposing 
my own reading on  someone else’s activities as political agency, I looked at 
educational projects in the North that were explicitly and reflexively about politics, 
government, leadership, change, decolonization and forms of action. As I said in the 
Introduction, the projects I chose were post-secondary projects because their lack of 
a stable institution meant they were arguing their case more aggressively and 
because the maturity of their students meant their self-accounts and analyses were 
more explicit and sophisticated.   
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I identified three such projects, one of which was the Akitsiraq Law School. I 
made contact with all three via email and applied for a research licence. A research 
licence is necessary for all research in Nunavut. Research licensing is in response to 
the colonizing history of research in the North. The license process is an attempt to 
grapple back local control (notably, this control occurs through state apparatus and 
involves a lengthy bureaucratic process). I then made an initial research trip of six 
weeks in April-May 2011.  I first went to Ottawa for two weeks. Ottawa was the 
location of one of the three projects and of some Akitsiraq graduates and associates. 
Then I went to Nunavut to meet with participants in these projects. During this initial 
trip, the boundaries of my case shifted (for the first time). It became clear to me that 
two of the three projects were not appropriate sites for research. One was over 
worked and over researched (a common problem in the North which came to shape 
my experience as a researcher). The other project was largely exclusive of white 
people. As I describe below, Akitsiraq turned out to be not only accessible and 
welcoming but also a uniquely compelling site for asking questions about the 
possibilities and limits of agency in and in relation to juridical law and academia. 
Juridical law and academia share the logics and practices of late liberalism. As I 
describe below, Akitsiraq then led me to Dechinta, which became my second main 
case.  
During this initial trip my conversations with participants in all the cases 
snowballed into conversations with people involved in all sorts of educational 
activities in Nunavut. This showed me that I had stumbled into something much 
bigger than any one of the projects: a huge struggle for university education in the 
Arctic, and over what that education should be like. The case for a Northern 
university has been made nationally by the National Inuit organisation president 
Mary Simon, the former Governor General, Michaelle Jean and the author John 
Ralston Saul (both of whom have been publicly outspoken about the need for a 
Northern University), and the Walter Duncan Gordon Foundation (which has funded 
the ongoing “Dialogue on a Northern University” that I described in the 
Introduction). The Canadian Social Science and Humanities Research Council and 
the Government of Canada’s ‘Centres for Excellence’ programs are also increasingly 
funding research projects related to Northern post-secondary education. As I 
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described in the Introduction, Dechinta, Akitsiraq, and their individual participants, 
are all part of this struggle. They are also somewhat marginal to it. The dominant 
voices are, as I described preivously, the state-funded vocational Colleges of the 
North. Although the two cases are very different, therefore, they perceive each other 
to be allies. For this reason, I started conceiving of my area of focus as this 
movement and contestation, and of Dechinta and Akitsiraq as sub-cases or points of 
micro and ethnographic focus within it. Dechinta and Akitsiraq only make sense in 
relation to this context and their boundaries within it are unclear.  
My encounters with Akitsiraq were through documents, interviews and 
participant observation. I reviewed all of Akitsiraq’s official documents before I left 
Edinburgh. These helped me get a sense of the project’s institutional history, as well 
as how Akitsiraq portrays itself publically. Because they are mostly aimed at getting 
government funding and public support, public documentation is one of the central 
ways in which Akitsiraq tries to engage and mobilize the state narrative of 
decolonization. They have therefore been a key body of data.   
 
When I arrived, I met with the Northern Director of the Law School and she 
offered me an office in the Akitsiraq building. She explained that I would need a 
place in town to meet people because people would “need to stop in for tea”. She 
explained that the office staff (her and a secretary) ate lunch together every day, that 
this was usually just soup and toast, and that I was welcome to eat with them as long 
as I bought my share of the groceries. Those lunches with the Director and whoever 
stopped by turned out to be some of the most important conversations in my 
fieldwork and provided a sort of continuity and a daily check-in and update as the 
time went on. They were comfortingly familiar to return to during the second trip.  
 
We talked rarely about my project. I had the sense she was not very interested 
in it, and that my explanations were inadequate and vague. When she engaged it was 
to express her concern that my research would not be “generalizable,” because 
Akitsiraq was so “unique”.  She explained quite early on that I “added legitimacy” to 
Akitsiraq by being there, by studying and writing about it. Legitimate projects are 
studied and written about, she said. It was for this reason that I guessed she always 
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introduced me to others as “our PhD student from Edinburgh”. I also guessed that 
this introduction offered further legitimacy by lending Akitsiraq a post-graduate and 
international dimension. I did in fact go on to serve as a connection between 
Akitsiraq students and students elsewhere, as I describe in the rest of this chapter.  
 
The Director proved to be a pivotal gatekeeper (as well, later, as an employer, 
collaborator and friend). With her, I participated in the activities of the Law School 
Society. It was this group of people I was most interested in: the ones articulating the 
vision and rationale for the project. I sat in on board meetings and ran minor errands 
for and with the Society in the office. I made a lot of tea for visitors. The Director 
also helped me navigate local norms. I had contacted all the former students and staff 
which I had identified from the reports, as well as anyone who might have any sort of 
perspective on the project, mostly workers in the Departments of Education and 
Justice. There weren’t a lot of replies. I sent another round of emails from Iqaluit. 
Email did not seem to be the way to contact people in Iqaluit. The Director said, 
“why don’t you just use the phonebook?” I thought that calling people at home 
seemed intrusive but she did not think so, so I did. Whenever possible I said ‘x 
suggested I email/call you’ and stressed that I was based in the Akitisraq office 
because I felt it offered me credibility and status. This helped. Perhaps, then, we 
exchanged our legitimizing potential. A lawyer I had met at the airport actually just 
took me to the office of one of the former students. Again, I thought this would be 
intrusive but she did not think so. Phone and in-person were better than emails. At 
some point, when I mentioned a lack of response, the Director said “you should do 
what they do here – just tell a story”. I started writing emails just telling people what 
I had been up to and asking for nothing in return. I thought that would seem 
presumptuous and self-involved and that no-one would want to read that. The 
Director said it was the way things were done. So I sent those emails. Every new 
strategy I used, I got one or two more replies. Some people I caught when they came 
to the office for whatever reason. I would just say ‘hi, nice to meet you’ and chat 
about whatever came up over tea. Sometimes they would tell me about their Scottish 
heritage or teach me some Inuktitut (an Inuit language). Later, I would send them an 
email saying “hi, we met earlier, I’m doing this research”. The longer I had been on 
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someone’s radar in a non-research context, the more likely they were to respond 
positively to a research request. 
 
The graduates of the Law School were reluctant to agree to interviews. I only 
got four official interviews out of eleven graduates. I met and talked with other 
graduates but not in formal or quotable interview form. Everyone in Nunavut is over-
researched. The Akitsiraq experience had also, to some extent, politicised the 
students, as well as having attracted already political students. Those students are 
more likely to be aware of the entanglement of research with colonial power and 
more likely to say “no” to research requests. The Akitisraq graduates had also 
received an exceptionally huge amount of public and media attention. They had been 
approached by countless journalists who had, as one explained to me, asked the same 
questions – and the “wrong questions” – over and over again. To them I was just 
another one of these people and they were tired of it and uninterested. Worse, that 
attention had been very traumatic for the students during the program. They felt the 
pressure of the public gaze – waiting, one graduate told me, either for them to “save” 
Nunavut or to fail law school. “Who has failed?” was a question students would get 
asked in the street, another said. Conversely, a local paper reported that the law 
school was “being billed as a training ground for Nunavut’s future leaders” (Spitzer, 
March 30
th
 2001).  The graduates had felt the pressure of these contradictory 
expectations and become extra sceptical of people who ask questions and write about 
things.  
 
I am confident that I could have got more interviews with graduates had I 
pushed harder but I did not push harder. I wanted to truly respect their right to say 
‘no’. I did not want to be just another researcher. I felt uncomfortable. I also did not 
find the interviews particularly helpful. The interview setting is a good way to get 
things out of people who consider themselves experts and like to talk (see below). 
But for the graduates the interview setting was not so good. At best they were used to 
promoting and defending the program for journalists not for an academic. One hour 
is not a very long time to get relaxed with someone. I do not really see my interview 
data as the way I found something out. Mostly I found something out some other 
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way – talking to people in kitchens and corridors, piecing things together. Back in 
my home institution and in writing, however, interview quotes are often much more 
authoritative and legitimate than kitchen chats or shared feelings, especially in 
Politics and IR contexts. I found myself searching for formal interview quotes to 
demonstrate things I knew from more personal and informal interactions. I wanted to 
demonstrate the relevance and legitimacy of the informal and everyday in my 
discipline (their exclusion is part of a colonial history), but I also wanted to make my 
case and be heard. This was an agency and ethics problem, and sometimes a hard 
balance to strike.  
 
Experts – judges, senior bureaucrats and college staff – agreed to talk to me 
more readily and talked at more length than the graduates. Those people – everyone 
except the graduates – talked to me like I knew nothing, especially of local tensions 
and fault lines. They treated me, it felt, as if I was some silly southern student come 
North and they had to start from the beginning and tell me how things are. They 
assumed I was unaffiliated. I might have been some or all of these things at different 
points. They often had some pre-prepared speech they were used to giving, which did 
not necessarily align with the questions I was asking them. They talked like what 
they had to say was the only thing to be said – the uncontested truth. Everyone tried 
to win me over to their side without letting on that there were ‘sides’ in what I learnt 
was a highly fraught context. This worked out quite well for me: I was not trying to 
get at some essential truth, but was more interested in how they deliberately chose to 
represent and articulate what they were doing, and how they related to what other 
people were doing. When the president of Arctic College actually ignored my 
questions and used me to practice a presentation he was planning on giving in the 
legislature, this was both useful and slightly offensive.  
 
After leaving Nunavut, I followed the activities of the law school online from 
Edinburgh and kept in regular touch with the Director via Skype. Towards the end of 
2011, she told me Akitsiraq was launching some new programming. This involved 
teaching an intensive three week course at the University of Ottawa Law School 
called Arctic Legal Perspectives, alongside a two week intensive Legal Skills course 
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for students from Nunavut. The third week of the Legal Perspectives course involved 
the University of Ottawa students travelling North. This meant that the two courses 
overlapped and some shared activities were scheduled. The Director would teach the 
Ottawa students while a Professor was brought in from the University of Victoria to 
teach the Nunavut students. The Director invited me to come and participate as a 
Tutor for the Ottawa students. I accepted gladly and went back, this time on payroll. 
The funding from this programming was provided by the Federal Government’s 
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (now called Aboriginal Affairs). For this 
trip I had the added legitimacy of having come back and of coming in winter (two 
things researchers are generally perceived as not doing). I also had the opportunity to 
participate and observe in the classroom setting for the first time. I made a third trip 
in January 2013 to work with a second iteration of the short-form Legal Skills course. 
Although this was not formally a research trip and I did not generate any data, my 
ongoing relationship and interaction with the Law School informs my understanding 
of it.  
Returning from my first trip to Nunavut, I was undecided whether Akitsiraq 
would be my only close-up case, or whether I would need to find another. Akitsiraq 
itself ended up leading me to the second case: Dechinta Bush University. This time I 
was employed immediately as a Research Assistant by the project, with the condition 
and expectation that I incorporate Dechinta into my PhD research. I was sent the job 
ad by several of the contacts I had made during my initial field trip in Nunavut and 
(though I did not know this at the time) an Akitsiraq Law School Society member 
contacted Dechinta and recommended me to them. My wages came from a research 
council grant to research land-based education and to support the development of 
Dechinta Bush University. My job was to develop institutional structures, policy and 
documentation, in collaboration with communities, academics, board members and 
students. This was ideal for me because questions of governance frequently got at the 
heart of how Dechinta’s participants conceived of the project in relation to colonial 
and Indigenous forms of government, and they conceived of the program itself as 
“self-governing” and “decolonizing” (these phrases were repeated across all 
Dechinta’s literature and my discussions with participants).  
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One of the questions I was asked at interview was “how will the addition of 
Dechinta change your project?” My answer was that it would involve a broadening 
of my geographic focus to include the Northwest Territories (NWT), where Dechinta 
is located, including the NWT’s very different (from Nunavut) material environment 
and political institutions. The addition of Dechinta would also, I replied, involve 
Dene who were the majority Indigenous people of the NWT. I explained the 
significance of this in the Introduction, and explain further in Chapter 4. 
This expansion gave me access to an alternate selection of ways of relating to 
late liberalism. Dechinta and Akitsiraq were an ideal pair of case studies for my 
research purposes. Akitsiraq aims to “equip Inuit with the tools” of juridical law – to 
work within the state – in “culturally relevant ways,” as per the understanding of 
culture in late liberalism (Akitsiraq Law School Society et al, 2007; Akitsiraq Law 
School Society, 2009). Akitsiraq is also supported by and employs the scholars in the 
liberal narrative described in chapter two. The Law School does all this in the context 
of the biggest land claim world-wide, and of Inuit claiming and mobilizing their 
status as Canadian citizens. Dechinta, on the other hand, is more explicitly critical of 
the state, and privileges bush knowledge and resurgence paradigm logics. The Bush 
University is driven and supported by as well as employing scholars in the counter 
narrative. It does all this in the context of Dene land using the language of 
nationalism against Canada. These two cases therefore gave me examples that 
aligned with both versions of decolonization (see Chapter 4), and a chance to see 
what their narratives of political action could and did do. The two cases also gave me 
more access to the broader dialogue on a university in the North, in which I 
discovered Dechinta and Akitsiraq were more in tension with mainstream approaches 
than they were in tension with each other (as I described in the Introduction). That is, 
while the two projects might have leant different ways, they did not fit neatly into 
‘liberal’ or ‘state’ or ‘otherwise’ boxes, and they worked together rather than in 
opposition. This early observation was part of complicating the either/or division and 
beginning to see how strategies from different logics could interact or work together.  
I made my first trip to work with Dechinta in summer 2012, and a further two 
in summer and fall 2013. The trips were two months, two months and a month 
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respectively. During the first two trips I was based in Yellowknife from where a 
small private plane leaves for Blachford Lake Lodge, the site of Dechinta 
programming. Like Akitsiraq, Dechinta is struggling for funding, and during my first 
year’s employment there was no programming running. During my first trip, I 
conducted interviews with former students and volunteers who were in town, along 
with board members, and worked in the office running minor errands and developing 
policy and governance structures for the organization. I made a two-day trip with a 
supply plane to Blachford Lake to explore the space.  Again, it was often informal 
encounters that gave me the most insight into the project. Again, I encountered a lot 
of conflict. This was both internal to the organization, in the history of the 
programming (as reported by students) and around the project in the wider 
community. Navigating conflict was one of the defining features of my research 
experience. 
My final trip for Dechinta was for its Fall Semester September 2012. The 
2012 Fall Semester was the fourth program delivered by Dechinta and the second 
full-length semester. It included five weeks of preparation off-site and five weeks on-
site at Blachford Lake Lodge. There were eight students. Six students were 
Indigenous and seven students were from the NWT. Students ranged from 18 to 35 
years old. Three students were mothers and one student brought her baby on-site 
with her. Two students had undergraduate degrees (the two non-Indigenous students) 
and one further student had experience of post-secondary in the South. I was on-site 
for the final three weeks of this semester, evaluating and facilitating/leading the 
program in my role as a research assistant. I also supported the students as they 
prepared for and intervened in a conference on the future of the North the weekend 
they returned to Yellowknife.  I have also drawn heavily on the transcripts from this 
conference, in which the students tried to articulate their Dechinta experience as 
decolonizing action, to make a case for certain forms of political action in the North, 




Notes on consent and confidentiality  
When I began research in Nunavut, I created informed consent forms in both 
English and Inuktitut, as required by the Nunavut Research Institute which 
licensed/permitted research in the territory on this condition. The Institute also 
provided the highly formal and conventional language required. I was aware of large 
body of literature written against the practice of written informed consent in research 
with Indigenous communities (Davison, Brown & Moffitt, 2006). I was also aware, 
anecdotally, of most Canadian university ethics committees exempting such research 
from written consent procedures. This is due to a lack of written traditions in 
Indigenous communities and a general wariness of the roles of contracts and 
signatures in colonization (Casteel, 1996). A critique of contractual ethics points to 
further limits of informed consent forms and norms. Perhaps unsurprisingly I found 
my government mandated informed consent forms to be met with hostility by 
interviewees and other participants. I also found a variety of positions in relation to 
the Research Institute articulated by academics and other Northerners. Several people 
told me they thought it was “ridiculous” they should have to appeal to their own 
government for permission to talk with other people. One academic told me she 
would apply for a license to research “vulnerable” people (she gave the example of 
people in their homes), but not government officials who she believed should not 
require a license to be held to account by the public. For my part, I began to seek 
verbal consent instead.  
My dictaphone was met with similar suspicion and hostility as consent forms. 
Some people declined to be recorded. Some seemed to shut down to me the moment 
I suggested it. Again, I started to make a call as to whether to even ask, and often did 
not. Although I have some fully recorded interviews my primary method for 
recording was note-taking during the interview. In these ways, I found myself torn 
between the demands of the Research Institute (the aims of which were to wrestle 
back control over research in the North from incomers), my own hopes for doing 
things differently, and the expectations and realities of participants. This was another 
balance I had to navigate throughout the research process.  
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Confidentiality presented even more problems. The groups of people I 
worked with were small and individuals were easily identifiable. I did not want to 
assume that anonymity was necessarily desirable. The separation of words from 
person and context in the form of ‘confidentiality’ may be a universalized western 
value (Harper, 2008). Chapter 6 shows in great detail how this separation is 
fundamentally opposed to the pedagogy and ontology of place posited by 
participants. Nonetheless, as I have described, the cases were also riddled with 
conflicts of various sorts, many of which were deeply personal. On one hand, I felt 
any account of Northern education had to address these conflicts, especially because 
the stakes and terms of the conflicts were so often so telling and so high. I did not, 
however, want to make the projects look bad in public. After all, ultimately I shared 
their hopes and aims and certainly respected their entitlement to the pursuit and 
success of their projects. Publishing who said what about whom did not seem like a 
way to do this. I did not want to break their trust, however implicitly or begrudgingly 
that trust occurred.  
My response to this problem is to refer to people as students, graduates, 
instructors, board or society members, and advocates. Sometimes when I feel an 
individual is still easily identifiable, I have been even vaguer and called them a 
participant, or referred to a group of people as participants and not quoted anyone 
specifically. I have not attributed interview or fieldnote quotations to specific 
individuals nor listed the individuals I interviewed. I have also, at times, altered 
gender pronouns to further hide an individual’s identity. This is not ideal, for the 
reasons described above and because it sometimes makes the story somewhat 
intangible or even inaccurate (gender is meaningful). This approach is, however, 
both necessary and the best strategy available.  
My aim in this section has been, quite simply, to describe what I did in the 
course of the research. The account I have given is of praxiography in practice: a 
cluster of methods practices that are attentive and responses to local specificities and 
complexities. I have not attempted to present a neat coherent list but rather have 
shown some of the practical and ethical challenges and ‘mess’ of conducting a 
research project, particularly in the Canadian Arctic. It is in all the practices 
94 
 
described here that I produced the experiences, materials and knowledge in relation 
to political agency that inform the current thesis. I now go onto describe the ethical 
dilemmas I faced in the research process and in turning the fieldwork into the 
narrative of this thesis.  
3.3 Spatio-temporalities of research ethics  
Early anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski argued that the ethnographer 
must “go native,” in order to “to grasp the native’s point of view, his relations to life, 
to realize his vision of his world” (Malinowski, 2014: 24). Conversely, the SAGE 
Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods describes “going native,” as the 
“development of a sense of ‘overrapport’ between the researcher and those “under 
study,” to the extent that the researcher “becomes” one of those under study” (Fuller, 
2004). Along with the hopes or risks of “going native,” social scientists have also 
become concerned with the limits and possibilities of insider research, outsider 
research, and their in-betweens (Adler and Adler, 1987). All these points illustrate an 
age-old question in the social sciences. Should a researcher research communities of 
which she is part, or become part of the communities she researches? This question is 
both ethical and epistemological. The first two quotes also show the emergence of 
this concern in relation to research with Indigenous people specifically.  
My engagement with this question is mediated by its articulation in feminist 
and post-structuralist research because this research most closely aligns with the 
epistemology and ethics of the current project. This research takes-as-given that the 
researcher is always already embedded in the reality she seeks to research. This is 
certainly the case, as I have shown thus far, for researchers in the Canadian north. It 
is especially troubling for outsider researchers in marginalized communities because, 
as I have also explained, these researchers risk speaking for others and repeating 
oppressive power relations. The question then becomes not whether but how she is a 
part of that reality. Post-structuralist and feminist researchers have developed a 
number of strategies for articulating and managing this problem: positionality, 
reflexivity, introspection, deference and silence (Etherington, 2004). These strategies 
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are also, as Kim Etherington argues, modes of researcher “agency,” (Etherington, 
2004:15).  They are ways of acting ethically.  
In this section I describe how I deployed these strategies in the current 
project. I also show how, by deploying them with the concerns of agency, 
decolonization and the North, I exposed some of their limits. In particular, I argue, 
the strategies are often underpinned by colonial and late liberal spatio-temporalities, 
as well as autological versions of action.  I conclude by discussing the process of 
creating the arguments of the current thesis. I argue that analysis and writing are also 
often aligned with liberal logics.  I therefore show throughout this section how I 
practiced ethics during the research and how my own agency in doing so was 
entangled with my broader academic context (a context which I shared with 
participants).  
Practicing ethics in research  
I begin here by discussing positionality and identity jointly, before moving 
onto discuss reflexivity, introspection, deference and silence. Identifying or locating 
onself as a researcher are, it seems to me, almost prerequisites for critical social 
science research today. It is taken as given that what Sandra Harding calls the 
“standpoint” (Harding, 1987:159) of the researcher matters. That is, that the co-
ordinates and subjectivity from which the researcher works and speaks has 
implications for the research itself. The effects of locating or identifying oneself are 
two-fold. They are ways of the researcher becoming aware of and attentive to the 
relations of power between them and their research and their participants. They also 
call the reader’s attention to that power relationship and make the researcher’s role in 
it transparent, often inviting the reader to interrogate the researcher’s ethics or 
credibility. I aim to do all these things in the current project. The logics of 
positionality and identity also helped me pose an ethical and methodological problem 
as part of this thesis: whether and how to do anti-colonial research as a scholar who 
is implicated in colonial power and privilege.  
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Identifying or positioning myself was, however, not a straightforward task in 
the context of this project. This task required that I be a fixed, stable and autonomous 
subject – the very object I sought to critique. Post-structuralism already has provided 
a critique of the myths and violence of identity politics, as described by Moya Lloyd 
(2005). I do not repeat this critique here, but rather extend and refocus it on my own 
experience and on research in Indigenous communities. In this thesis I have 
repeatedly described my ethical quandary as: ‘The question of whether and how it is 
possible for me and people like me to do research with Indigenous people in 
Indigenous contexts.’ I have also described ‘me’ as ‘neither indigenous nor 
Canadian. I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh and I mostly live and 
work in the UK where I was born and have lived my whole life.’ The problem being 
that ‘my research… involves indigenous people, colonial power and the place now 
known as Canada.’ That is, it involves some form of other in relation to which I am 
historically privileged and possibly an oppressor.  
My language in these quotes is awkward because my engagement with the 
logic is awkward. This expression of myself is slippery, awkward and inadequate. 
Part of it involves my not being something whilst part involves my being something. 
Somehow location also plays a role. Perhaps what I am not is easiest to pin down: I 
am not Indigenous by anyone’s definition. I do not identify as Indigenous and am 
never identified as such. I do not need to settle what Indigeneity means in order to 
state this. Having been born and lived since in the UK, the same goes for my lack of 
Canadianness. This second way in which I’m an outsider takes a backseat to the 
problem of my non-Indigenousness, but it also excludes me from the language and 
identities of non-Indigenous settler-Canadians. There is a growing academic and 
activist discourse around settler identity and Indigenous-settler alliances, with settler-
Canadians developing their own mechanisms decolonization (for example, in the 
Journal of Settler-Colonial Studies, or in the edited collection Alliances [Davis, 
2010]). As a British person my colonial privilege happens very differently to that of 
settler Canadians but there as yet no discussion in the decolonization literature as to 
how people at a distance, like me, might respond. One function of this thesis is to call 
for or to begin one.  
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Unlike what I am not, what I am is much more difficult to pin down. Clearly 
the UK and the university are key parts of my story and the problem at hand. 
Geographic location is a conveniently straightforward way of describing myself for 
the reader. The UK and the University are, however, meaningful in ways that go 
beyond location. They are more than locations. Simply locating myself is not 
sufficient in either articulating or addressing the problem. In fact, it seems to avoid 
articulating or addressing the problem. Saying ‘I am here’ is much simpler than 
saying what being here means, either for me personally or for the project at hand. In 
fact, at times I deliberately used location to avoid the problems of identity. 
Nonetheless even positionality understood as geographic location evokes a version of 
space that, as Karen Barad describes, aligns with Euclidean and representational 
geometric logic and therefore with liberalism (Barad, 2007:240 [the same critique 
applies, Barad argues, to ‘intersectionality’]). This same liberal ontology is the target 
of Dechinta’s placed-based pedagogy in Chapter 6.   
A broader more nuanced version of identity does not seem to do the work I 
need it to do either. I could say ‘I am British’ but what would that tell you instead? If 
you had some sense of the complexities of identity, you would know that it does not 
tell you very much at all – except perhaps that I identify as British. However I do not 
feel defined by Britishness. I identify more with other things such as cities, my work, 
my friends, my politics. I just know that someone else might identify me as British, 
and that in this instance the only way I might have to take full responsibility for my 
privilege is to say I am British. Alternatively you might take it as a translation of 
location. Then we are back to the limits of location again. Saying ‘I am British’ does 
not therefore really tell you what Britishness means for my researching with 
Indigenous people. It avoids having to tell you what it means. The ethical strategies 
of identification and positionality can stand in place of an analysis or engagement of 
the ethics of the researcher in order to “return myself to comfort” (Barker, 2010:321). 
They also transfer responsibility for the ethics to the reader by leaving it up to them 
to give my location or identity meaning, to do the analysis and to hold me 
accountable. In all these ways, saying ‘I am British’ makes me a single, knowable, 
unified subject and erases my co-production with my research and its context, and 
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this aligns identity-oriented research ethics with the logics of liberal action I have 
described thus far. Nonetheless it also matters, and so I keep saying it.   
In all these ways the ethical strategies of positionality and identity, while 
necessary, also intersect with the late liberal and settler colonial realities which I 
examine in this thesis and which participants sought to resist and rework.   Taken 
along with existing critiques of identity politics, these limits and alignments of 
identity and positionality in the context of the current research might sound pretty 
damning. But it was positionality and identity – as practices, as concerns, as ethics – 
that enabled and drove me to express this very problem in the first place. They are 
the main strategies available for holding me accountable for my colonial privilege 
and revealing that accountability to the reader. If I am honest, they are also necessary 
for the ethical legitimacy and perceived integrity of my work amongst the 
communities of scholars in which I work and hope to engage. I hope this is not 
precisely the same “returning myself to comfort” that Adam Barker (2010:321) 
describes, although certainly it is related. Further, as I have mentioned repeatedly, 
legitimacy is a desire and risk for research participants themselves as well as for me. 
For all these reasons, I have both embraced and denounced these strategies. In fact 
my embracement has led to and enabled my denouncement.  
I now discuss reflexivity, introspection, deference and silence, to which I 
turned when identity and positionality met their limits. Reflexivity, introspection, 
deference and silence are similarly common to feminist and post-structuralist 
research and are characteristic of anti-colonial research too. My implication in the 
research problem and its ethical dimension meant that some kind of self-awareness 
was necessary. Typically, in research, this awareness happens in the forms of 
reflexivity. Reflexivity is already extensively theorized and articulated in critical 
methodological literature (Roulston [2010] and Etherington [2004] do this 
particularly well). Introspection, deference and silence are less theorized, but in my 
experience still common practices, particularly for scholars working on 
decolonization (as evidenced by the settler contributions to Lynne Davis’s Alliances 
[2010]). Once again I applied all these strategies at some point during my research 
and found that, although they are important, they often align with liberal logics. 
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Deference, instrospection and silence all, I argue, operate around a non-
Indigenous/Indigenous binary. They therefore risk reinscribing Indigeneity as a fixed 
and homogenous category. Like identity and positionality, they can also all work to 
negate the responsibility of the researcher and support the status quo. Reflexivity, 
like positionality, also aligns with the geometric logic of late liberalism. Notice the 
language: mirrors are external and they represent. Finally, all these strategies 
potentially privilege and centre myself and my agency over that of the people I 
worked with.  
As I described in Chapter 1, I was initially uncertain as to whether I should 
focus more on myself – and things I associated with me, like colonial power – or on 
the people I worked with who were often Indigenous. I wanted to take seriously the 
most extreme implication of academia’s colonial history: that anything I said about 
Indigenous people would be an extension of colonization, simply by virtue of who I 
am; that I should be silent about anything relating to Indigenous people; that I should 
defer to their accounts and perspectives at all times; and that I could not truly know 
or understand their very different realities anyway and so would inevitably warp or 
incorporate them into my own logic. I also did not want to write myself out of the 
project (i.e. lie).  
At the same time, however, I did not want to make the project about me. I 
wanted to foreground the agency of the people I was working with, in order not to 
write them out (again, as in colonial history). I also wanted my research to be taken 
seriously and not be accused of ‘navel gazing’ (Maddie Breeze [2014:99-102] 
discusses the demands of “getting taken seriously” in PhD research). I saw my desire 
for my research to be taken seriously as political. Writing in the disciplines of 
Politics and International Relations, I aimed to stretch and question the meaning of 
politics and the international themselves. This aim required convincing scholars in 
these disciplines that the people and activities I was working with were ‘real 
politics’. I repeatedly encountered puzzled responses from peers and colleagues in 
Politics and IR who wondered what I was doing there and thought my research 
sounded “sort of like anthropology”.  It often seemed like all the strategies available 
for making myself visible in the research process (the current discussion, for 
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example) further alienated me from what Breeze calls “seriousness” (Breeze, 
2014:99) in these disciplines. As I described in Chapter 1, these concerns led to 
uncertainty during the planning stage and a repeatedly shifting focus between myself 
and the people I worked with. This shifting is replicated in the current thesis, which 
moves its gaze repeatedly back and forth.  
All these concerns limited the epistemological scope, aims and claims of the 
project. As I have said already, I do not claim or aim to represent Indigenous life or 
realities. I have simply used my fieldwork encounters to think through a bigger 
theoretical problem. Despite this, two things remain true. First, although I have done 
many things other than my thesis research at request of or to contribute to my 
research communities and participants, I am still deeply uncomfortable with the word 
‘use’ here. Second, inevitably some account or understanding – if not representation 
- of the projects I worked with is contained in this thesis. Equally inevitably, my own 
voice and my liberal context are overrepresented in this account.  
Nonetheless, I chose these risks over complete silence or introspection and 
simply looking at myself, colonialism liberalism and my own context. I even chose 
them over total deference to Indigenous points of view. I made these choices for the 
following reasons. The same historical entanglement of colonialism and research that 
raised the possibility that I could not speak about Indigenous people and that I should 
only examine myself also, I suggest, obliges me to speak about them, and to look 
beyond myself. That is, my implication in colonial power means that I am faced with 
the choice of either reinscribing that power by default by saying nothing, or at least 
attempting to resist it by saying something. Part of saying something in this thesis is 
trying to address the ways in which Indigenous agency has been written out of 
academic knowledge by refusing to recenter myself and my own agency through 
introspection. There remains something of a double-bind, here: I assign myself the 
agency of decolonization, risking repeating the colonial European saviour complex. 
Whatever my failings here, I want to make clear that the participants in my projects 
were anything but in need of saving. In almost all of my engagements, the people I 
worked with were older, more experienced, more qualified, more respected and 
smarter than I was – and not afraid to take advantage of this disparity! Telling a story 
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in which Indigenous research participants are these things is another way I seek to 
counter conventional accounts of Indigenous peoples as vulnerable by definition.  
Deference seemed initially like a solution to the limits of silence and 
introspection. I mean deference to Indigenous people and Indigeneity. This includes 
fully buying into Indigenous truths as well as following Indigenous methodological 
norms. This might involve following Indigenous scholarly assertions, arguments or 
methodologies. It might include following the lead of the Indigenous participants in a 
particular research project, or the indigenous community in which a particular project 
is undertaken. It might include focusing things which are important to Indigenous 
people. It could look like, for example, using oral, story-telling or narrative 
methodologies. It could look like being critical of the settler-state or academia. It 
could look like contributing to the projects and goals of the participants in a research 
project. There are aspects of all of this in the current project, however once again 
deference seemed to turn on a colonizing fixed and homogenized version of 
Indigeneity.  
Clearly having dialogue with Indigenous people, listening to Indigenous 
people and following Indigenous self-articulations are necessary for non-Indigenous 
scholars committed to decolonization and Indigenous self-determination (and indeed 
self-determination in general). As principles, these are absolutely central to my 
project. How to put them into practice is, however, far from straightforward. Once 
again, the assumption that one can simply ‘defer to Indigenous self-articulations’ 
homogenizes Indigenous people. It also romanticizes them. Part of humanizing 
anyone is, surely, admitting their fallibility. More than this, it is simply impossible to 
‘defer to Indigenous people’. Even the tiny selection of Indigenous voices I have 
described so far (scholarship, participants, methodology and so-on) holds a huge 
range of often competing perspectives. The decolonization debate discussed in 
Chapter 4 is just a slice of this contestation. As in any project or community, 
interpersonal conflicts and politics are also prevalent. The stories I have told in this 
chapter about the projects I worked with illustrate this. Even the participants in this 
thesis research diverged wildly in views and needs. Even a single project or a single 
individual changed over time.  I had to make my own way through this contestation. 
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I did not necessarily need to decide who was ‘right’, but I had to piece together some 
version of events. The version contained in this thesis is ultimately my version of 
events.  I could not escape being its author, and I could not escape the requirements 
for authorship in academia (and, perhaps even narrower, the requirements for 
authorship of a PhD).  
Reflexivity is the strategy I have used most extensively and consistently. As I 
have said, reflexivity risks repeating colonizing geometries (Barad, 2007:87-71), re-
centering the (white, in my case) academic, and even decreasing the legitimacy of the 
research. Nonetheless, reflexivity and sometimes autoethnography were the ways I 
kept all these problems open and visible, and how I explored them throughout the 
project. My self-examination was, however, targeted. It had clearly defined 
parameters and functions. By making the production and producer of the thesis 
visible, this was one way of taking seriously the theories of knowledge as embedded 
and contingent that were proposed by the research participants (and their critiques of 
academic conventions as not doing so) [see Chapter 6]. I have, however, included 
reflexive and autoethnographic data and reflection only when it bears on the problem 
of post-liberal agency and/or on the problem of decolonizing research more 
generally. This, in turn, lead me to the multiple and relational approach to ethics that 
I described in the introduction and practice throughout the thesis.  
Writing a thesis  
Returning to my desk in Edinburgh, I had generated fieldnotes from five 
separate research trips with Dechinta and Akitsiraq. These notes ranged from single 
words scribbled in a damp notebook in a teepee by firelight before falling asleep, to 
blow-by-blow accounts of lessons I was sitting in, or events I had just walked out of 
(in Ottawa, I frequently talked to my dictaphone as I walked from an interview or 
event to a bus stop). I also had notes, and less often recordings, from twenty 
individual and group interviews. Finally, I had documents that I had collected both 
prior to and during my trip, by and around both projects and the broader Northern 
university discussion. These included newspaper articles, policy documents, 
publicity, class handouts and photographs of classroom displays and whiteboards. I 
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now describe the colonizing conventions I once again encountered when it came to 
turning these materials into a thesis. I focus on writing specifically here. In Chapter 
8, I show how I constructed the actual arguments of the thesis.  
One of the key aspects of academic work, especially at PhD level, is that the 
various parts of knowledge production are divided up clearly. A PhD generally has 
identifiably separable methods, literature, theory and data, for example, if not 
specific sections dedicated to each. These parts are then represented as having 
followed a linear temporality. Generally research questions come first, then a 
methodology, then data collection, then analysis and then writing. This temporality is 
evidenced in my discussion of my induction week above. Even an approach like 
“grounded theory” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which seeks to create data-informed 
questions and analysis, is still a linear temporal arrangement of these parts of 
research. When my PhD induction week presenter told us not to worry, that we 
would be able to “impose a narrative” later, what she meant was that we would be 
able to separate out these various parts and organize them in linear time. We would, 
she was saying, be able to organize our research experience into a narrative including 
a rationale, methodology, data collection, analysis and conclusions – occurring more 
or less in that order, and distinguishable from each other. She was telling us that the 
PhD and research process is messy, but that a thesis is linear and coherent.  I have 
taken great comfort from this throughout the PhD and have self-consciously 
practiced the shaping of my research experience into narratives at regular intervals. I 
have reorganised and re-told the constituent parts of research in successive accounts 
of my PhD. I have tried out these stories on others and assessed how intelligible, 
convincing and appealing each version seemed.  
Each of these narratives was ‘true’ in that it is assembled out of events and 
practices in my research that really happened. Each of these narratives was one way 
of doing the sense-making work integral to social research. Yet my separation of 
theory, methods and fieldwork in these narratives is also only partly true. I show 
throughout the thesis how these aspects were, in fact, entangled in the contexts in 
which I have worked. What interests me here, however, is not that they fail to 
capture the general mess or what the induction week presenter called the “muddling” 
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of the research process, of my research process – although they do failure to capture 
it – but how these linear and divisible narratives construct realities which align with 
liberal and colonizing logics. Linear progressive stories are troubling in colonial 
contexts. This is so even when those stories eschew crude versions of discovery and 
enlightenment in favour of a more humble but no less linear/progressive beginnings 
(problems), middles (research), and ends (arrivals). This telling of the research story 
is not arbitrary: its temporality, its actors, and its knowledge all align with the spatio-
temporalities at work in settler-colonialism and late liberalism. This is one way in 
which the terms of legitimacy of my own location in the university are the same 
terms with which participants were also grappling. The reduction of mess in this way 
in this instance is not arbitrary, but deeply political in the context in which it works. 
This research spatio-temporality is echoed again in the literal writing on the 
thesis, right down to its grammatical conventions. Convention demands that I write 
about scholars in the present tense. For example, Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox (2012) 
‘argues’ that the way academics use tenses universalizes the voices of scholars. 
Convention also requires that I write about my so-called participants in the past. For 
example, Stephanie ‘said’ that that writing research participants in the past tense 
delegitimizes their perspectives. I might even go further and tell you that we were 
sitting in a pub when Stephanie told me that – but probably not that I was sitting in a 
pub when I read Irlbacher-Fox, or even when or where I read Irlbacher-Fox. In this 
way, through tense and location, the scholarly author is both unified and 
universalised, whilst the ‘lay’ actor is always local, contingent and less authoritative.  
This problem was further complicated and exposed in my project where, like 
others, Stephanie is both an author in my academic field and a participant in my 
research. Do I refer to her one minute in one way, and the next another? Do I report 
Stephanie’s words in her book more honestly – using ‘Stephanie said’? Do I start 
referencing every chat I have in the pub I have about my research?  What would this 
mean for the status of academic knowledge – for the separation of theory and the 
empirical? The function of this separation is to maintain a hierarchy of knowledge 
and knower, mapped onto a separation of theory and the empirical and enacted 
through the use of particular tenses in academic writing. This separation is the target 
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of the place based pedagogies I describe in Chapter 6. If I reject convention, I risk 
seeming like I am not fluent in academic language. If I am completely honest, 
sometimes I took something Stephanie said in a boat, looked it up in her book and 
then referenced it Harvard style to add legitimacy to my writing. Again, I have 
followed a strategy of multiplicity and relation.  
My point here is that these demands for linearity, separation and hierarchy 
kept pushing back against my attempts to alleviate ethical issues in the research 
process – attempts which, themselves, were also intextricably bound up in the limits 
of my research context. I was striving for legitimacy: in my university, with the 
research participants and, ultimately, also for myself. Of course, I am not only an 
academic and some of the other things I am, such as a queer feminist, sometimes 
conflict with the academe. Yet whilst my personal sympathies might align against the 
university, my experience and subjecthood are to a large extent produced by it. 
Increasingly these demands were not only external, they were internal – becoming 
markers by which I could judge my own self-worth. Words like ‘data’ started 
slipping into my vocabulary, despite my initial objection to their role in my research. 
I talked about the ‘impact’ of my research to obtain a grant, but did not remove quite 
all of the strategic language I had incorporated from further iterations of my research 
proposal. Most of all, I wrote a thesis which can be read and makes sense linearly 
and which I even agree is more accessible for incorporating this convention. I hope, 
however, that it can also be read some other way. That is, that I have wedded 
convention and legitimacy with disruption and alternatives. This is a balance, a 
response to both needs, but it also a necessary relationship with its own effect. That 
effect is the argument I make in the thesis.   
To summarize, the current thesis is fraught with ethical dilemmas. Rather 
than resolve these dilemmas, I chose to explore them in the course of the research. I 
used the established strategies of identity, positionality, reflexivity, deference and 
silence to understand and navigate my own ethical action and agency as a researcher. 
By using these strategies in my work with Northern higher education, I showed that 
they were limited and aligned with the colonizing spatio-temporalities that Northern 
educators critiqued and resisted. I showed how telling research stories or ‘data 
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analysis’ along with conventions of tense use are often similarly informed by a linear 
and progressive temporality. There are no easy solutions to these. Like the 
participants, I am embedded in these logics and looking to them for my own security 
and legitimacy (as well as that of the anti-colonial arguments I make). I suggest, 
however, that the multiple and relational workings of agency in the story I tell in the 
rest of the thesis provide a model for navigating this tricky ethical domain.  
Conclusion 
This chapter serves two functions in the current thesis. First, the chapter 
describes my methodological approach and methods practices. The thesis draws on 
praxiography because praxiography enables my aim of exploring agency empirically 
and aligns with the critical and queer epistemology that informs that aim. Putting 
praxiography into practice meant, for me, going to the North, participating in 
Akitsiraq and Dechinta, interviewing actors and reading a range of documents. 
Second, the chapter frames and begins the autoethnographic and methodological 
dimension to the current project. In this dimension, I examine my own experiences in 
attempting to act ethically in the context of academia. Throughout the thesis, I show 
that these experiences converged with and were guided by those of the research 
participants. I therefore use my own activities a site in which to explore agency. I 
argue that the spatio-temporalities of liberalisms are particularly salient when it 
comes to imagining or reimaging the meaning of action. I also argue that researcher 
agency can be productively practiced and theorized as ‘post-liberal’. This 
methodology chapter is the first part of making this argument. In the following 
chapter I begin my empirical engagement with the politics of decolonization in 
Canada.   
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4. The politics of decolonization 
in Canada    
 
This chapter is about what I call the ‘decolonization debate’. The 
decolonization debate is a controversy as to what anti- or non- colonial political 
action looks like, given that a central pillar of settler-colonialism is the capture and 
regulation of what counts as politics. Actors in the decolonization debate include 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals, organizations, governments and groups 
of various kinds. They include leaders, activists (from anarchists to human rights 
advocates), politicians, lawyers and researchers. All the academic literature I 
reference in this chapter is authored by scholars who are also active in the world 
beyond academia in a way that reflects or informs their scholarship. Their 
interactions are often fierce, with resurgence paradigm actors denouncing Indigenous 
people who engage the state as effectively self-colonizing and self-assimilating 
(Alfred, 2005:86-87). Anti-colonial activists in Canada, including many participants 
in the current project, are organizing their lives around their positions in the 
decolonization debate. As Slash describes, for example, he is torn between whether 
he is more likely to find agency, as an Indian, in living traditionally off the land and 
somewhat separately from most of Canada, or by succeeding in formal education and 
participating as a Canadian citizen (Armstrong, 1998:69).  
The decolonization debate is shaped by two clusters of voices. Voices in one 
cluster suggest decolonization should and can happen within, and adapt, the liberal 
tools of the settler state (Borrows, 2002; Tully, 2005; Assembly of First Nations, 
2014). Voices in the other cluster assert that these tools are inherently colonizing, 
and that decolonization can only happen outside or against them (Alfred, 2005; 
Smith, 2005; Coulthard, 2010). The decolonization debate is therefore a concrete 
version of the agency problem I described in the previous chapter: how to act 
simultaneously against, to transform and within a set of logics and practices (the 
settler-colonial state) which sets the terms for action. In my reading, each cluster 
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includes either an implicit or explicit version of history, power and politics: accounts 
and interpretations of how colonization happened/happens and what this means for 
de-, non- or anti- colonial action. In this chapter, I describe the debate as turning on: 
the location and form of agency involved in treaty-making; the form of (often 
Indigenous) subject or actor; the modes of action and self-determination available in 
state-based political strategies, activities and languages today; and the risks of 
assimilation or recolonization in all these things. I return to these themes repeatedly 
throughout this Chapter. In all these ways, the decolonization debate is both a 
product of and an instance of struggles over the meaning of agency political agency. 
The debate is a concrete version of the problem of agency I have outlined thus far. 
The debate is also the starting point for my empirical investigation of the 
contingencies and contestation of political agency in this thesis.  
In this chapter, I begin to show the specificities of liberal logics and their 
challengers in settler-colonial Canada. I later show how these specificities are taken 
up in the education projects I worked with. In the first section I describe the late 
liberal narrative of decolonization. I call this cluster of thinking ‘state,’ 
‘constitutional,’ or ‘liberal,’ depending on my emphasis. This cluster includes 
narratives within or aligned with the late liberal settler state. In this cluster treaty-
making, Indian Status, Canadian citizenship, Indigenous organization membership, 
Land Claim negotiations and Self Government agreements all affirm Indigenous 
individuals as pre-formed political actors and state strategies as mechanisms through 
which those actors can exercise agency and self-determination strategically. At the 
same time, in my reading, the discourse of ‘reconciliation’ between settler and 
Indigenous populations, as well as ‘recognition’ of Indigenous people by the state, 
both affirm the separateness and fixedness of settler and Indigenous identities and 
agencies. They also assume the authority of the state to recognize (i.e. enable or 
condone) Indigenous people and their existence as a group or category. In this line, 
the violence of the residential school system and assimilation policy are aberrations 
on the history of Indigenous settler relations in Canada: colonialism is a past event 
and mistake, rather than a set of distributive (Fraser, 2000), spatial or structural 
relationships or processes. Space and place are static objects to be owned or managed 
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as governed through Land Claims. All these logics and practices align with the 
liberal forms of agency described in the previous chapter.  
In the second section I describe the second cluster of voices which is 
generally known (and self-identifies) as the “paradigm advocating Indigenous 
resurgence” (Irlbacher-Fox, 2009:4). The resurgence paradigm includes counter-
narratives of power, history and politics. These centre critiques of Indigenous 
engagement with the late liberal state as assimilatory and of the state and liberalism 
themselves as inherently colonial – contingent on colonizing logics and practices 
(Alfred, 2005; Smith, 2005). In this line, Indigenous or decolonizing agency cannot 
be liberal, because it is precisely liberal forms of agency that have worked to 
colonize in the first place, and because liberal action is impossible without 
colonization. In addition, colonization is an ongoing process, not an event, and must 
be understood spatially rather than temporally (Wolfe, 1999).  Participants in this 
cluster therefore attempt to articulate and practice non-liberal forms of politics, actor 
and agency: on the levels of ontology and epistemology; in daily life and practices; 
collectively and anarchically; and around Indigeneity as a (often spatial) practice 
rather than a category. Like the queer and critical accounts of non-liberal agency 
reviewed in the previous chapter, however, they have an uneasy and slippery 
relationship to liberalism.  
In the first two sections I therefore show how, in the politics of 
decolonization in Canada, political agency is presented as an either/or problem: 
either within the late liberal state, or against it. In the third and final section, I return 
to academia again. I focus particularly closely on theories of alliances between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars and scholarship. By ‘alliances’ I do not 
simply mean co-authoring or direct collaboration between individuals. I mean all the 
ways in which the work of colonizers, settlers and white people attempts to ally with 
the goal of decolonization. I show how the same concerns and framing, along with 
the two clusters of approaches to anti-colonial action, approach the question of 
whether and how researchers should operate in colonial contexts. I also show, 
however, how the either/or way of articulating the problem also begins to break 
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down in practice. The rest of the thesis further undermines and problematizes this 
way of framing political action and agency.  
A note on the word ‘decolonization’: in the academic and activist circles that 
I engage here, the word ‘decolonization’ is used to describe any action towards 
creating non-colonial futures. This is far more than simply undoing colonization (i.e. 
going backwards) as the ‘de’ might suggest (although I do wonder about the 
temporality implicit in the word – more on this later). It has become increasingly 
common to use the word ‘decolonization’ instead of ‘post-colonial,’ particularly in 
settler-colonial contexts.  This is in order to recognize the ongoing present of 
colonialism as well as the nature of colonization as a material process rather than 
event or ideology, as theorized by Patrick Wolfe [2006] (i.e. ‘ization’ rather than 
‘ism’). ‘Decolonization’ also signals a political orientation to that present and a 
desire to transform it. The emergence of decolonization as an academic concept and 
concern is a result of the increasing presence of Indigenous and anti-colonial voices 
in academia in specifically settler-colonial contexts, including North America, Latin 
America and the Middle East. Canadian decolonization scholarship has played a 
leading role in creating and developing this new field. 
4.1 State narratives of history and politics  
In 1996 the Canadian Federal Government published a 4000 page history of 
Aboriginal, settler and state relations in Canada. The report (also known as ‘the 
RCAP’) was the product of several years of consultation with Indigenous 
communities by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The RCAP goes 
beyond the typical scope and language of a state report in its critique of Canada and 
the Church and its recognition of multiple epistemologies and cosmologies.  The 
RCAP is therefore indicative of the most radical potential of state knowledge and 
practices.  This contrasts with, for example, Canadian Prime Minister Harper stating 
that Canada “… we [Canada] have no history of colonialism,” (Harper in Ljunggren, 
2009).  Nonetheless, in this section I show the RCAP to be in alignment with late 
liberal stories of colonization and decolonization more generally. These stories are 
generally told by Federal, Provincial and Territorial Governments and courts, as well 
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as by Indigenous organizations and interest groups of various kinds that work with or 
within those governments (to be clear, all these Governments include Aboriginal 
individuals). Alongside the RCAP, I also draw on the various policies and 
government initiatives that respond to demands for decolonization in the last forty 
years: land claim agreements, self-government agreements, the truth and 
reconciliation commission, and the discourses of reconciliation and recognition.  
As I described in the previous chapter, late liberalism is the form that “liberal 
governmentality” has taken as it “responds to a series of legitimacy crises in the 
wake of anticolonial, new social movements, and new Islamic movements” 
(Povinelli, 2011: 25). The autological and economic subjects and logics of classical 
and neo- liberalisms inform and are joined by state and liberal narratives of 
difference and recognition, in which “culture has become an object that one could 
possess or insufficiently create” and that is “pliant to legal and social science analysis 
and political and social incorporation” (Povinelli, 2011: 26). In Canada, this occurs 
in state narratives of colonization and decolonization. In the last chapter I also argued 
that linear and progressive temporalities, coupled with (and often organizing) 
stagnant and universal versions of space, are present across liberalisms (Coulthard, 
2010). These spatio-temporalities structure the narratives of decolonization and 
decolonizing action I describe in this chapter. The specifics of these narratives vary 
between narrator and location. Nonetheless, the logics of these stories and of political 
action and agency within them all align with the late liberal state and the versions of 
liberal agency described in the previous chapter. 
The late liberal story of colonization in Canada is often phased, linear and 
teleological, moving from cooperation, through conflict, and onto reconciliation. J. 
R. Miller, for example, a well-known historian of Indigenous-settler relations, tells 
the story from first contact to treaty-making (“cooperation”) to colonization 
(“coercion”) to resistance, reconciliation and recognition (“confrontation” of the 
state) [Miller, 2000: chapter titles; see also Miller, 1996, 2009].
 
The RCAP identifies 
“stages,”  numbered 1-4: “Stage One: Separate Worlds,” “Stage Two: Contact and 
Co-operation,” “Stage Three: Displacement and Assimilation,” and “Stage Four: 
Negotiation and Renewal,” (RCAP, 1996: section headings).  First contact generally 
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encompasses some or all of the period between European arrival in the late 1500s 
and the beginning of treaty-making in 1867. State narratives of first contact tend to 
focus on variety, on cooperation and on Indigenous agency (RCAP, 1996; Miller, 
1996, 2000, 2009). During this period, varied European actors including French and 
British explorers, traders, officials, missionaries and settlers interacted with equally 
varied Indigenous groups and nations. Those interactions were often voluntary on the 
part of Indigenous people and cooperative with Europeans (for example in trade, 
hunting and guiding). Even conflict or war was a legitimate interaction between two 
peoples competing for a space. The official narrative, exemplified by the RCAP, 
stresses the unconstrained and individual agency of Indigenous people and state 
agents interacting at this time. 
Treaty-making is the second phase in this narrative. From 1867 to 1921 the 
British Crown signed the ‘numbered treaties’ with First Nations in Canada. Treaties 
assigned land rights to both parties. This usually meant the succession of Indigenous 
land to Europeans and the assignment of reserve land to Indigenous people. Treaty-
making followed the consolidation and creation of the Canadian state through 
confederation in 1867. Treaty-making facilitated more secure, legal and legitimate 
access to land by the state and its settler citizens. Each treaty was unique, made with 
an individual First Nation. Treaties were contracts between nations. They therefore 
affirmed the national status and diversity of Indigenous peoples. For this reason 
treaties are highly valued in late liberal narratives of decolonization and in 
Indigenous communities today (as when the National Chief Atleo says “we are all 
treaty people” [Assembly of First Nations, 2014). I want to note two underlying 
logics of treaties here. First, treaties draw on and enact a relation of property between 
people and land: they assume that land can be owned, portioned, assigned and signed 
away.  Second, treaties work within a representative political logic: they assume that 
a person can represent a group or nation, and sign a treaty on behalf of that group or 
nation. That person and that group are clearly defined, autonomous and legal entities. 
Taiaiaki Alfred (2005:144-151) makes both these arguments. I return to these logics 
of treaties and their alignment with liberal logics of action in the following chapters.  
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The 1876 Indian Act re-wrote the state version of Indigenous people from 
autonomous, varied nations to homogenous, subservient “wards” (not yet but later 
citizens) of the Canadian state (RCAP Part Two, Section 9).  Through the Indian Act, 
the state recognized “Status Indians” and granted certain legal rights (such as voting, 
welfare, reserve access and tax exemption) and limits to those Indians. It determined 
who belonged to a community and who counted as Indian legally and it did so 
initially around European social values. For example, the Act excluded women who 
married white men from Indian Status, but not men who married white women. This 
exclusion aligned with European gender norms (Emberley, 2001). The Indian Act 
also created a set of political, governing institutions in Indigenous communities with 
the authority of the Canadian state. It established “Band Councils” in each state-
recognised “Band” (no longer nation) of Indians. Officially elected representatives of 
bands could then interact with the Canadian Government and govern internally with 
state legitimacy. This was intended to replace pre-existing, often hereditary, systems 
of governance within Indigenous communities, which were no longer acknowledged 
by the Canadian state. The new systems aligned with the same norms as Status. All 
these clauses, with exception of the gender differences (Government of Canada, 
1985), remain in the Indian Act (1879) and in force today.  
In the liberal narrative, the Indian Act is the mechanism through which 
communities are able to govern themselves. It is also a primary state marker of 
Indigenous difference. This legal difference is, as I described, meaningful materially 
and socially. It is so meaningful that Indigenous groups and individuals have fought 
for inclusion and equality under the Indian Act (changing, for example, the sexist 
provisions described above). An effort (a white paper) from the Federal Government 
to abolish the Indian Act in 1969 was met with a fierce backlash from First Nations 
(a “red paper”) and is understood within the liberal narrative to have begun a new era 
of Indigenous activism. In this new era Indigenous political activity was expressed 
and intelligible within the terms of the state. This activity refused assimilation and 
demanded recognition of Indigenous difference and Indigenous rights in law. 
Although the Indian Act actually happened simultaneously with treaty-making, it is 
not usually located within the treaty-making phase but rather in the next phase – 
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colonization – because it undermines their autonomy as nations and asserts Canada’s 
authority over them.  
The third phase, “colonization”, is associated with or reduced to assimilation 
policy (and sometimes, even more narrowly, simply with/to residential schooling). 
The Gradual Civilization Act (1857) stated that Indians should:  
“be consolidated on few reservations, and provided with ‘permanent 
individual homes’; that the tribal relation should be abolished; that lands should be 
allotted in severalty and not in common; that the Indian should speedily become a 
citizen… enjoy the protection of the law, and be made amenable thereto; that, finally, 
it was the duty of the Government to afford the Indians all reasonable aid in their 
preparation for citizenship by educating them in industry and in the arts of 
civilization” 
Residential schools, which I describe below in greater detail, were the 
primary vehicle for fulfilling these assimilatory goals and for “killing the Indian in 
the child,” (Parliament of Canada, Hansard, 2008). Compulsory state-funded, 
church-run schools attempted to socialize Indian children into settler society and 
culture through a variety of methods ranging from religious and academic teaching to 
direct violence efforts. At the same time, traditional practices (like the potlatch in 
1884 and the sun dance in 1885) were banned in many communities and previously 
nomadic peoples were required to settle by law and (government engineered) 
economic necessity. This drive toward assimilation was fueled and justified by 
colonial ideas about “savage”, “barbaric” and even “nobel” Indians in need of 
saving, civilizing or even “shepherding out” of existence and the “euthanasia of 
savage communities,” (Francis, 1992:199; see also Berkhofer, 1979). 
Assimilation policy and practices, particularly residential schools, have been 
the impetus and target of the most recent “reconciliation” and “recognition” phase of 
liberal decolonization (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2014). This phase 
includes the abolition of residential schools, the introduction of legislation for land 
claims and self-government agreements, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
around residential schools (including a financial payout for residential school 
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survivors), a public apology from the Conservative Prime Minister for residential 
schools, and a general discourse of “recognition” of Aboriginal difference, value and 
belonging (as per Charles Taylor [1992] or Will Kymlicka [1998]). This shift in the 
state discourse around Indigenous-state relations has occurred largely through the 
political action and organizing of Indigenous peoples with and within the Canadian 
state, especially by the Assembly of First Nations. The generations of residential 
school survivors and graduates have been especially pivotal in driving this shift. 
Graduates and survivors left residential schools with the linguistic and cultural 
capital and political motivation and common ground they needed for attempting to 
create change in this way. They used this capital to mediate between courtrooms, 
legislatures and Indigenous communities. I am pointing out the roles of residential 
school survivors because I do not want to say the late liberal narrative is imposed 
top-down by a white state. Nor do I want to paint Indigenous people as passive 
victims.  
Alongside recognition this generation of activists also negotiated the 
possibility of land-claims or “modern treaties” (Alfred, 2005:144). Land claims are 
agreements between specific Indigenous peoples and the Federal Government. 
Claims assign specific land ownership and management rights to both parties, 
usually “extinguish Aboriginal rights,” and are entrenched in constitutional law. An 
Indigenous people is represented by an Indigenous organization, which is elected by 
its members. Those members are then “beneficiaries” of any agreement that is made 
(this language can be found across land claims, and in the Nunavut Land Claim 
Agreement specifically). The Indigenous organization negotiates the agreement, 
oversees its implementation and manages any collectively owned or accessed 
resources on behalf of beneficiaries. In many regions, these organizations have 
become another layer of government, along with Federal, Territorial and Band 
governments. Self-government agreements are similar constitutional contracts, made 
with Indigenous organizations. However they do not assign land rights but rather 
rights to govern within a specific Indigenous nation or group. Although self-
government agreements might permit governance out-with the usual boundaries and 
norms of the Canadian state, they do so through state mechanisms. This illustrates 
how, as Elizabeth Povinelli describes, liberal orders can “make room for difference” 
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without disturbing their “fundamental truths” (Povinelli, 2011:26). Through these 
forms of government, Indigenous people are assigned agency and can act but only 
within state terms. Agency in those terms is rights-holding, property ownership and 
legal recognition. As such it is individual, autological and juridical again.    
The Assembly of First Nations also lobbied the Federal Government to 
establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission on residential schooling, a payout 
to residential school survivors and a public apology for residential schooling. The 
Assembly of First Nations is the organization representing all First Nations 
governments and band councils in Canada (this does not include Inuit who 
participated separately in the negotiations). The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission recognizes the damage of residential schooling and the Federal 
Government’s role in it. This recognition is both political and economic. It aims to 
“heal the relationship” between Aboriginal peoples and the Federal Government, as 
well as “compensate” financially for trauma experienced (Residential Schools 
Settlement Agreement, 2008). In this part of the late liberal narrative, colonialism is 
reduced to residential schooling, and compensation and recognition both happen in 
money and individually not collectively.  Colonialism is limited temporally to events 
in the past. 
This phased late liberal story is told, sanctioned and enacted by the Canadian 
state, including by Indigenous groups operating within the state, as illustrated by the 
RCAP. In this late liberal narrative, Indigenous people are a cultural and legal 
category and they have been oppressed primarily through cultural assimilation and as 
such they can be un-oppressed through legal and rhetorical recognition and 
reconciliation. This late liberal story of colonization and decolonization is expressed 
temporally (apologies for the past and hopes for the future), without recognition of 
colonialism’s spatial dimension (displacement and dispossession). When the state 
narrative does reference space or land, it is with with specific, bounded spatial 
concepts (management and ownership) that still prioritize time (prior occupancy or 
cultural continuity are conditions of land claims). Actors are assumed to be rights-
holding, voting, contracting, representing and land owning autonomous subjects. 
Action and politics are assumed to happen in legislatures, court rooms, band 
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councils, board rooms and so-on. There is a complex interrelation here between the 
effects of Indigenous action on the state, the responses of the state to Indigenous 
challenges, and the incorporation of Indigenous action into the structures and logics 
of the state. This is the terrain of struggle that constitutes late liberalism (Povinelli, 
2011).   
Participants in land claims, self-government, rights, reconciliation and 
recognition, are diverse and have varied rationales for and interpretations of their 
engagement. Not all participants buy fully into the state narrative. Indigenous 
lawyers in particular are simultaneously critical of the ways in which state narratives 
and mechanisms are potentially colonizing, but nonetheless see hope in and attempt 
to work with them (John Borrows [2002], discussed below, is the best known 
example of this). I now review three sets of academic and activist orientations to this 
story that are sceptical of it, it but nonetheless engage it. Sometimes, I argue, their 
critiques actually rely on the same liberal logics they claim scepticism of. In these 
federal and constitutional stories, Indigenous actors are legal, state, citizen actors 
again, with power being exercised bureaucratically and institutionally. These three 
versions of the liberal story are related and not necessarily mutually exclusive. My 
goal in reviewing them here is to show how liberal articulations of Indigenous 
agency and decolonizing action are varied, but that certain logics are also persistent 
across them.  
As I mentioned earlier, one way of reading the history of treaty-making offers 
is as evidence of a history of nation-to-nation cooperation and recognition between 
settlers and Indigenous people (Henderson, 1994). Land claims might revive and 
embody this original spirit of treaty. The state and law can be understood in this vein 
as a form of ongoing dialogue and therefore as being as varied, contingent and 
changeable as any dialogue – albeit with asymmetric participation between 
Indigenous people and settlers thus far (Borrows, 2002). In this line, treaties could 
create “treaty-federalism,” with Indigenous peoples on a par with other governments 
within the Canada federation (Henderson, 1994:241). Treaty-federalism sits 
reasonably comfortably within the Canadian state as it exists (although its full 
implications – a state founded in treaty and a meeting of equal peoples might not). 
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The Assembly of First Nations makes this treaty-federalist argument, calling for the 
renewal and implementation of treaties, and pointing out that “all” Canadians (settler 
and Indigenous) are “treaty people” (Assembly of First Nations, 2014). There is 
some debate as to the meaning of treaties themselves (whether they necessarily enact 
politics as representation and ownership, for example). Ultimately, however, actors 
are still signatories, beneficiaries and representative Indigenous organizations. 
Action is still legal and contractual. Power is still held and distributed, albeit more 
evenly between First Nations and the state rather than being granted to First Nations 
by the state.  
James Tully (2005) suggests that it is possible self-consciously re-imagine 
and re-articulate the state to be inclusive of Indigenous participants - rather than the 
state being inherently colonial (or inherently anything). This includes replacing the 
idea of a unified Canadian ‘nation’ with treaty-federalism as described above, but 
also showing how settler states are already informed by Indigenous people (or 
creating a history in which they are). Tully, for example, shows how the US 
Declaration of Independence was informed by the Iroquois Confederacy and in doing 
so attempts to enact an already Indigenous US constitution (Tully, 2005). Similarly, 
in Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, Borrows shows how Indigenous law has 
influenced Canadian federalism (Borrows, 2010). Through re-articulating and re-
remembering in these ways, the late liberal settler state might be re-imagined as 
inclusive, not colonizing, of Indigenous peoples. In this story the nature of reality 
and governance is beginning to shift. Rather than being taken-as-given or essential, 
the state is constructed discursively and therefore open to reinvention. That 
reinvention, however, remains strategic. I return to the meanings of strategy in the 
context of the current project in Chapter 5.  
Finally, in a more radical interpretation, instead of being within the Canadian 
constitutional order, treaties might be understood as a meeting of different legal or 
constitutional orders. Keira Ladner, for example, raises this as a possibility but not a 
reality (Ladner, 2005, 2009). In Ladner’s version, different sorts of actor, agency and 
action are available, legitimate or visible in different orders, with treaty being the 
point at which they meet or are translated. In an Indigenous context, she argues, 
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treaties have a different meaning than in settler and state contexts. When these 
contexts meet, these two versions of treaty interact but do not necessarily collapse 
into each other. This narrative is much further removed from that of the state and 
leaves open questions of how and whether this is possible.  
While the narratives of decolonization I have described here are varied, all 
see some potential in the late liberal state for anti-, un- or de- colonial action. Indeed, 
many of those narratives are articulated by or with state actors themselves. These 
accounts of anti-colonial action rest on autological and juridical versions of agency 
as well as linear progressive temporalities. In land claims, self government 
agreements, Indigenous organizations and band councils, the actor is taken to be a 
legal entity capable of buying, managing, signing, electing, representing and so-on. 
Action happens in law, legislatures and courtrooms. The story that is told about this 
form of action is phased and forwards-moving. Even when the very dates referenced 
in the story are concurrent, they are still separated out as if they were successive (as 
in treaty making and the Indian Act). In the next section I go onto describe 
challenges to this late liberal narrative of colonization and decolonization. These 
challenges, I argue, operate around different understandings of history, power and 
agency.   
4.2 Counter narratives of power and action  
In this section I review alternate narratives of decolonization. Together these 
are known commonly as the ‘resurgence paradigm’.
 
‘Resurgence’ invokes a form of 
action that is dynamic and goes beyond resistance, beyond any single relation to 
colonialism, and beyond revival.  The resurgence paradigm operates around non-
liberal and anti-liberal critiques of the settler state and of attempts to decolonize with 
or within the state. Within the resurgence paradigm, individuals articulate, assume or 
practice non-liberal or anti-liberal forms of government, action, actor and agency. 
With different accounts of power, they produce different accounts of history – of 
colonization and decolonization. First, they show how liberal and state logics and 
activities are not neutral mechanisms for redistributing power juridically, but rather 
assimilatory cultural practices. Treaty-making in particular is not nation-to-nation 
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negotiation but yet another practice in a series of practices which attempt to 
reorganize Indigenous life and governance to align with European and state norms. 
Second, they show how the logics of the settler-state are contingent on colonization 
and the exclusion of Indigeneity. Third, they show how forms of state recognition – 
whether in the form of Indian status or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – 
are in fact state claims to authority over Indigenous people which assume culture and 
subjectivity take late liberal forms. Finally, scholars and activists in the resurgence 
paradigm attempt to articulate and practice forms of politics outside or against the 
settler state. These include everyday practices of knowledge, culture, relationships to 
land and community and politics located in books, on barricades and in homes rather 
than in courtrooms or legislatures.   
First, participants in this cluster tend to have an account of power and reality 
as constituted in everyday or micro practices (Allen, 1998; Alfred, 2005; Smith, 
2005).  This generates a narrative of colonization and decolonization – especially of 
treaty-making and land claims – that looks different to that described in the previous 
section. Assimilation is especially important to this account because it is the 
everyday reorganization of Indigenous lives and erosion of Indigenous daily cultural 
practices (and with them the reality they enact) which constitute cultural genocide 
and colonization (Wolf, 2006: 387). This is an ongoing process occurring from 
smallpox and wage economy brought by settlers (the resurgence paradigm’s focus in 
the “first contact” phase) through the making of both numbered and modern treaties. 
There is a continuous and ongoing logic of colonization throughout Indigenous-
settler relations, rather than colonization being a mistake or phase.  
Power, in this account, is not simply redistributed through treaties and land 
claims. Treaties and land claims are conceptualized as everyday practices – 
reorganizing Indigenous lives, communities and government around the logics, 
norms and practices of settlers, liberalism and the state. They create new elites – 
privileging men, English and bureaucratic skills and disrupting hereditary lines, 
gender balances, Indigenous languages and traditional or land based skills (these are 
the “brown white men” Slash was talking about). Land Claims are as much of an 
industry as they are a governmental mechanism, with corresponding economic elites 
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(Mitchell, 1996). Through land claims and treaties, land is increasingly owned, 
managed or divided. This contrast with Indigenous tradition in which land is 
stewarded or itself an agent, governing of Indigenous communities (I describe this at 
length in Chapter 6). Having a say in the dominant system of government has been a 
strong incentive for Indigenous involvement in these practices (Alfred, 2005). In 
these ways, resurgence scholars and activists argue that treaty making is part of the 
assimilation of ideas and norms around what political action, actors and authority 
look like.  
Second, participants in the resurgence paradigm expose the rationalities and 
strategies of state politics as necessarily colonial.  In one strand of this dimension, 
the state is by nature an “exclusionary concept rooted in an adversarial and coercive 
Western notion of power” (Alfred, 2005:83; same idea in Smith, 2005).  In this 
argument the state is founded on colonial power.  As such that power cannot be 
challenged without challenging the state (Alfred, 2005:82).  In a second strand, the 
state is contingent upon a certain version of Indigeneity.  In this strand, to engage 
state politics is to reinscribe the pre-conditional exclusion and inferiority of 
Indigeneity, and the problematic dichotomies entwined in the historical co-
production of state and Indigeneity (Shaw, 2008).  Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s barbaric 
and noble Indian others are most emblematic of this logic and how Indigeneity is a 
necessary other to state politics (Hobbes, 1996; Rousseau, 1968).  
Third, “recognition” reinscribes the state’s authority to do that recognizing 
and reduces Indigeneity to “cultural difference” rather than a mode of government or 
spatiality that is fundamentally challenging to liberal government and its legitimacy 
(Povinelli, 2011). This makes Indigeneity commensurable in the language of 
liberalism. In an online article for the the New Socialist (2006) Glen Coulthard, a 
Dene scholar and Dechinta creator and instructor, describes the politics of 
recognition as the “range of recognition-based models of liberal pluralism that… 
instead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the ideal of 
mutuality… promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonial power that 
indigenous peoples have historically sought to transcend.” Coulthard points to the 
potentially assimilating effects of engaging in liberal and state politics for Indigenous 
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peoples: “…the power relations within and against which indigenous demands for 
recognition are made can subtly shape the subjectivities and worldviews of the 
indigenous claimants involved.” If power works not in juridical or economic ways 
but in micro level cultural practices what does that mean for Indigenous resistance? 
Coulthard’s argument is common to the resurgence paradigm in which power is 
understood as operating in everyday ways making the everyday of late liberal politics 
assimilating.  
In these counter narratives of colonial power and history, state and liberal 
strategies cannot be routes to decolonization. Decolonization must occur in every day 
practices – in relationships with land and community, in culture, without reinscribing 
the logics of liberalism, and without need for recognition from the state or settler 
culture. Decolonization might also occur in practices which challenge the state and 
settler culture directly. The following are some examples to illustrate the diversity of 
what resurgence paradigm politics might mean in practice: i. “Self-conscious cultural 
traditionalism” involves working to strengthen Indigeneity daily lives and 
communities by living in Indigenous ways. This includes include creating alternative 
and subsistence economies and practicing traditional forms of art, religion, pedagogy 
and family (Allen, 1998; Alfred, 2005); ii. The refusal to vote in Canadian or US 
elections, refusing to give legitimacy to illegally occupying states. iii. Mohawk in 
Kanawake have expelled a number of white people from their reserve land. iv. 
Others have occupied sites where development is planned. This includes, notably, the 
stand-off in Oka in 1990 which began as a peaceful reclaiming of a traditional burial 
site about to be turned into a golf course but ended violently (I discuss this in 
Chapter 7. More recently, a blockade of a road in New Brunswick has been erected 
to prevent shale gas fracking. v. Citing Franz Fanon, Coulthard (2006) argues that 
“those of us struggling against colonialism must ‘turn away’ from the assimilative 
lure of the politics of recognition and begin to direct our struggles toward our own 
on-the-ground strategies of freedom”. These are just a few political activities that 
draw on resurgence paradigm rationalities.  
Reading this section on counter narratives together with the last section on 
late liberal narratives makes two features of the politics of decolonization clear. First, 
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there are countless diverse understandings and practices of anti-colonial action. 
Many First Nations have two or more formal governing structures operating side-by-
side with divided bases of legitimacy: traditional government structures (such as 
tribal councils) are in operation alongside (and against) state-sanctioned Band 
Councils. Other actors locate their political agency in their daily lives, in books and 
knowledge, or on barricades. Second, this multiplicity is not a comfortable plurality 
but rather an intense contestation. Participants in the decolonization debate generally 
identify or align themselves with one ‘side’. They work within either the 
constitutional or the resurgence paradigm and therefore within or against the late 
liberal state. What matters for the current thesis is the framing of this question or 
problem of political action as either/or and as oppositional. In the next section, I 
discuss further this either/or framing of the problem and show how it is engaged in 
higher education.  
4.3 Locating agency and the university  
In this section I argue that the decolonization debate turns on versions of 
agency. The debate is, in my reading, in large part a debate over what political 
agency does or should look like. The meaning of agency is a key stake in the debate. 
Making agency central and explicit in this way can, I suggest, show how the debate 
has emerged and also some of its limits and contradictions. In particular, I re-
emphasise the either/or shape of the decolonization debate and argue that it has 
become charged and polarized in this way due to the agency problem faced by its 
participants. My aim in making this argument is to make a case for centering agency 
and also to begin to denaturalize and question the way that agency is problematized 
in the decolonization debate in Canada. In the second half of this section I turn my 
attention to how the decolonization debate plays out in higher education in general. 
The second section serves to illustrate my argument, to contextualize the current 




Reading agency in  
Participants in the state debate respond to increasing dominance and attempts 
at assimilation of the liberal state in Canada and the state’s roles in colonization. 
They have reorganized and regulated political authority and around colonial, state 
and liberal logics, making these the most authoritative modes of knowledge, action 
and politics.  This produces both the imperatives and the dangers of engaging those 
strategies in a politics of decolonization. As I have described, responses to this 
problem have played out along two lines, with two sets of options being articulate for 
what James Tully calls the “arts of resistance and freedom” (Tully, 2000:42).
 
 The 
first set involves the practice of resistance within the dominant “techniques of 
government”, “the structure of domination as a whole,” or the “dominant language of 
western political thought” (Tully, 2000:42). That is, the practice of decolonization 
within the terms of the late liberal state, including juridical law. The argument here is 
that legal and financial mechanisms provide the most powerful, legitimate ways to 
making change happen – and that the settler state is not inherently colonial but rather 
open to (and possibly already inclusive of) Indigenous intervention and 
rearticulation.  
The second response involves the practice of resistance and freedom “against 
the structure of domination as a whole,” (Tully, 2000:42). That is, efforts to escape 
or evade the dominant arts of government in late liberalism – in knowledge, cultural, 
familial, local, environmental and anarchist practices. Tully points out that while the 
first approach risks assimilation, the second risks invisibility in relation to the 
dominant, late liberal, arts of government. In this way, Indigenous people and all 
those seeking to transform colonial power relations seem to be faced with erasure 
and colonization in both directions: with little space for agency. In this way, the 
possibilities for action are framed as either/or: inside or outside the late liberal state.  
Two accounts of power produce two accounts of history. Different accounts of power 
give different meanings to the same events. Each of these stories produces its own 
narrative of political action and through each runs versions of agent and agency, to 
which I turn now.  
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For scholars in the liberal and constitutional vein, Indigenous people can 
strategically chose to engage state forms of politics and government to achieve the 
political goal of decolonization. In treaty making, for example, they were not ‘duped’ 
somehow but free and rational acting agents. The same goes for modern land claims. 
This form of agency aligns with state logics making it stronger within those terms (as 
Tully points out). This form of agency also attributes critical capacity to Indigenous 
peoples and avoids essentialising or fixing them with some authentic form of 
Indigeneity from which they cannot stray. In this line, Indigenous peoples can 
change and adapt just like any other peoples. At the same time, the idea that the state 
can be altered or reimagined avoids essentializing the state as inherently colonial, or 
articulating it as one monolithic intentional agent and colonizer. This narrative of 
anti-colonial action through or with the late liberal state therefore seems to attribute 
the maximum possible agency to Indigenous people.  
The narrative is, however, autological in that it detaches political activities 
from individual actors by obscuring any way in which engaging those activities 
might change the actors themselves (as described by Coulthard above).  Further, it 
also risks blaming Indigenous people for their own oppression and as creating the 
conditions (treaty-making, for example) that have lead to their subordination and 
colonization. The constitutional approach is also blurry. It does not have the same 
clear narrative of state accountability that the resurgence paradigm does. This 
blurriness risks obscuring assimilation by attributing agency to Indigenous peoples 
and calling assimilatory change adaptation. For example, the idea that Indigenous 
bureaucrats are strategically deploying state tools obscures the non-neutrality of 
those tools and the uneven ground on which they are used. In fact this idea misses the 
non-neutrality of the very idea of ‘tools’ (ie. that Indigenous people can exist 
separately before and after their deployment and not be produced/changed/colonised 
in the process). My point here is not to assess the value or accuracy of the late liberal 
narrative of decolonization but to show that it is informed by understandings of and 
concerns with agency, as well as that it has implications for the meaning and 
possibilities of political agency.  
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In my reading scholars in the resurgence paradigm are similarly concerned 
and entangled with political agency. For scholars in the resurgence paradigm, 
colonial power is constituted and must be resisted on micro and epistemological 
levels. Decolonization happens in or against cultural assimilation and in or against 
colonial forms of knowledge. In this line, treaty making was never and is never a 
form of agency or self-determination for Indigenous people – it was and is the further 
colonisation of Indigenous people and land. Treaties in this line are done largely to 
Indigenous people, sometimes with the aid of corrupt or assimilated Indigenous 
politicians and bureaucrats. Contemporary Indigenous elites, working within the 
logics and tools of late-liberalism are puppets or even self-colonisers of the settler-
colonial state. There is no ambiguity here over where accountability for colonization 
lies: with settlers and the liberal state. There is therefore no risk here in somehow 
holding Indigenous people responsible for their own oppression. There is no risk of 
obscuring the roles of liberal and state practices in colonial power.  
At the same time, however, this attribution of agency (or lack of) articulates 
Indigenous politicians, bureaucrats and whole nations and communities as victims at 
best and colonizers at worst.  This is much like how Saba Mahmood describes 
feminists as obscuring women’s agency by equating agency with political goals or 
ends (Mahmood, 2012: 10, 14). The resurgence paradigm also risks leaving single 
fixed versions of Indigenous authenticity and the state intact. Further, it risks denying 
voice and visibility and therefore agency with the dominant form of politics in late 
liberalism, as well as denying critical capacity to those Indigenous actors who choose 
to engage the state. This denial might repeat colonial Indigenous exclusion. Again, 
my point here is not to assess the resurgence paradigm but to show how agency is 
central to its narrative and its potential implications.  
There are, as I described, more than merely two narratives of decolonization 
or two practices of decolonization politics. The decolonization debate includes 
multiple nuanced forms of political action, located along a spectrum. Many 
decolonization scholars discuss, relate and combine across different points in that 
spectrum in practice. I had particular trouble locating some of the more radical 
constitutional scholars, like Keira Ladner, who acknowledge differing settler and 
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Indigenous realities and legal orders and their contradictions yet still attempt to find a 
way to bridge and relate (Ladner, 2009). Nonetheless, even a spectrum has two 
opposed ends. The closer any account is to one of those ends, the more likely they 
are to denounce those on the other half of the spectrum.  
In this thesis I argue that there is more than opposition at work here. Instead, 
different forms of political agency and action are, in fact, interrelated and co-
constituted in myriad different ways. This argument is drawn from my fieldwork 
which showed that in everyday life and in practice many anti-colonial actors do not 
choose one or another form of politics but move between and combine them. 
Throughout the thesis I show that forms and narratives of action conceived of as 
liberal or non-liberal are actually intimately entwined, co-produced and co-
dependent. Here I want to briefly consider that the same might be true for forms of 
agency in the decolonization debate, and to point to connections that are already 
visible in the discussion above. I return to the overall implications of these potential 
connections for the politics of decolonization in the final chapter.  
Versions of agency do seem to travel and repeat across the decolonization 
debate between supposedly oppositional practices and theories of action. The 
Indigenous subject in the resurgence paradigm takes on some of the essential 
qualities of that in the liberal paradigm in the form of ‘authenticity’ or the strategic 
capacities assumed in “a self-conscious kind of cultural traditionalism” (Alfred and 
Corntassel, 2005:611). In Kanawake, for example, Mohawk are asserting Band rights 
to determine membership and reserve access under the Indian Act. They are also 
employing a biological concept of race inherited from Europeans. Conversely, the 
constitutional approach buys to some degree into the possible neutrality of explicitly 
strategic agency itself, and of critical capacity divorced from context, as articulated 
by the state and liberal democratic politics. Even the most nuanced approaches, like 
treaty-federalism and Keira Ladner’s (2005, 2009) legal orders, still seem to assume 
an autonomous individual, capable of standing outside those orders or moving 
between by rational choice and will. This last point is a key finding from my 
fieldwork: a liberal idea of choosing the non-liberal. These blurrings, complexities 
and interrelations are made visible by centering agency in an account of the 
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decolonization debate in Canada. Talking about agency means talking about forms of 
action that are not defined by the binary of colonization and resistance, but which 
still engages the concerns and ethics that motivate the decolonization debate in the 
first place. This is what I do in the rest of this thesis, beginning with higher education 
now.  
Turning to the university  
I now describe how academic work is problematized in and by the 
decolonization debate in Canada. I argue that researchers seeking to resist the 
colonizing potential of academic work are faced with another, connected, agency 
problem. Those researchers include non-Indigenous outsiders like me. I show that the 
same liberal and counter strands I described above frame and are woven throughout 
this problem and the research process. I also show, once again, how the divisions 
between these strands begin to break down in practice. This break down is only just 
visible in my discussion here, but becomes central in the subsequent chapters.  
As I described in the previous chapter, academia has both colonial and liberal 
heritages, playing central roles in both as well as in the colonization of politics and 
government specifically. Academia is also the primary site of authoritative 
knowledge production in Canada, as well as a route to economic security and 
participation in many aspects of society. Anti-colonial researchers and activists are 
faced with the question of whether and how to engage academia as a potential site of 
agency because or despite of its implication in colonization. The problems faced by 
anti-colonial researchers therefore echoes that of anti-colonial actors more generally. 
I also described in the last chapter how I personally was faced with the desire and 
imperative to resist colonizing conventions, but also with the challenge of making 
myself and my argument legitimate, intelligible and authoritative in academic terms. 
This was further complicated by my co-ordinates as a non-Indigenous UK-based 
researcher, and my initial uncertainty around whether to slant the thesis towards 
liberalism (avoiding the risk speaking for or about Indigenous peoples), or towards 
Indigenous peoples and alternatives (ensuring they were not written out).  
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As I described in the introduction, academia’s colonial heritage is in part due 
to the historical relationship between academic and Indigenous forms of knowledge; 
in part to particular patterns and tendencies within liberal university knowledge; and 
in part to non-Indigenous academics speaking about or on behalf of Indigenous 
people, and dominating academic knowledge production more generally. Academic 
knowledge has driven, justified and legitimized colonization (Smith, 1999). Like 
formal education more generally, it has also been central to colonization of 
government and politics that I describe above (Godard, 1990:149; Hoy, 2001; 
Shoemaker, 2002). Academic knowledge is often written, divisible, representative 
and universal. Even when it recognizes specificity, there is a still a universality in the 
way it travels globally. It is hard to imagine academic knowledge, in fact, that does 
not have implications beyond the specific (even when ‘generalisability’ is rejected). 
It is equally difficult to imagine an academic actor whose qualification only has 
meaning in relation to some particular spatio-temporal co-ordinates. The agent of the 
university is the autological subject. She is the formally qualified professor or the 
consumer student, who can acquire agency by acquiring knowledge and becoming 
educated. Academic knowledge is recognized by juridical government.  
As one site of liberal and state politics as I described above, academia has 
therefore become a contested site of decolonizing action: variously approached as a 
tool for gaining political authority, a tradition open to intervention and 
Indigenization, and an inherently colonizing form of action. I cannot speak to those 
who have chosen to disengage from academia entirely, however the resonance with 
the resurgence paradigm of such a decision should be clear. Those resurgence 
paradigm activists and scholars who do engage the university are, however, more 
relevant here. During my fieldwork I encountered a program called Indigenous 
Governance at the University of Victoria. Many leading scholars and activists in the 
resurgence paradigm teach at or are graduates of this program. The program 
primarily accepts Indigenous students. Students are expected to act politically 
beyond the university, maintain connections with their communities, and to use 
Indigenous epistemologies in their work. Students are rewarded for demonstrating 
community, political and epistemological values. In our conversations, former 
students explained to me that they understood the program’s aim to be “making 
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warriors,” and subverting university resources (time, space and money) to political 
ends. The university was, they argued, ultimately a colonial and neoliberal 
institution. This approach aligns more closely with Dechinta than with Akitsiraq, as I 
describe in Chapter 6.  
On the other hand are actors who argue that higher education can and should 
be made relevant to Indigenous people or Indigenized and that more Indigenous 
graduates and scholars are necessary to decolonization. These actors range from 
Government and university schemes to get more Indigenous students into education, 
to Indigenous legal scholars who attempt to change university norms from positions 
in its mainstream. Dale Turner argues that this is where the decolonization struggle 
lies and that action is writing and that agency is the forum and language with which 
to write (Turner, 2006). Unlike resurgence paradigm scholars who do not locate their 
own agency or self-determination in recognition from society more generally, the 
assertion of Indigenous knowledge as legitimate university knowledge hangs 
political legitimacy and agency in part on the intelligibility of that action in wider 
society. This logic aligns with that of the liberal and constitutional narrative of 
decolonization. Indeed, voices in this narrative are more often found in Law or 
Political Science departments than separated into Indigenous Studies. Perhaps they 
are also found more often in the university than elsewhere. This approach aligns 
more closely with Akitsiraq than Dechinta, as I describe in Chapter 5. 
This short discussion further contextualizes both my own academic work and 
the educational projects I worked with in my fieldwork. It also illustrates how the 
decolonization debate is articulated by and informs academic work.  Again, the 
choice seems to be either/or: either academics can refuse colonizing conventions or 
they can mobilize them. Both options have their own attendant risks of erasure or 
assimilation. In my case, I could refuse representative, written, generalizable and 
divisible knowledge or I could reproduce it and use that reproduction strategically. In 
this thesis, however, I do both. I am honest about the messy, non-linear research 
process. I treat a range of informal sources with the same authority as more 
conventional ones (e.g. chats and feelings like books and interviews) and approach 
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participants’ stories as theory. I also make myself and my personal and professional 
investments and limits explicit.   
Straying from convention in these ways did, I felt, make it harder to get my 
research taken seriously. I risked erasing my commitments to decolonization and my 
own success from academia by articulating both in ways that were not always visible 
from the academic mainstream. PhD assessment criteria, supervisions, annual review 
boards and conferences all kept insisting I make my work intelligible in academic 
terms. Colleagues and mentors kept pointing out that I had chosen to do a PhD after 
all. More than this, however, I found I actively sought recognition for political 
reasons. As I have said I wanted to convince Politics and International Relations 
scholars that Indigenous politics belong in these disciplines. I wanted to convince 
academics that tanning a moose is politics, for example, and that Indigenous-state 
relations are ‘international’. I wanted to convince them that everyday talk is a kind of 
theory. To do this convincing, I would sometimes speak in more authoritative 
language, referring to ‘interviews’, not ‘conversations,’ and ‘data’, not ‘experience’. 
I also wrote the current doctoral thesis which will provide access for me to 
legitimacy in and beyond the university, via a title and qualification. I did not wholly 
buy into the primary form of agency available to me as an academic. In fact, this did 
not really offer me agency if I wanted to act against convention. But neither could I 
reject them entirely. Not only am I a product of them, but they were paradoxically 
necessary to make my argument against them convincing. 
I described this process of negotiating conventions and deviations in 
academia in much greater detail in the previous chapter and introduction to the 
thesis. Here I want to make a specific point about how the way that the problem is 
posed in the decolonization debate is reiterated in the way it is understood in 
academia. I also want to argue that, across scholars concerned with decolonization, 
as well as in my own practice, it is possible to see the binary begin to blur and to see 




In this Chapter I have described the decolonization debate as a contestation 
over the meaning of political agency. I showed how two narratives about colonial 
history and anti-colonial action operate around liberal and counter-liberal 
understandings of political action. Agency is, I argued, what is at stake in this fierce 
debate. I have also shown how using agency rather than, say, resistance or 
transformation, enables a discussion about action as related to settler colonialism and 
liberal agency but not necessarily defined and determined by that relation. I have also 
situated research ethics as an agency problem in part shaped by the same liberal 
educational conditions as the decolonization debate, as well as within/by the debate 
itself. In the following two chapters I turn to two case studies, Dechinta Bush 
University and the Akitsiraq Law School. I show how these respond to and extend 
the decolonization debate and the agency problem described here. I also show that 
how participants understand and navigate this problem in their daily lives looks very 
different to how it is posed here. Actors in the two projects do not follow the 
either/or approach of interlocutors in the debate. Instead, they practice many of the 
forms of action I have described here. They locate their own agency in relations and 





5. Late and latent liberalisms 
 
Capacity and culture, and their interplay, loom as perhaps the most crucial 




Graham White’s (2009) paper, Governance in Nunavut: Capacity vs Culture, 
evaluates Nunavut against the goals of capacity-building and cultural relevance. 2009 
marked ten years from Nunavut’s creation in 1999. “From its first day,” White 
argues, “the Government of Nunavut has struggled with capacity issues and with the 
task of imbuing its operations with Inuit values and culture.” (White, 2009: 64). He 
defines “capacity problems” as a “vacancy predicament,” and culture as “the attempt 
to build a truly Inuit government,” and shows how the Government of Nunavut is 
pursuing both (White, 2009:58). White goes onto complicate the pursuit of these two 
goals. He asks: “Is the unquestioned need to build and maintain governance capacity 
compatible with the objective of developing an Inuit government?” (ibid). White 
then answers his own question: “capacity building does indeed on occasion run 
headlong into cultural imperatives” (ibid). White cites education as the primary tool 
for training skilled Inuit leaders or passing on Inuit tradition – for building capacity 
and reviving culture (ibid).  
 
Capacity vs Culture exemplifies public dialogue around Inuit and Northern 
self-determination in Nunavut (see Henderson [2008] or Timpson [2006, 2009] for 
further examples). White’s paper also exemplifies the state and late liberal narrative 
of politics I described in the previous chapter. In this line, agency and self-
determination are understood as capacity and cultural relevance, while political 
actors are understood as Inuit employees and officials. Formal education is seen as 
the way to build capacity and to create Inuit political subjects. Crucially, all of this is 
taken as given: the historical emergence of capacity and culture as political goals, or 
the state as constituting politics, is erased. Capacity and culture as state and Inuit are 
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understood as separable, if sometimes competing. This narrative of self-
determination exemplifies the liberal or constitutional paradigm I described in 
Chapter 4.  
 
In this chapter I locate the movement for a Northern university and Akitsiraq 
Law School in relation to this logic. I introduced this movement and project in 
Chapters 1 and 2. In this chapter I show how their participants theorize their own 
action in ways that align with, draw on or adapt the autological and juridical late 
liberal narrative of decolonization and liberal agency. I argue throughout that this 
alignment is not passive or submissive and that participants are not duped blindly by 
the state narrative. Nor is this approach unified. Participants affirm it in a wide range 
of ways. Nonetheless, I also identify ways in which liberal logics are persistent and 
latent. They often reemerge, I suggest, in counterintuitive moments. For example, the 
idea that the state can be strategically subverted to non-state ends assumes an 
autological separation of actor, rational action and desired outcome. While this 
chapter is about these liberal logics in Northern education, I also note repeatedly that 
they are slippery. No moment or practice I describe in this chapter can be fully 
captured or fixed by the word ‘liberal’. Even the most straightforward examples, 
such as “making Inuit lawyers,” have potentially disruptive effects (in this case, 
exposing a contradiction in state logics by pairing “Inuit” with “law”) [Akitsiraq Law 
School Society, et al, 2007]. I note these moments of doubt and disruption in this 
chapter in order to take them up more fully in the next.  
 
The chapter is organized around three ways in which participants in the 
movement for a Northern university and in Akitsiraq in particular understand what 
they are doing. First, participants argue that they are ‘capacity building’. This, I 
explain, is understood in state-building and development logics, which operate 
around a juridical version of power and a linear, progressive temporality. Agency in 
this line is ‘acquired’ like or as skills and resources. The acquisition of agency in this 
way is liberal progress. The liberal logics of capacity, development and state-
building are examined and critiqued extensively already in Peace and Conflict 
Studies (Richmond, 2010, 2011) and Development Studies (Escobar, 2012). Whilst 
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Canada is not usually understood as a ‘post-conflict’ or ‘developing’ setting, I show 
how these same logics are in fact at work in the Arctic in and around education. 
Second, I discuss how Akitsiraq is “making Inuit lawyers” (Akitsiraq Law School 
Society et al, 2007). Inuit are often understood here in the cultural logic of difference 
in late liberalism. In this line the Indigenous actor is a rights holder, beneficiary or 
recognized by a legal category. Actors in this line are qualified and legally 
recognized individuals. Participants in the projects I worked with, Akitsiraq included, 
did keep trying to assert difference as something more than a legal category or 
curriculum. But the educational and legal institutions they were interacting with kept 
failing or refusing to see difference in this way and insisting difference be articulated 
in the liberal model of culture instead. The third and final section is about how 
participants seek legitimacy strategically by appealing to dominant regional and 
national status, rhetoric and ideas, including appeals to the university, sovereignty, 
security, Northerness and Indigeneity. Actors do not buy fully into these ideas but 
rather seek to mobilize them for other ends (usually some other version of self-
determination). However, the very idea that they can choose rationally to strategize 
and even subvert in goal oriented way aligns with the autological versions of agency 
and action that this strategy seeks to resist.  All these accounts by participants of 
what they are doing align with and are informed by but are not reducible to the late 
liberal narratives of political agency I described in Chapter 4. 
5.1 Institutionalizing self-determination 
As I described in Chapter 4, in the late liberal narrative of decolonization a 
number of state institutions and processes constitute mechanisms for Indigenous self-
determination. These include different levels of government, bureaucracy, 
Indigenous organizations, co-management boards, impact benefit agreements, land 
claim agreements, self-government agreements and so-on. Agents in these 
institutional arrangements are individual, qualified and educated politicians, 
bureaucrats, workers and citizens. Agency is acquired by these agents like an object 
through education and is then exercised, tool-like, in action. Capacity and self-
determination in these terms and as White describes it above, therefore involves the 
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creation and growth of political institutions, along with the qualification of Inuit as 
actors in them.  This section is about Northern education as a method of capacity 
building. I describe how proponents of more and better formal education in the North 
posit formal education as integral to self-determination understood as ‘capacity’. I 
show how this understanding of agency is bound up in late liberal logics and 
practices.  
In this section I show how participants understand agency as the capacity to 
act in this within these institutional structures. Proponents of more and better formal 
education in the North argue, in this line, that education will equip Indigenous people 
and Northerners with the tools and skills necessary to self-determine in these liberal 
and state terms. Indeed, as I described in Chapters 1 and 4, formal education has 
been central to the very creation of these mechanisms of government. First 
Indigenous people organized politically in and against state schooling. Now, the 
agents of self-determination are formally educated employees of governments, 
Indigenous organizations, and in workplaces more generally. In this section I 
describe these logics as they play out and are articulated in the movement for a 
Northern university and at Akitsiraq. I show how this is a linear, temporal story in 
which improvement and empowerment involve moving towards a future through the 
logic of development. I also show how agency understood as capacity turns on an 
autological version of agency in this context.  
The notion of capacity as agency and the possibility of attaining it through 
capacity-building practices is the core argument around which proponents of a 
Northern university make their case. Self-determination in these terms is, they argue, 
impossible without adequate formal education. According to the National Inuit 
Organization, for example, “The ability to build the capacity in the Inuit population 
to take on these [governance] roles is absolutely dependent on the education system” 
(Nunavut Tungavik Incorporated, 2007: 6). Currently the Government of Nunavut is 
understaffed and Inuit are underrepresented within it. Population proportionate 
government was mandated by the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement. Adequate 
educational provisions in order to achieve this were also mandated by the claim. The 
137 
 
National Inuit Organization has recently taken the Government of Nunavut to court, 
arguing that it has failed to fulfil the promise of the claim on both counts.  
Formal education is so crucial to capacity because, as White explains, in 
Nunavut a “capacity problem” is understood largely in terms of a “vacancy 
predicament” (White, 2009). There are simply not enough local residents with the 
perceived ability or will to staff the government. Nunavummiut (people from 
Nunavut) lack the formal qualifications associated with working in the modern 
bureaucracy. They have low school completion rates. They have no Northern 
university to attend. Across the North, therefore, Southerners are flying into work in 
these layers of government at huge cost to Northerners (Akitsiraq Law School 
Society, 20 November 2009). These costs are both financial and social or cultural, as 
a large portion of government employees are transient outsiders with little knowledge 
of, or commitment to, the North. Northern jobs are extremely well paid because of 
their remoteness (there is 40,000 dollar per year ‘Northern allowance’ in addition to 
normal wages). Recent southern graduates take the opportunity to pay off their 
student loans and to get experiences, responsibilities and job titles that they would 
not have access to until much later in their careers in the South. Then they take their 
taxes and expertise back home to the south. Despite the constant influx of 
southerners, many jobs are simply left open in the absence of qualified 
Nunavummiut and the government never reaches ‘full capacity’. In all these ways, 
education, self-determination and government are closely entwined in Nunavut. For 
all these reasons, education is seen as the way to fulfill the land claim both in letter 
(its legal mandate) and in spirit (self-determination). All of these points were made to 
me repeatedly by Nunavummiut making a case for more and better education in 
Nunavut.  
This is where Akitsiraq comes in. Akitsiraq draws heavily on the rhetoric, 
logic and practice of capacity-building as self-determination. In our interviews, 
participants frequently told the story of Akitsiraq as a response to the creation of the 
new Territory. Two of its founders used the same words to stress to me that “in 1999 
there was only one Inuit lawyer”, Paul Okilik, who then became its Premier. They 
explained to me that they began to imagine an Inuit law school in the run up to the 
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creation of Nunavut in 1999. After 1999, they then put the law school into action, 
arguing that the new government was legally mandated to provide post-secondary 
and legal education. They cite Article 23 in particular (see Akitsiraq Law School 
Society et al, 2007; Akitsiraq Law School Society, 2009; Akitsiraq Law School 
Society, 20 November 2009). As I said above, Article 23 of the NCLA mandates the 
Government of Nunavut to hire a “population proportionate” (86% Inuit) workforce 
and to provide the training that will enable Inuit to fill government jobs. A 
population proportionate workforce means the Government must hire Inuit lawyers, 
prosecutors, policy writers, policy analysts and court-workers of various kinds (as 
well as teachers, administrators, garbage collectors and so-on). Law degrees and 
post-secondary education more broadly will be necessary for some of these jobs. 
Inuit must be “equipped”, they assert, with Canadian common law as “invaluable 
tools to build their society” (Akitsiraq Law School Society et al, 2007). They argue 
that, “the agreement’s conditions call for the territorial government to build self-
governing capacity. The Akitsiraq law graduates greatly enhance the territory’s 
ability to achieve this goal” (Akitsiraq Law School Society et al, 2007). To this end 
the Law School aims to “produce Inuit lawyers” and “future leaders” (ibid).  
The Akitsiraq Law School Society also makes an economic case.  The 
program will bring funding from outside the Territory to be spent locally: “Funded at 
~$1M per year, the program brings to Nunavut ~ $500K in supporting funding from 
national sources each year, with the potential of another ~$500K annually in project 
funding for the legal education, seminars and associated writing and research” 
(Akitsiraq Law School Society, 20 November 2009). In addition, millions of dollars 
of legal fees are going South. Inuit lawyers, trained in Nunavut, would keep this 
money North: “within the next 10 years graduates will bring back or retain in 
Nunavut millions of dollars of salaries and fees which would otherwise be paid and 
spent in the south every year” (Akitsiraq Law School Society, 20 November 2009). 
This financial argument speaks to the poverty that characterises much of Indigenous 
life in Canada. It also speaks in the economic language of neoliberal government in 
which the success of government and wellbeing of citizens are measured in 
economic terms. When capacity and agency are understood as money, they can be 
acquired and exercised with qualifications, employment and wages. This argument 
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aligns with neoliberal terms in particular which, as David Harvey (2005) and 
Foucault (2010) describe, reduce power, value and success to economics (see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of these thinkers).  
In these ways, the Akitsiraq Law School ties its activities firmly to the Land 
Claim Agreement and articulates Inuit self-determination in the same late liberal 
terms as the Claim: as something that can be recognized in law and expressed and 
enacted through state, managerial, bureaucratic, electoral, economic and 
representational activities. Politics and power are reduced to the formal institutions 
of government. Individuals, representatives, office-holders and employees with 
appropriate legal, institutional, bureaucratic and linguistic skills, experiences and 
qualifications are required to negotiate and implement these new forms of Indigenous 
self-determination. Agency is something which is acquired and wielded like a skill or 
tool through training: the Law School equips autonomous Inuit subjects with law so 
that they can govern themselves. Political subjects and actors are Lawyers, graduates 
and employees. Political capacity in this line is “bureaucratic effectiveness” and 
“suitable structures and processes, adequate financial resources, and sufficient staff 
with the proper training and expertise to develop and implement policies and to 
deliver services” (White, 2009: 71).  
In my view, the emphasis of Akitsiraq on this state narrative of self-
determination reflects its co-production with the Land Claim as well as its need for 
recognition and the attendant funding from government. After being denied funding 
the Akitsiraq Law School Society has had to repeatedly restate, reassert, and rework 
the case for the law school. In doing this, they have tried to demonstrate in the 
Government’s terms why Inuit lawyers are necessary in Nunavut and have made 
their public case primarily in the terms of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, and 
of social, legal and economic development and capacity building.  
The prevalence of this logic of self-determination in Nunavut was made clear 
to me through participants’ speculations as to the past and future “success” or 
“failure” of the law school (these words were repeated across my interviews). As I 
said earlier, the Government of Nunavut denied funding to a second cohort. This 
resulted in ongoing discussion amongst Akitsiraq’s advocates as to the reason for this 
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as well as rebuttals and defences against any imagined reason. Akitsiraq Law School 
Society members believed that they were denied funding because the law school was 
not perceived to be “successful” in the eyes of the government and general public. 
They believed that the Government’s idea of a successful law program is one in 
which most graduates go onto be lawyers. Only two Akitsiraq graduates are 
practicing lawyers while the rest are policy workers, activists and mothers.  This 
focus on success and its quantifiable measurement is, as I described in Chapter 2, a 
recurring feature of liberal and late liberalisms. 
There were two sets of responses from Akitsiraq’s participants to this 
perceived accusation of failure. The first was, as I described above, a reiteration of 
the necessity for Akitsiraq in capacity-building, legal and economic terms. Right at 
the end of my fieldwork, the Society commissioned a new business consultant to re-
draft the business plan to try to demonstrate the Law School’s ‘successes’ so far. The 
second response of Akitsiraq Law School Society members was to question the 
government’s definition of success and even of capacity building. Akitsiraw Law 
School Society members repeatedly insisted that creating activists, policy workers 
and mothers was success, and that these people were the agents of Inuit self-
determination as much as lawyers. Society members articulated capacity variously as 
including “critical thinking”, “leadership”, “activism” and the creation of a “critical 
space”. In fact, one interviewee emphasised the capacity to question government, not 
just to follow it. Akitsiraq’s public face is therefore constructed in such a way that 
capacity and success mean “making Inuit lawyers” to a government and business 
audience but can be interpreted differently in other contexts. Even when participants 
used the language of capacity building they did not necessarily fully buy into it. I 
discuss participants’ strategic engagement with capacity and success along with other 
aspects of government discourse in the third section of this chapter. For now, I mean 
only to note that participants do not engage the liberal logics of capacity uncritically 
or exclusively, despite these logics being central to the emergence of the law school 
and penetrating every corner of Akitsiraq I explored. 
In all these ways, Akitsiraq and the broader movement for a Northern 
university are by their own accounts embedded in the logics and processes of 
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capacity building in the Canadian North. They are therefore also what Alex Bellamy 
describes as liberal state-building projects in that they create “liberal polities, 
economies and societies” under the guise of universalized liberal notions of progress, 
local empowerment and good governance (Bellamy [2008:4-5] is talking about post-
conflict liberal interventionism). In this way the North still looks like the colonial 
frontier that I described John Locke as concerned with in Chapter 2. In capacity and 
state building agency is understood as something which can be gained and exercised 
like a tool.  Sometimes this tool is as literal as money. Capacity building understands 
and produces political agents as educated individuals and therefore autological 
subjects. This is not to say that these processes directly determine agency in the ways 
they claim to represent it. What they are also doing but do not say is asserting and 
regulating a liberal and state version of politics and delineating political action as 
bureaucratic and institutional. I described the broader historical process of 
reorganizing politics in these ways in detail in the previous chapter on narratives of 
colonization. In this section I have shown how the movement for a Northern 
university and Akitsiraq in particularly are located within this history and the late 
liberal narrative of decolonization.  I now move onto examine the production of 
subjectivity and difference at the law school and its further entanglement with the 
logics of action in late liberalism.  
5.2 Codifying difference and subjectivity 
Nunavut (the Inuktitut word for “our land”) was created April 1, 1999 as a result of 
the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. For millennia a major Inuit homeland, 
Nunavut today is a growing society that blends the strength of its deep Inuit roots 
and traditions with a new spirit of diversity.  
Government of Nunavut, 2012 
 
 In 2003 a Human Rights bill was proposed for the Nunavut, containing a 
clause against discrimination on the grounds of sexuality. Some Inuit activists, 
religious leaders and politicians argued that non-heterosexuality violates Inuit and 
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Indigenous cultural tradition and should therefore not be approved by an Indigenous 
government. Repeatedly, the bible and Christianity were cited by those against the 
inclusion of the clause (Henderson, 2008:195). Simultaneously, a growing 
Indigenous ‘Two-Spirit’ movement was striving to carve out a specifically 
Indigenous mode of resistance and identity in Canada. The movement centred on the 
assertion that Two-Spirit people, or Beardaches, who took on some or all 
characteristics of another gender or who had sex with people of the same sex, in fact 
had valued and recognized roles in Indigenous life prior to colonization; that 
colonisation, and the introduction of Christianity in particular, were responsible for 
current heterosexist attitudes (Gilley, 2006:32, 53). The debate over sexuality and 
rights in Nunavut was just one of many moments when policy and culture have met 
or been co-articulated. Note that the debate begins with policy and seeks to fix a 
version of Inuitness in law.   
 
In this section, I describe how difference in Northern education is codified, 
commodified and neutralized by the state as culture. Note that the debate started with 
the proposal of a bill, and Indigenous difference was then articulated in relation to 
that bill. I describe how the Indigenous subject and political actor is articulated as 
beneficiary, rights-holder, trainee and employee. This is the way difference has been 
addressed and integrated in late liberalism more generally (see my discussion of 
Elizabeth Povinelli in Chapter 2). In this section I show how these logics are engaged 
and produced at Akitsiraq. I show how versions of Indigeneity and subjecthood are 
co-produced even when they are imagined as opposed. I also argue that despite the 
prioritization of policy and its logics in enacting culture in Nunavut, policy itself is 
not fixed or containable. In the sexuality and rights debate, for example, policy 
triggers a conversation and questioning that goes beyond law.  
 
Ideas about difference are central to decolonizing education (and to 
decolonization in general). Decolonizing education could mean reconciling a 
previously settler institution (formal education) with the aim of Indigenous self-
determination (and Indigenous culture).  Decolonizing education could also mean 
using education to revitalize Indigenous difference (this latter meaning sees 
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education as more neutral). Akitsiraq is also defined centrally by a version of 
difference in its aim of combining university pedagogy and Canadian common law 
with Inuit pedagogy and traditional law.  Akitsiraq’s participants do perceive 
Indigenous people and ways of being to be more than a ‘culture’ held by a liberal 
subject or legal citizen. They even recognize Indigenous reality as having entirely 
different ontology, epistemology and social order and with it different forms of actor, 
action and agency. Nonetheless, this section shows how the institutions with which 
Akitsiraq interacts (governments and universities) keep insisting that difference be 
articulated on their late liberal terms as culture, and Inuit subjects as a legal or 
bureaucratic category. In this section therefore I describe how both how Akitsiraq 
appeals to late liberal logics of culture and actor, as well as how liberal logics of 
agency keep reinserting themselves even when rejected.   
 
In their critiques of recognition, Elizabeth Povinelli (2002) and Glen 
Coulthard (2006, 2007, 2010) show how late liberal logics of inclusion and 
difference begin with the state and ask how Indigenous people and culture can or 
should be included (see Chapters 2 and 4). That is, they centre the state and in doing 
so require all else to be made intelligible in relation to the state and the dominant 
culture in order to be recognized or included (Povinelli, 2002).  The Nunavut Land 
Claim Agreement states that the Government of Nunavut must be relevant to its 86% 
Inuit population. The GN’s subsequent IQ policy, states that Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit 
(IQ), or “an Inuit way of doing things”, must inform all areas of government, 
education and public employment (Henderson, 2008:190). IQ takes the form of eight 
codified principles, decided in a series of conferences including elders and 
politicians. Alongside IQ policy, Article 23 further requires the government to be 
culturally relevant in that its labour conditions and political rationales must appeal to 
or facilitate the Inuit participation necessary to a population proportionate public 
service. There is also an assumption in Article 23 that hiring Inuit will make the 
government culturally relevant simply by its being staffed by Inuit. Together, IQ 
policy and Article 23 impact much of life in Nunavut in which the Government along 
with Inuit Organizations make up the majority of employment, and both are 
decentralized across Nunavut’s many small communities.  
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Incorporation of Inuit culture in Nunavut therefore takes two forms. First, it 
involves codifying and implementing culture in government activities. Second, it 
involves employing Inuit in Government. Both of these are mandated by the Nunavut 
Land Claim Agreement directly. Similarly, in education inclusion of Inuit means 
incorporating Inuit pedagogies and curriculum content, as well as raising numbers of 
Inuit students and teachers. This includes covering events in Indigenous history, 
employing Indigenous teachers and assistants, having Indigenous language classes, 
offering specific support to Indigenous applicants and students, having a “traditional 
knowledge” component of every class, or having a resident elder in a school or 
university (all these are the case in Nunavut schools [Mcgregor, 2010]).   While these 
last two examples go some way to recognizing the existence and value of knowledge 
and actors other than those that conventionally have authority in the school system, 
by beginning with state education and making it ‘relevant’ or ‘inclusive’, they still 
privilege the forms of action and authority embodied in the conventional state school 
system. 
As I described in the previous section, participants in Akitsiraq were 
motivated by and appealed to the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement and to its 
capacity-building logics, especially when seeking government and business support 
and funding. In Akitsiraq’s aim to “Northernize” its LLB curriculum the law school 
also appealed to the principles of cultural relevance embodied in the Nunavut Land 
Claim Agreement and described here. Different professors did this differently. 
Common practices included using Northern or Indigenous cases or issues in class. 
Often “Northernizing” meant beginning with the LLB and adapting it to include 
cultural specificities, rather than some more reciprocal relationship between juridical 
law and the North. This is how it was described to me by southern instructors in our 
interviews. Professors noted repeatedly that their ultimate aim was to deliver an LLB 
that was recognizable and equivalent in standard to any institution in the South. They 
told me there were limits to what Northernizing could mean in light of this aim. 
There were, in fact, diversions from this aim and pedagogical differences. I discuss 
these complexities in the next chapter.  
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For now, I want to highlight the similarities between this approach and the 
late liberal logics of recognition and inclusion described above, in education and 
beyond. These similarities are echoed in the discussion of capacity building above 
and legitimacy seeking below: Akitsiraq’s appeal to legitimacy within and funding 
from government and business meant that the Akitsiraq Law School Society often 
articulated the Indigenous subject and political actor in line with the liberal logics of 
government and business. In this line, the Indigenous actor is seen not as they are 
within Indigenous worldviews as entirely different forms of subject (see next 
chapter), but rather as Canadian citizens with specific legal and cultural attributes. So 
the self-determining governmental actor is an Inuit beneficiary lawyer or a university 
educated status Indian, not a person with a specific relationship to land or community 
(although, in determining status, these things now come into play). They have 
additional characteristics which are commensurable with, rather than contradictory 
to, their liberal subjecthood. 
In our interviews, members of the Akitsiraq Law School Society repeatedly 
articulated Indigenous personhood as something other than legal status. Most often, 
as in Akitsiraq’s admissions policy, they understood Indigeneity and authority as a 
relationship with land and community. Akitsiraq’s leaders also reported a broader 
and sometimes different view of difference in our conversations, not least in their 
recognition of two entirely different and potentially incommensurable legal orders 
and ways of knowing. Nonetheless, when they tried to practice a version of 
difference in which settler law did not dominate they ran into barriers. For example, 
despite their commitment to the definitive role of Inuit law in the program, students 
reported to me that Inuit law was repeatedly subordinated to settler law. The 
Akitsiraq Law School Society are careful to articulate Inuit law not as a past tradition 
but as ongoing, current, dynamic and adaptive. The Law School is part of conceiving 
and enacting Inuit law in this way as part of that process (see Akitsiraq Law School 
Society et al, 2007). Yet the Society had trouble joining it with an LLB degree in a 
way that did not make it an ‘add-on,’ due in part to the pull of the LLB qualification 
and the partnership with the University of Victoria. A single Elder taught the Inuit 
law component and also acted as counsellor to the students.
 
The Elder-in-Residence 
role which constituted the Inuit law component, was actually only added after the 
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first year – and then in response to students themselves petitioning the Akitsiraq 
leadership via a student representative who sits on the Board of Directors. From the 
second year Akitsiraq stressed the importance of the Inuit law class, along with the 
Inuktitut language classes, by making them for-credit. Credit by a Southern 
university constitutes recognition, giving them the same knowledge status as the 
Euro-Canadian law classes. However, the University of Victoria still required 
students to take the same number and selection of their conventional LLB classes, 
meaning that traditional law ended up being in addition to, rather than included in, 
the usual degree work. This meant that students had to do extra work on top of an 
already full course load. Students reported that this meant their Inuit law work would 
fall off the edge, and that they did not feel it had equal status within the program.  
Similarly, when the Law School Society tried to incorporate community 
connections into the admissions criteria and oral evaluations into its curriculum, the 
Universities of Victoria and Ottawa agreed in principle. When it came to putting 
these values into practice, however, the bureaucracy and norms of the southern 
institutions proved resistant to them. University of Victoria representatives insisted 
that the capacity to complete an LLB must be the ultimate deciding factor in 
admissions, and that this capacity had to be measured in formal qualifications and 
previous education. This would discriminate in favour of an Inuk who had pursued 
these versions of success over, say, community connections. University of Ottawa 
representatives said they agreed with the principle of oral evaluations but could not 
process them due to the lack of ways to monitor assessment. Nor could their 
assessment criteria be changed to align more closely with Northern communication 
via song as suggested by Northern partners.  
At other times, students themselves asserted academic norms. In the short-
programming for both Nunavut and Inuit students that Akitsiraq ran in January 2012 
and 2013, professors attempted to create classes that were less case-oriented, more 
talk-oriented and that aligned with multiple ways of thinking about law as in Inuit 
law (in film, for example). The Northern students, however, requested more of the 
“real stuff”, by which they meant case law (this quote is from one student and other 
students in the class echoed her request). The Southern students actually requested a 
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written test which was not included on their original curriculum. They did not know 
how to judge their own progress without a written test. In all these ways, despite the 
efforts of Akitsiraq’s leaders, the liberal logics of institutions resisted and persisted. 
In these ways, value was ultimately embodied in conventional pedagogy and 
juridical law, with the university retaining the right and role of recognition of other 
forms of knowledge but also being unable to see some of those forms. 
What I have shown here is how the law school replicates a limited version of 
Indigenous difference as culture. Elizabeth Povinelli describes this as the way in 
which liberal governmentality responds to the demands of Indigenous difference 
without disrupting its core autological logics. As I described in the previous section, 
in capacity-building, the Indigenous agent in this line is a citizen or worker like any 
other. In this section I have shown how that agent then gains culture held like an 
object or recognized by a legal category. Alan Cairns (2000) calls this version of 
Indigeneity “Citizens Plus” (this is the title of Cairns’ book). When Akitsiraq 
privileges the university and the state and describes what it is doing as including or 
incorporating Indigeneity it is working within this late liberal logic. I have also 
shown how even when Akitsiraq’s leaders attempt to assert a version of Indigeneity 
as a political or ontological difference rather than a cultural one, liberal logics push 
back in the form of university norms and institutional arrangements. While I have 
been concerned with the late liberal logics in this section, I have also drawn a picture 
of a struggle. I take up the possibilities created in that struggle in the next chapter. 
Now, I turn to how participants engage in the languages and practices of capacity and 
culture described thus far, as well as in others, in pursuit of legitimacy.  
5.3 Seeking legitimacy  
This is Nunavut – “Our Land” – just as Yukon and the Northwest Territories and the 
entire Arctic Archipelago are “Our Land.” And, on this you have my word, we will 
back our sovereignty over “Our Land” with all the tools at our disposal, including 
the men and women of our Armed Forces who are launching Operation Lancaster 
from Iqaluit today.  
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Canadian Prime Minister Harper, 2006, in a speech in Nunavut during a “sovereignty 
exercise”  
 
We are all seeking legitimacy… but not too much. 
 
Akitsiraq Law School Society member, 2012 
 
The Akitsiraq Law School Society are strategically and persistently seeking 
legitimacy for their project. Legitimacy means more than one thing and plays more 
than one role for Akitsiraq. Legitimacy “means funding, space and support”, one 
Akitsiraq Law School Society member told me. But legitimacy also means, he went 
on, recognition that “Inuit can be lawyers too”, “rule themselves”, “speak for 
themselves”, and that Inuit traditions can be understood as law and as such have the 
same authority and legitimacy as Euro-Canadian law. In this section, I describe how 
participants across education in the North, including at Akitsiraq, attempt to gain 
legitimacy and authority for their projects and points of view for these reasons. I 
show that they do so by appealing to prevalent national and regional markers of 
legitimacy. Locally, they appeal to Northerness and Indigeneity as well as to the 
discourse of capacity building as described above. Nationally, they appeal to 
sovereignty, security and nationhood. Sometimes they appeal to these things 
sincerely. At other times they appeal to them more strategically in that they do not 
necessarily desire these goals but appreciate the political weight they carry and seek 
to divert it to other ends. In particular, participants often appealed to liberal 
conceptions of political actor and action to underwrite alternate conceptions of actor 
and action. Nonetheless, the very idea that this rational and deliberate strategic action 
is possible looks a lot like autologial action and agency again. In this section I first 
describe the ways in which participants are seeking and mobilizing authoritative 
institutions and discourses (such as universities and sovereignty). I then move onto 
examine the autological version of agency underlying this strategy, as well as 
strategic forms of action more generally.  
  
The participant above, however, recognizes another effect of 
commensurability: the elevation of the status and legitimacy of Inuit law (and, as I 
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describe in the next chapter, to destabilize Canadian law). Similarly, the Arctic law 
school elevates both national and regional perceptions and understanding of Inuit 
capabilities. External and internalized racist attitudes assume that Inuit are not 
capable of studying or practicing law. Nunavut residents were, one student reported, 
“waiting for us to fail – they kept asking”. But participants in the law school were 
especially keen to show that the law school was “at least” as rigorous as its Southern 
counterparts. They repeatedly told me that Akitsiraq was in fact more rigorous due to 
its small class sizes and mature student body. They pointed proudly to the graduate 
who clerked at the Supreme Court of Canada (a huge prestigious success in the terms 
of law school). In all these ways participants in the law school were keen to 
legitimize Akitisraq, its Inuit participants and its locally specific components 
including Inuit law. Juridical law, the university, the Nunavut Land Claim 
Agreement and the state therefore inform the logic of the law school, but also mark 
its legitimacy and the legitimacy of what it does. Making Indigenous law 
commensurable with Canadian law and the university is one way of perpetuating 
liberal governance (Povinelli, 2002, 2012). At the same time, however, the 
engagement and inhabitence of Canadian law by Inuit could be understood as an 
agentic practice (Mahmood, 2012).  
Akitsiraq Law School participants were aware, however, that they could not 
seek legitimacy or follow its logics at any cost. The same Society member quoted 
above continued: “we want it [legitimacy] and we don’t. They could say ‘sure, come 
join our faculty and follow our policies,’ and we would say ‘no’ because that’s not 
our mandate.” This Akitsiraq Law School Society member recognizes not only the 
necessity, but the risks and limits of legitimacy in relation to the Law School’s 
broader aims. Hence the question: “could a program which responded to 
conventional Law School standards by teaching ‘mainstream’ law to Inuit students 
avoid being a tool of assimilation and acculturation?” (Akitsiraq Law School Society 
et al, 2007). As I describe below, tensions and conflicts in the program tended to 
converge around this line: the simultaneous needs for legitimacy and the 
maintenance of Indigenous difference.  
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At the same time, due to the value of culture in late liberalism, Northern and 
Indigenous difference was also mobilized strategically to validate all sorts of political 
and educational activity in the North. As I described in reference to the 
decolonization debate in Chapter Three, Northern or Indigenous authenticity may be 
taken for granted as a goal but its substance and meaning (what they look like and 
how to get there) are highly contested. Northerness and Indigeneity were markers of 
authority in almost any public debate in the North, with everyone appealing to them 
for legitimacy. In my fieldwork conversations I found that everyone articulated their 
particular institution or program as the most effective way to build post-secondary 
and therefore political capacity in Nunavut. Everyone articulated their particular 
institution or program as the most Inuit, Northern and culturally relevant. The term 
“bricks and mortar”, for example, came to stand-in for ‘Southern’ and to be the 
marker of illegitimacy. My understanding of this is that it implies that Northern 
universities will look different because they are Northern in their spatial-
configurations. Being confined and stationary in a single building for education (or 
anything) is a practice that came to the North with settlers (Inuit only moved into 
houses forcibly or voluntarily in the 1950s [Tester, 2006:5-7]). In my conversations I 
learnt that uniquely Northern education might more likely involve the land, the 
internet, and multiple locations or communities. Not to mention there are no actual 
bricks or mortar in the North.  
However, the meaning of the term “bricks and mortar” turned out to be 
largely irrelevant when it came to the actual use of the term. Interviewees would 
accuse rival and opposed programs or individuals of being “bricks and mortar”.  But 
they would do so regardless of the content of their proposals. “Bricks and mortar”, 
“Southern”, “Northern” and “Indigenous” seemed to become detached from any 
particular referent and re-attached to signify authority in struggles and debates over 
who got to articulate, control and enact what Northern education should look like.
 
This is true across politics in Nunavut. For example, the content of the IQ principles I 
described earlier was in fact highly contested when the principles were drafted. Not 
only did huge disparities and disagreements emerge from the lengthy ‘traditional’ 
consultation process around the very meaning of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, but the 
possibility of incorporating Inuit or Indigenous tradition into a state generated by 
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colonial powers has been vociferously challenged (Henderson, 2008:190-199). 
Nonetheless, while the content of culture has been contested, the goal has remained 
largely intact. There is still a single, knowable and fixed Inuit culture intelligible 
from within the late liberal state.  
A final set of markers of legitimacy to which education advocates appealed 
was that of Canadian sovereignty, security and nationhood. Although political (and 
economic) development and capacity in the North are now languages of Indigenous 
self-determination, they are also part of a broader narrative that precedes Indigenous 
constitutional activism (Dickerson, 1992). The Arctic is an historically strategic and 
contested site of international sovereignty assertions and disputes. This began 
between fishing and whaling vessels in the later 1800s and was amplified during the 
Cold War (Mitchell, 1996). Tensions have been revived recently through recent 
international attention to the melting Northwest Passage. This attention has been 
enacted by the Harper Government primarily through military “sovereignty 
exercises” (e.g. Harper, 2006). Northern Indigenous peoples and Inuit especially 
have, however, attempted to write themselves and their wellbeing into this 
sovereignty discourse (Byers, 2009). Again, this is not new: during the Cold War 
Canada claimed Inuit as its citizens for the first time in order to mark its sovereignty 
in the Arctic (Tester and Kulchyski 1994). This involved the creation of the welfare 
state in the North (assimilation, including education) and even the forced relocation 
of some Inuit communities to strategic locations.  
During my fieldwork, however, Indigenous groups themselves attempted to 
intervene in and mobilize this energy and attention around Arctic sovereignty to their 
own ends. They argued that Arctic sovereignty is not just about military presence, 
but can also be served by prosperous Indigenous communities in the North. For 
example, the Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty states: “The foundation, 
projection and enjoyment of Arctic foreign rights require healthy and sustainable 
communities in the Arctic. In this sense ‘sovereignty begins at home’” (Inuit 
Circumpolar Council, 2012). In these ways, Canada’s development of its North, 
including Northern Indigenous peoples, is therefore written into its national narrative 
(its national anthem includes the line “the true North strong and free”). Included in 
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this narrative is a sense of Canadian benevolence compared to its international 
competitors. Northern Indigenous people are now seeking to engage this 
entanglement and work strategically within it.  
Proponents of a Northern university have all attempted to engage this logic. 
For example, John Ralston Saul (1999), a well-known Canadian author and advocate 
of a Northern university, argues in a blog post that: “We remain the only circumpolar 
country without Northern or Arctic universities. This is a fundamental Canadian 
failure.” I described in the introduction how the funders of much of the movement 
for a Northern university, the Walter Duncan Gordan Foundation, “aspires to the 
ideal of a sovereign Canada that is dedicated to the security and wellbeing of all 
Canadians and committed to tolerance, pluralism and democratic participation” 
(Walter Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2013). The Foundation also says it is also 
committed to a form of Canadian Nationalism is “founded on those values 
fundamental to Canadians, and designed to foster the continuing evolution of a 
dynamic and independent Canada,” (ibid).  More recently, however, the Foundation 
has become open about its use of “Arctic security as a bargaining chip” and 
denounced this strategy as ineffectual (Lajeunesse, 2013:2-22).  
There are therefore diverse markers of legitimacy in the North, including the 
university, settler law, the Canadian state, capacity, culture, Northernness, 
Indigenousness, sovereignty, security and nationhood for legitimacy and authority. 
What these markers have in common, however, is circulating liberal logics of action. 
I have shown in this chapter and previous chapters how all operate around 
autological versions of agency. My aim is not to reduce these varied entities to 
liberalism, but to argue that liberalism connects them. I have also shown that 
“seeking legitimacy,” in late liberalism and all this diversity is not a single action or 
approach but varies depending on what participants are trying to achieve and who 
their audience is. It also operates on a spectrum from proud claims to Canadianness, 
to cynical mobilization of fears around Arctic security. At the former end of this 
spectrum participants’ expressed a commitment to late liberal values and ideas. At 
the latter end they were more strategic in an attempt to mobilize the weight and 
dominance of late liberal narratives of action in the eyes of government and the 
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general public. Sometimes participants recognized the limits and dangers for their 
own interests of these bids for legitimacy, including that “too much” legitimacy 
might result in colonial assimilation. Nonetheless, even when participants recognize 
the contingencies or violence of liberal narratives of action, they still end up 
articulating a version of liberal agency in the notion that they can choose to mobilize 
them (or even refuse them) strategically. I now turn to discuss this tension and the 
logics of strategic action in bids for legitimacy as well as in northern educational 
activism more generally.   
Acting strategically 
There are two strands of strategic thinking running through Northern 
education. First, participants are mobilizing the language and authority of late liberal 
forms of politics towards other ends. For example, as I described in the previous 
section, they are strategically seeking legitimacy by engaging discourses of culture 
and capacity. Second, participants often recognize more than one form of being, 
knowing and acting at play but believe they can choose between them strategically as 
it suits them. These two strands are two configurations of liberalism and its 
alternatives. I argue that both cases are articulated autologically. In both, participants 
believe they can act deliberately and rationally towards an end-goal and that actor, 
action and outcome are separable and connected through linear, progressive time.    
The strategic deployment of politically salient ideas was common to all the 
projects I worked with in the course of my fieldwork. Participants wanted 
recognition, support and funding simply to enable their projects to exist. This is made 
explicit in the Foundation’s discussion of sovereignty as a political “bargaining chip” 
(Lajeunesse, 2013:2) and the Akitsiraq Law School Society member’s bid for 
“legitimacy… but not too much”, as I discussed and referenced above. As I also 
described, participants also drew on late liberal logics to assert the status of Inuit law. 
In other projects participants sought to demonstrate the legitimacy of Indigenous 
knowledge and ways of being more generally. Often the true object of such a bid for 
legitimacy and status ran counter to the logic of that which was being used to 
legitimize it. For example, the state version of culture contrasts with a version of 
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Indigeneity as a relationship to land. The former was, however, frequently used to 
elevate or facilitate the latter. In the next chapter I discuss the ambiguities and 
possibilities at work here. For now, I want simply to note that the idea one story 
about action can be told strategically in order to facilitate another obscures the fact 
that there is a logic of action at work in the notion of ‘strategy’.  
The same logic of strategy persists when participants are not bidding for 
recognition but rather recognize two realities at work side-by-side. Participants often 
maintained a sort of liberal supra-subjectivity in their perception of the ability to pick 
and choose strategically between the two. Akitsiraq interviewees repeatedly 
recognized the operation of two realities with two forms of government 
simultaneously. One told me, for example, that different laws operate out on the sea 
ice than do in town. Another told me that when he encountered a problem, he would 
immediately think of which law would be more useful. A third told me that if the 
Government made “bad laws”, Inuit would just follow Inuit laws instead. Just to re-
emphasise, ‘law’ here means more than simply rules. Law enacts ways of being, 
knowing and acting (Borrows, 2002). A member of the Department of Justice told 
me that when there was an act of violence, both Inuit and settler laws were triggered 
into action and there would always be two responses to such an act. This recognizes 
and enacts the possibility of non-liberal forms of agency.  
Yet at the same time a very liberal, almost consumer model of ‘choice’ 
underlies the possibilities of selecting or moving deliberately between them. 
Participants somewhat awkwardly suggested it was possible to choose rationally and 
individually some form of reality where rational and individual choice is less 
possible. Again, the subject is detached from that form, able to choose freely and 
individually and the historical specificity of these different forms of subjectivity and 
action are erased. This ultimately makes difference commensurable and integrates it 
within the logic of late liberalism. This time this happens even when participants are 
‘choosing’ to reject liberal logics and it happens on a deep and sometimes implicit 
level. This is what Saba Mahmood is talking about when she argues that the idea of 
subversion risks repeating liberal logics of action (Mahmood, 2012:20-22).  
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My intention here is not to dismiss the potential changes attendant to state or 
liberal legitimacy and recognition, or the value and necessities of gaining authority 
and legitimacy. Nor is my intention to ignore the other realities and ways of being 
that are legitimized or chosen, or to ignore the non-strategic forms of action that are 
at work simultaneously. I discuss these at length in the next chapter. Here, however, I 
want to argue that the idea that non-liberal forms of action can be chosen 
strategically appeals at least in part to liberal logics of choice and strategy. These 
logics are autological and linear progressive. The logics assume a subject can act 
rationally and strategically towards a future end point. The idea of strategically 
enacting a reality in which strategy is not a mode of action is, of course, somewhat 
contradictory and awkward. I deal with this paradox and awkwardness in the 
following chapter. This is a tense, paradoxical analysis which I also take up in the 
next chapter.  For now I mean to show that in seeking legitimacy, autological and 
late liberal rationalities of action are, therefore, latent even in the so-called ‘choice’ 
to reject or redirect them.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has shown some of the ways in which liberal logics operate in 
the movement for a Northern university and at the Akitsiraq Law School in 
particular. Late liberal notions of culture and capacity provide the impetus, rationale 
and legitimacy for higher education in the North. Latent autological versions of 
agency persist when participants articulate what they are doing as strategic. Akitsiraq 
therefore aligns in many ways with the constitutional narrative of decolonization that 
I described in Chapter 4. It does not do so entirely, however. As I have indicated, 
participants do attempt to redefine culture and capacity and they do create tensions 
and paradoxes in the ways they engage these discourses. Nonetheless, the liberal 
logics of the higher education and governmental institutions with which they interact 
often take precedent or persist. Taken together then the activities I have described in 
this chapter demonstrate the salience and repetition of late liberal logics of agency. 
My description also shows, however, that participants rarely understand what they 
are doing in these logics alone.  
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It should be clear by now that no practice or articulation of agency happens in 
isolation. Each is entangled with its socio-historical context, including with other 
forms of agency, in very specific ways. Each of the above sections overlaps and 
interrelates with the others. Culture or capacity might be understood as goals. White 
understands them as competing goals. Historically situating the emergence of these 
goals, however, shows that they have been and continue to be co-constituted with the 
liberal settler state (this story is told across the last chapter and this one). Although 
each section focuses on specific accounts of agency that align with their late liberal 
context, no section neatly contains or brackets those accounts as only liberal. Each 
section highlight moments where some alternative seems visible or possible and 
where I have pointed to their overflow into Chapter 6. In the next chapter, I go onto 
explore some of these breakdowns and alternatives.   
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6. Pedagogies of place 
 
At Dechinta, one doesn’t just learn about decolonization, Dechinta is 
a practice of decolonization. 
 
Dechinta students’ statement to the press, 2011 
 
In August 2012 I was on a Dechinta weekly conference call about the 
upcoming semester, which was due to begin in early September. An instructor on the 
call mentioned a new book that was coming out: Alice Legat’s Walking the Land, 
Feeding the Fire. He had received an advanced copy. The book is about how the 
Tlicho (pronounced ‘kley-choh’) Dene “become knowledgeable” (Legat, 2012:30). 
Dechinta is on Tlicho Dene land. Alice Legat is a white anthropologist, who sits on 
Dechinta’s advisory committee, and has lived and worked in the North for a long 
time. In Walking the Land, Legat argues that the Tlicho Dene become knowledgeable 
in relation to a place, by walking and story-telling in or with that place. In fact, 
becoming knowledgeable also means to come into being as a knower or actor. In this 
way place ties being and knowing together inseparably, making being and knowing a 
situated, dynamic and “spatial” processes (ibid).  During the conference call, I 
listened as a member of the Board of Directors discussed Walking the Land with the 
instructor who had raised it. They both agreed that “this is exactly what we are 
doing” (the instructor), and that for Dechinta’s third semester, the book should go on 
the reading list. I immediately ordered a copy of the book and read it on the plane on 
my way to Canada for the semester. It was then the first book that the students read 
when they arrived on site. Seven of the nine students were Dene, and two were 
Tlicho Dene specifically. The Dene students were therefore reading an ethnography 
of their own people by a non-Dene anthropologist.  
The students felt the book resonated strongly with their experiences, and 
together they used its vocabulary and account to construct a framework for making 
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sense of their activities in the rest of the semester. The concept they fixed on was 
“knowing two ways” (Legat, 2012:4). The concept of knowing two ways, Legat 
explains, was first advised by Grand Chief Jimmy Bruneau. The concept has since 
been taken up by the Tlico Dene Legat worked with, along with the ideas of “doing” 
and “being” “two ways” and becoming “strong like two people” (ibid). The “two 
ways” Legat describes are the Tlicho way and the Kweet’ii (white) way, and include 
two languages and two knowledge systems. These words became almost mantra-like, 
with the students repeating them several times a day throughout the semester. What 
the “two ways” were comprised of varied and included the bush and the university, 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous, property and reciprocal relations to land, and the 
state and self-governance, amongst other pairs. “Two ways” were at work, according 
to the students, at Dechinta and in their own lives, both inadvertently and 
deliberately.  
This short story illustrates the three themes of this chapter: place, critique and 
ambiguity. In the story, we can see how Dechinta’s participants theorize place and 
attempt to intervene in knowledge (including blurring the line between theory and 
practice). We can also see how “two ways” operates ambiguously without any fixed 
definition. Place, critique and ambiguity are all ways in which participants in 
Dechinta understand and articulate what they are doing more generally. Each, I 
argue, points to a way of thinking about post-liberal agency. Participants’ spatio-
temporal practices or ‘place’ points to a form of action that is not aligned with the 
chronotope of late liberalism. Participants’ knowledge practices or ‘critique’ 
intervenes in the autological agency on an ontological and epistemological level, as 
well as making room for imagining alternatives. Ambiguity and indeterminacy 
enable participants to do this. Ambuity and indeterminacy also constitute, I argue, 
distinctly unliberal features of action themselves. The story above illustrates all three 
elements of the chapter and their interconnections. So do all the stories I tell in the 
chapter. Participants themselves deliberately weaved together aspects of life which 
are separated in liberal logics. For example, as Legat describes, the Tlicho Dene 
collapse knowing and being through place. Throughout the chapter I return to the 
themes of interconnection and indivisibility. 
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This chapter is stylistically different to the other chapters in this thesis. I tell 
more stories. I tell stories because they capture the contingencies and entanglements 
of the forms of agency articulated by participants in Dechinta. They also capture the 
fleeting sense of possibility that I found necessary to considering post-liberal agency. 
I return to the meaning of fleeting senses of possibilities in the final section of this 
chapter. These stories are not intended to exemplify my argument directly. Nor is my 
argument an analysis of them. Rather, I take the stories themselves and participants’ 
own stories within them as theory and treat them on a level with the scholarly 
theorists I also discuss (as described by Weiss, 2011). This chapter is also less linear 
and less neatly divided than the other chapters. This is because the material I am 
working with resists neat categorization and is consistently interconnected. Unlike in 
the previous chapter where I was able to separate out actor (Inuit), action (strategy) 
and agency (capacity), these are all happening at once in every story I tell here. If 
there is a ‘flow’ to the chapter it is cyclical, or back-and-forth, rather than linear. The 
different logics of thesis writing and place-based pedagogy sit uneasily together in 
this chapter. This is not to say that the chapter does not necessarily have a single 
cumulative effect. Its aim is to show how late liberal logics of action break down, are 
contested, and are imagined otherwise, at Dechinta Bush University.  
6.1 Re-configuring spatio-temporalities  
As the Professor on the call pointed out, the marriage of place, pedagogy and 
politics was what Dechinta was doing already. Dechinta’s leaders and publicity 
materials described Dechinta as “place-based” and “land-based” as well as 
“decolonizing” and “self-governing” (Dechinta website, 2012). Dechinta’s approach 
was derived from and with local Dene knowledge and this enthusiastic reading of the 
book affirmed its accuracy and resonance in those communities. In this section I 
describe how participants in Dechinta Bush University locate their agency in or in 
relation to ‘place’. Without exception, participants across all my interviews were 
concerned with place and with the land, the North, Nunavut and the NWT. In this 
chapter, however, when I say ‘place’ I mean specifically an adapted version of what 
Bakhtin calls a “chronotope” (Bakhtin, 1982:84).   
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Bakthin describes the chronotope as “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal 
and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (Bakhtin, 
1982:84). The chronotope, Bakhtin explains, is informed by a “Kantian evaluation of 
the importance of these forms [space and time] in the cognitive process” (ibid). 
Space and time are primary in the constitution of reality: “the image of man is always 
intrinsically chronotopic,” and “every entry into the sphere of meaning is 
accomplished only through the gates of the chronotope” (Bakhtin, 1982:85). Unlike 
Kant, however, for Bakhtin space and time are not “transcendental” but “forms of the 
most immediate reality” (ibid). Following Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, for 
Bakhtin time and space are not absolute or universal and they are not something we 
exist “in” (ibid). Instead, time and space are found differently everywhere – they are 
modes of thinking and organising life, not external to it – and they are entangled and 
co-constitutive. In Chapter 2 I elaborated Elizabeth Povinelli’s “chronotope of late 
liberalism” (Povinelli, 2011:31) to show that liberal agency operates around a linear 
progressive temporality privileged over a stagnant and universal notion of space.  
The chronotope of place is therefore more than “simply some material object 
of profound importance to Indigenous cultures (although it is this too)” (Coulthard, 
2010:79-83). Instead, Glen Coulthard argues, land and place “ought to be understood 
as a field of relationships of things to each other. Place is a way of knowing, 
experiencing, and relating with the world” (ibid). Knowing and learning are “spatial” 
(Legat, 2012:175) and operate around a “floating temporality” rather than a “linear” 
settler temporality (Legat, 2012:61). Actors gain authority, through becoming 
knowledgeable, through and with place. In fact they come into being as actors 
through the same process – knowing and being are inseparable. This integration of 
knowledge, place and authority is common to many Indigenous societies and is 
documented widely (see especially Tim Ingold [2000] and Keith Basso [1996]). In 
this section I show how the chronotope of place as a “field of relationships” in which 
spatiality organizes inseparable and contingent temporalities is articulated and 
practiced in daily life at Dechinta Bush University. I argue that this resists and 
reworks the colonizing spatio-temporalities of liberalisms and creates other 
possibilities for action and agency. Enacting the chronotope of place is enacting 
Indigenous self-determination and decolonization.  
161 
 
Dechinta attributes agency to place and to the land. Its 2012 poster 
advertisement proclaims: “Meet our most honoured professor…: [picture of the lake 
and trees at Dechinta] The Land.” Its former Director and founder describes the 
“land as the primary teacher”: “how does land inform how we act, our ontology, and 
how we conceive of core values and ethics? … Land as a teacher and contextualizer 
for healing, governance and community health” (Director quoted in Luig, 2010:36). 
The agency of land and place occurs at Dechinta in three ways. First, Dechinta is 
informed by local realities and needs, as well as being “by Northerners, for 
Northerners”. I have talked about this aspect of Northern education more generally 
throughout the thesis. Second, as a “contextualizer”: teaching and learning in and in 
relation to place expose the contingencies and contradictions of knowledge 
(particularly governmental knowledge). I discuss this in detail in the next section. 
Third, place governs. That is, place determines what happens in daily life and place 
determines who has the authority to act. It is this third way that I focus on here.  
Dechinta Initiatives has organized its governance structure and operations 
around the logics described in the previous paragraph. The organization is advised by 
a council of local leaders and experts. The most respected instructors were always 
people who had strong connections to the land and place. These people were 
primarily but not exclusively elders. There were two resident elders on site. In Dene 
norms elders would have been camp leaders. It was important that these were not just 
any elders, but elders from the land on which Dechinta is based. (Dechinta’s leaders 
claim that this is the case, but I also encountered skepticism around this fact from the 
program’s critics. Notably it was it was Dechinta’s leaders’ belonging to place that 
came under attack when critics wanted to attack Dechinta.) Further, if there was a 
moose sighting or a sunny day, we went hunting. If there was rain, we stayed in and 
told stories. If it was cold, we collected more firewood. If it was hot, we went 
swimming. In these ways, we experienced and recognized the land as the primary 
mode of agency in our daily life. It was not the only mode of agency, however.  
Our daily activities were therefore structured so that the Dechinta facilitator 
(me) and student leaders (rotating) would consult with the elders at least daily to 
determine our activities for the day. If there was a big activity coming up, we might 
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consult them the day before to make sure we were prepared. The elders would make 
these decisions in large part based on weather or other environmental demands. This 
was not straightforward. The elders were often resistant to scheduling and I had the 
impression they often gave me a time or activity just to get me off their backs, and 
when we came to it they would change their mind, forget, or act as if there had never 
been a plan. In addition, as I describe in a story below, the degree to which elders 
actually got to lead the course varied, and had to be balanced with the requirements 
of the University of Alberta. The agency of place was in constant friction and 
competition with the chronotope of conventional university life, including with pre-
made plans, professors’ schedules and University of Alberta deadlines. 
Nonetheless, the principle of leadership, action and authority being derived 
from a relationship to place was articulated and aspired to by all Dechinta’s 
participants and, to some degree, was simply made necessary by the social and 
material conditions of living and teaching in the Arctic. The formal qualifications 
and job titles which gave authority to instructors in the South became meaningless in 
the Northern context. I might have been the convener, for example, but when it came 
to bush tasks I was essentially useless, and bush tasks structured our day both by 
principle and necessity. Our youngest student of 18 could certainly have made a 
better call than me on what weather was navigable by boat and how. During our time 
together she taught me how to strip bark, make teepee floors, chop wood, and paddle, 
amongst other things. All the students, in fact, knew what needed doing and how, in 
ways that I could not. This is not to say that a group of young people faced with a 
large amount of work did not need leadership of some kind, but rather that my formal 
qualifications and position did not equip me to give it to them. Those qualifications 
were laughable and we all laughed about them regularly. What the students needed, 
and would have respected, was someone with the intimate knowledge of the land 
built through experience and a relationship with that land. That person is an agent in 
place-based pedagogy. Place itself has a direct impact on the pedagogical 
relationship.  
The material environment also organized everyday life. When the weather is 
bad (or, as they say there, when “there is weather”) people could not fly in or out. As 
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we approached winter, uncertainty and anxiety increased around whether we would 
get out and what date we would leave. Some days, instructors did not make it in or 
lessons could not proceed as planned. I want to discuss Akitsiraq briefly here 
because I am wary of romanticizing the land and place as ‘wilderness’. Akitsiraq was 
based in a city of 8,000 and in a college classroom. Its students were not expected to 
hunt for dinner. They paid for and ate lunch in the well-heated college canteen. 
Lunch was likely made out of ingredients bought at the local supermarket. 
Nonetheless, the role of place at Akitsiraq was comparably strong. Students would 
still follow the weather to a day of hunting or a day at home rather than go to classes. 
The material environment still made southern academic norms impossible. The very 
limited and poor internet access challenged pretty much all academic practices. High 
speed internet only arrived in Nunavut mid-way through the program and remains 
unreliable. Students could not always use the university interface or download online 
journals. Staff at Victoria library would make photocopies and send them North – but 
this was, again, delayed by the postal service (which faces similar challenges) and by 
weather/flights not being able to land. Southern teaching staff came North for part of 
or a full semester and as such were in a constant state of adjustment to teaching in 
this environment. All of this contributed to the different expectations and frustrations 
and tensions between Northern and Southern students and staff that I described in the 
previous chapter. 
Returning to Dechinta, the following story about the day we set up ‘out-
camp’ shows how place-based knowledge happens in practice. The day we set up our 
camp, group anxiety was high. We were overscheduled and had a number of 
important tasks which we could not complete all of – including setting up camp. We 
were all about to leave the comforts of the lodge (running water, privacy, 
connectivity) to sleep in a teepee together for a week. We travelled a half hour across 
the lake by motorboat to the camp-site. Our first priorities were to set up shelter and 
to get firewood. Assembling and erecting the teepee took up most of the afternoon. 
We had to chop down trees of the appropriate height. We had to remove the branches 
from those trees and carry them to the teepee site. Then we had to stand the branches 
up securely against each other. Then we had to get the canvas up around the massive 
frame in a way that it would protect us from the weather but also allow us to have a 
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fire or stove in the middle. Then we had to add that fire or stove in a way that would 
not burn us or the tent down but would not let in rain or snow through either. We 
were also directed by the Elders to collect tiny spruce branches and weave a floor for 
the teepe. We then had to go through the same process for the frame tent for the 
Elders and the frame for the kitchen.  
This took us all afternoon. I joked at one point to a student that if we had a 
pre-made made-in-China tent from Walmart this whole thing would be a lot quicker, 
less work, less stress and possibly even more effective. We would be able to get on 
with chopping firewood instead of worrying about being cold and we would be able 
to take advantage of the moosehide tanner who was visiting back at the Lodge and 
would only be with us for the day. My own norms valued efficiency, quickness and 
orderly scheduling! I watched as the students patiently followed the elders’ precise 
instructions as to where to put the teepee poles (“forward… no no to the side…” or 
“okay we need another tree”). I wondered whether it would be easier if the students 
could point out when they thought the elders were wrong about how to balance the 
poles – or even if they had a sense of why they were doing particular things, rather 
than following blindly. Again, this version of authority, derived from a relationship 
with the land, jarred with my own. At the end of the day, after several hours of hard 
work, we had a slightly crooked teepee with a canvas that would not close properly. 
We had not got any firewood. I felt confused about my responsibility as group leader 
and facilitator in all this. I thought again about that Walmart tent.  
But some other things happened during the course of that day, too: I spent a 
lot of time collecting spruce branches with our youngest student. We talked about her 
anxieties about out-camp and she played me hip-hop on her iphone, which I think 
established some cultural common ground (across the distance, we had both heard 
the same songs) although also disconnect (I enjoyed them a lot less than she did). We 
established a rapport which we would carry throughout the semester and a ground on 
which we could later relate. The students also taught me how to use an axe, which I 
had never done. They laughed at and congratulated my varied efforts with the axe. 
This was the beginning of my acquisition of a necessary survival skill. It was also the 
beginning of my learning from the students which continued throughout the 
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semester: the activity reversed the conventional pedagogical relationship. Everything 
that made me authoritative: my job title, my educational qualifications, my role as 
leader and assessor, they were all meaningless in this context. The students were far 
more authoritative, and were really my teachers through this experience.   
One of the elders explained to me what trees were good for the tepee and 
which were good for what sorts of fire: I began to distinguish each tree from the next 
which would enable me to find my way through the bush throughout the semester. 
Another elder showed me how to lay the spruce floor. I followed her instructions 
exactly but my floor was not as neat or soft or tidy as hers. I began to be integrated 
into that system of order and to learn how to interact with it which so far I had only 
read about in books.  
The hard physical work changed our attitudes and interactions as we became 
tired and frustrated or satisfied and invigorated. Bonds and tensions formed around 
this work in a pattern that continued throughout the semester: solidarity and 
cooperation between those working hard and resentment of those perceived to be 
working less hard, as well as racial and familial tensions around these issues. When 
we gathered on that spruce floor for our first night in the teepee, looking up at the 
stars and Northern lights through the opening above us, we recalled those hours and 
that work. This strengthened our sense of cohesion and solidarity when it came to our 
nightly ‘circle’, during which we shared our reflections on the day and planned for 
the next. Of course, the fatigue from the work and anxiety about the days ahead also 
exacerbated our frustrations with each other and several contributions were short and 
terse. All of this happened in the hours during which we set up the teepee and might 
not have happened with a pop-up Walmart tent or some ‘more efficient’ way. And 
this was only one of many activities that we undertook. (I do not mean to romanticize 
the tepee. Something similar did in fact happen when students later tried to erect a 
Walmart tent. That tent was not fit to sleep in, however.) Reflecting on setting up the 
teepee late that night, I realized that as much of the theory of the land-based and 
experiential pedagogy I had read, I could only really understand it through or in 
experience. In the same way, I have been able to communicate it better (if not fully) 
through a story than an analysis.  
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The place-based pedagogy was the process of setting up out-camp. Teaching, 
learning and even the emerging community and hierarchy, all happened through the 
process, which had effects for what we knew and how but also beyond. This was the 
becoming that Alice Legat was talking about in Walking the Land. This way of 
practicing knowledge governed our activities. In my story, place determined who 
was authoritative as well as being an agent itself. Place and space organized 
temporality (more on this below). This is the chrontope of place at work, and it looks 
strikingly different to the chronotope of late liberalism and the conventional 
university classroom. This is the way participants theorized their own action and 
agency: in place, and in the relations between place and the wider late liberal North.  
By theorizing and organizing education around the chrontope of place, 
Dechinta’s participants therefore seek to challenge the chronotope of liberal action. 
Their emphasis on time and space as entangled in place enact what Goeman 
describes as a “break from the uni-directional, progressive narrative found in the 
narratives of manifest destiny” (Goeman, 2008:24). Instead, “Indigenous conceptions 
of land are literally and figuratively the placeholder that moves through time and 
situates indigenous knowledges. Conceiving of space as a node, rather than a linear 
time construct marked by supposed shifting ownerships, is a powerful mechanism in 
resisting imperial geographies that order time and space in hierarchies that erase and 
bury Indigneous connections to place and anesthetizes settler-colonial histories” 
(ibid). A second effect of place at Dechinta was to expose the contingencies of 
pedagogic authority and governmental knowledge. I now turn to discuss this in the 
next section.  
6.2 Practicing critique 
In this section I argue that place-based pedagogy is a critical practice and that 
place as critique is another mode and effect of action at Dechinta. Before discussing 
Dechinta specifically I want to stress that by ‘critique’ I mean an intervention into or 
reworking of governmental knowledge in practice. By ‘governmental knowledge’ I 
mean knowledge practices that themselves govern. This is not an academic critique 
or criticism. Critique as a practice is more akin to Michel Foucault’s “critique,” that I 
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began to describe in Chapter 2 (Foucault, 1997:28-30). To resist the dominant arts of 
government of the church, Foucault’s Reformation Protestants do not reject the god, 
biblical texts or truth status through which those arts govern. Instead, they re-
configure their relations within and against the government of the church to shift 
authority from the priest to the text and its reader. Similarly, Dechinta reconfigures 
university pedagogy in the bush. This re-configuration occurs, centrally, around the 
chronotope of place. As described above, Dechinta attempts to disrupt and rework 
late liberal everyday spatio-temporalities. Relatedly, as I describe here, relocating 
governmental and university knowledge to the North exposes its contingencies and 
contradictions. I have already noted how my own re-location to the Arctic 
undermined any universal claims of my status as lecturer or instructor. I now 
describe what teaching law and politics at university level in the Arctic meant for 
that governmental knowledge and teaching itself more generally.  
I am returning briefly to Akitsiraq because Akitsiraq’s focus on law illustrates 
this so starkly. I then look back to Dechinta for further depth and complexity. In the 
previous chapter I described how the legitimacy of the liberal narrative of leadership 
and capacity, along with juridical law and the university, gives authority and 
visibility to Akitsiraq. However, this combination of liberal and alternate ways of 
knowing and acting has effects beyond this legitimization. For example, one 
instructor described how property law had to be entirely re-thought to be taught in a 
Northern setting. Property is arranged, she explained, differently in the North, where 
there is so much land, little privately owned housing and no tradition amongst Inuit 
of ownership as exclusivity. Another instructor described his introduction of a classic 
case about a policy prohibiting the use of vehicles in a park. The idea, he said, was to 
get students thinking about whether a pram or a bicycle, for example, is a ‘vehicle’ in 
the park. But the students did not follow this logic. Instead, they ask asked “what’s a 
pram?” and “what’s a park?”. They did not understand how this enclosed piece of 
space might have its own laws. Often, the instructor said, “they were rolling in the 
isles” – laughing at the absurdities of the taken for granted features of Southern life 
and law. These contradictions exist in many places but become starkly visible when 
trying to make Euro-Canadian law make sense in the Arctic setting. The effect of this 
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re-placing is, therefore, to expose the limits of the Euro-Canadian law in the 
Northern setting – its contingencies on what is taken as given in the South.  
Similarly, Southern instructors had to adjust pedagogically. Most Akitsiraq 
students are adults ages 30 to 60 and have not attended university or possibly even 
graduated high school (even though Law is usually a post-graduate degree in 
Canada). They therefore have no idea of the norms of the classrooms that their 
instructors are used to. In one of the classes I attended students treated lectures more 
like conversations and any one of them would interject any time they had something 
to say or ask. Afterwards the instructor told me that it “kept her on her toes” and that 
their “questions were not linear,” meaning that they did not make the similar ‘on 
topic’ associations that Southern students would. She explained to me that in 
response she had to reconceptualise her lecturing. She drew a point on the board, for 
me, and then arrows pointing out in all directions. These arrows where were the 
students’ questions directed the conversation. Her job, she felt, was to draw a circle 
connecting the heads of all these arrows. In these ways authority was shifted in 
Nunavut to Inuit and other people from Nunavut, and the spatial representation of 
law was shifting from linear to circular articulations. This might seem obvious, but 
contrast this to the homogenous culture of universities world-wide, or the likely 
experience of a minority Inuit student in one of those universities who would have to 
adapt to fit.  
Returning to Dechinta, contingencies and contradictions in liberal pedagogy, 
knowledge and government were exposed in their combination with land-based 
pedagogy. Land-based practices combined with book reading, assignment writing, 
and accreditation from the University of Alberta. Alice Legat’s (2013) Walking the 
Land, Feeding the Fire was on the reading list. Jeneatte Armstrong’s (1996) Slash, 
with which I opened the introduction to this thesis, was also on the reading list. 
Book-based knowledge and land-based knowledge have contrasting underlying 
logics. The effects of this combination of books and the land were two-fold. First, 
combining the bush and the university exposed the relationships and tensions 
between these different forms of knowledge and government. Second, they 
undermined the division of theory and practice, and ontology and epistemology. Both 
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of these effects, I argue here, are forms of critical practice, exposing the contingency 
of liberal logics of action and enabling alternate forms to be imagined.  
As I said above, students picked up on the phrases “knowing two ways,” and 
being “strong like two people,” from Alice Legat’s ethnography, Walking the Land. 
These two ways are captured in Dechinta’s title: Dechinta Bush University brings 
together the way of the bush and the way of the university. I discuss the ambiguity 
that operated around this “two” in the following section. Here, I talk about the 
contingencies they exposed and the tensions that they produced in turn.  I argue that 
by drawing attention to contingency and tension “knowing two ways” undermines 
universal and colonizing knowledge and versions of politics and action. I have 
already discussed tensions between the North and the university at Akitsiraq (in its 
admissions process, for example). Here, I show how these same tensions emerged at 
Dechinta.  
Perhaps the most fraught area of activity during the fall semester was the 
organization of what we were doing at any given moment: how what we were doing 
was decided, through what logic, what process, and by what authority. Universities 
are structured around the clock and calendar. Classes begin and end ‘on time’. 
Deadlines are integral to university life and, to some degree, the functioning of the 
academic workplace and the rest of the lives of academics. Dates and times are 
planned in advance and the goal is to adhere to these plans. A specific material 
environment and space is also conducive to university life: protection of people, 
books, electronics and even attention or mood from harsh weather, electricity for 
lighting and computers, internet access, a surface to write or type on, perhaps literal 
and psychological space to think, to read, to disengage from that immediate material 
reality through text and theorizing (‘critical distance’).  Of course, none of these 
things is a necessary condition for academic work – one student joked repeatedly that 
he was going to make a “bush desk” out of the wall of the outhouse we built in the 
bush. After all, there was no obvious need for walls on our bush outhouse. These 
conditions definitely make academic work easier and more likely, however. That 
student never did get the chance to make a bush desk. His time and energy was 
already overstretched by more immediately urgent bush tasks (like getting firewood). 
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His workload was exceptionally heavy, as being the only male student meant he was 
responsible for much of the work that would have traditionally been done by men. 
These forms of time and space were present at Dechinta, in scheduling and in 
the lodge. Delivering programming that is equally rigorous as that in a Southern 
university is of central concern to Dechinta. Dechinta seeks to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the program and ability of its participants. It also aims to equip the 
students with university skills should they wish to use them – either at a university, 
or more generally as they embody one of the two ways. Students therefore have to 
complete and submit assignments 'on time' and for deadlines. There is a written, 
fixed schedule of these assignment timings throughout the semester. There is also a 
written, fixed schedule of instructor visits and therefore classes. After all, most 
incomers are functioning on clock and calendar times in home institutions or 
workplaces. People must be booked on planes, more food must be bought and flown 
in to feed more people, and so-on. Institutionally Dechinta must also work with the 
University of Alberta's deadlines. 
The lodge also provided the material and spatial conditions necessary to 
university-like activity. The Lodge enables participants to scatter, with its multiple 
rooms, cabins and so-on. It also enables them to continue to connect to the outside, 
via the internet and, less directly, via people coming and going on the plane. 
Generator powered heating, electric lighting, shelter and Lodge staff to cook and 
clean, all enabled us to, more or less, recreate a ‘classroom’ in the Bush. It did not 
matter, in this structure, if there was a storm outside (or, conversely, a sunny window 
of opportunity). We could continue with a class, as scheduled, regardless. Students 
could fragment into twos or individuals. Two students would often hide in the 
bathroom. I would have to retrieve them, enacting my teacher authority and status. I 
would go upstairs alone and make fieldnotes on my laptop, enacting my researcher 
outsiderness. Students were often late for scheduled activities, keeping the group 
waiting (we would always wait – unlike in a Southern class). I would hike up and 
down the rocks gathering the group together, being teacher again, although my 
authority somewhat undermined by having to hike backwards and forwards up a 
large hill in order to exercise it. The students could also receive and read articles for 
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their work (ostensibly – actually the internet was too slow and Dechinta too 
disorganized in getting these to the students), submit their assignments online, type 
their assignments on the Dechinta laptop, and post to the Dechinta blog. This way of 
organizing space is a way of enabling the privileging of clock-time above all else, a 
material environment created to make distant or irrelevant another material 
environment, through walls and electricity. It also had the effect of fragmenting the 
community. This is not a normative statement – fragmenting does not necessarily 
mean ‘bad,’ and personal space was often quite welcome. 
On the other hand, in the bush, when events happen (the organization of time) 
is determined largely by when environmental opportunities and imperatives present 
themselves. If there is a big catch of fish, more time is given to gutting and drying. If 
the weather is bad, activities happen indoors. If it is cold, more wood must be 
chopped and so-on. These things are impossible to determine in advance and so 
planning times and dates actively interferes with the order and logic of bush life.That 
is not to say there is no planning – when going out on the land, for example, one 
must plan and bring everything needed or risk death. However this is not planning 
around time.  Here space and place order time.  
The space of out-camp was more conducive to this way of organizing time 
and to community cohesion. At out-camp, we were forced into close proximity with 
each other at all times. There were only really two spaces – inside the tepee or 
outside, around the kitchen or fire. It was not safe to wander off too far alone - and 
there was nowhere to go. It was hard to be late for anything – because we were 
always already there, either free or doing some necessary activity. There was not 
even really a sense of ‘being late’. You could see, at a glance, roughly where 
everyone was and what they were doing: it was hard to avoid commitments or be 
alone in any way. The tasks that we had to complete were not written on a schedule 
on a wall in another room – they made themselves known to us, through the cold, 
wet or hunger. It was very difficult to read or to write anything in this context. We 
hung up our paper schedule on the wall of the kitchen frame – it got rained on and 
ruined. These two ways of doing time were in almost constant tension throughout the 
semester: between the weather and the scheduled activities, between the wishes of 
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the elders and the assignment deadlines, and between the necessities of camp and the 
instructor flown in to deliver a class. These tensions came to a head in the last few 
days of the semester which I describe now.  
As we neared the end of the semester, we had piled up a number of 
administrative tasks that, scheduled for earlier in the semester, we had pushed back 
due to other demands on our time. We had to conduct a paper evaluation of the 
program, for the University of Alberta, for funders and for Dechinta's own 
development. Previous semesters had shown that students were unlikely to complete 
evaluations off-site, so we wanted to avoid them having to do so. We also had to 
have a discussion about post-site work and deadlines – these had also been pushed 
back throughout the semester. Again, previous semesters had shown that it was 
difficult to engage students off-site to complete assignments, so we needed to make 
our expectations clear and give students the information they needed to complete 
them. Incomplete assignments meant no university credit for students – undermining 
a central mission of the program. We had to have a final presentation assessment, as 
per the syllabus and schedule, and we had to let students prepare for this.  At the 
same time, we needed to take-down out-camp. This was no small task – we had 
accumulated a large quantity of equipment, from canoes to a well-stocked tent-frame 
kitchen.  
We had also promised to go and visit the cabin of the father of one of the 
Elders which was further up Blachford Lake. On the way back from that journey, the 
elders and one student split off to track moose. We had been looking and calling for 
moose all semester, but had encountered none, so when the elders and student 
returned to tell us they had spotted and shot a mother and calf, camp was elated (and 
relieved as we had been anxious during their extended absence). They had butchered 
the calf, which died by the shore, but the mother ran off into the trees. This meant 
that a second party had to go out to track and butcher the mother the next day, which 
was the final full day of the semester. Navigating a large rocky and windy lake, 
tracking, skinning and butchering a moose are no easy tasks. When I went out with 
the second party, it took us (five people) over an hour simply to shift the moose into 
an accessible position. It takes centuries of knowledge generated from the land to 
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know how to find and follow moose. It takes skills and expertise to know how to 
butcher it. Removing the hide is a particularly important task, because moose-hide 
tanning is a process which organizes much of Dene life and governance, and it is 
easy to cut and ruin the hide with a knife (Irlbacher-Fox, 2009).  
The day after we got the moose was the last full day at out-camp and on-site. 
We had to butcher the moose, pack up camp and do all of our university and 
administration tasks. The students were divided between wanting to prepare their 
final assignments and wanting to learn about the moose and to work with the elders. 
Everyone was divided between the authority of the elders and the university. The 
Even though the elders said we had to work on the moose, other Dechinta staff felt 
we had to do the university tasks. Under pressure, we did the university tasks in a 
somewhat perfunctory way, perhaps losing some of their potential value. Whilst we 
were doing these tasks, the elder butchered the moose, so the students did not get to 
learn how. There was some confusion and negotiation as to what was going to 
happen to the moose. The elders were going to take some; some was going in a 
community freezer; the students could take some; some parts, probably the hide, had 
to stay with Dechinta. The camp still needed to be packed up – the semester was 
scheduled to end and a plane was due to fly into collect us the following day. 
These last few days of the semester illustrate some of the tensions that 
emerged when we tried to combine bush and university ways of life and learning. 
They also show how, in combining both, we were not able to take either for granted. 
We were able to see the forms of life which each enabled. We were not able to 
choose freely or strategically (as participants suggested they might be in the final 
section of Chapter 5). We found ourselves feeling the force and weight of university 
logics and spatio-temporalities – even if we might have wished otherwise. 
Nonetheless, because they were operating in the bush, we were not determined by 
these logics blindly or absolutely. In this “complex interplay between what replicates 
the same process and what transforms it,” (Foucault, 1997:58), Dechinta created the 
possibility and space for critical reflexivity around its participants own agency.  
I now end this section by discussing a further critical feature and effect of 
Dechinta: the collapse of distinctions between theory and practice, ontology and 
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epistemology. Dechinta’s 2010 evaluation report makes these effects its explicit aims 
(Luig, 2009). This collapse is evident throughout this whole chapter. In the story I 
told above, Dene forms of knowledge are articulated between the elders who Alice 
Legatt worked with, her book Walking the Land, and the Dene Dechinta students – as 
well as, of course, the thesis you are reading right now. Frequently I would encounter 
the words or actions of instructors and experts in the field, only then to go to their 
books for some more legitimate reference. I experienced this entanglement 
particularly acutely in my ongoing relationships with grant leaders and instructors 
Glen Coulthard and Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox. These scholars were already drawing 
on community experiences and now on Dechinta itself in their work (in fact we were 
all engaged in a research project on/with Dechinta at the time). Similarly, I would sit 
and read books theorizing land-based learning while also doing land-based learning 
itself. Sometimes I would help the students engage with those books.  
My description of place-based pedagogy here is of a messy, everyday 
entanglement of books, readers, writers, knowers and known. My point (and 
Dechinta’s participants point) is to show that subject and object, theory and practice 
and even epistemology and ontology cannot be neatly separated out. This contrasts 
directly with autological action, in which actor (knower), action (knowing) and 
outcome (knowledge) are separable and organized in linear progressive time. In my 
description so far, they are not separable in this way. Rather, they are all happening 
simultaneously and are organized spatially. This is part of what has made the current 
chapter so difficult to separate. This is not a completely new revelation. When, for 
example, Judith Butler says that discourse “enacts or produces that which it names” 
she is arguing that knower, knowledge and known are not in fact separable (Butler, 
1993:13). The pedagogy of place is much more than an analysis, however. The 
pedagogy of place enacts this collapse in daily life as well as enacting something else 
– experience and place – in its stead.  
This section has covered contingencies, contradictions and the collapse of 
multiple divisions. This far-reaching selection of accounts contributes to a larger 
picture in which place-based pedagogy is a critical practice. Much like that of 
Foucault’s protestants, they do not reject governing knowledge (the university) 
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outright, but rather reconfigure it (with place) in order to rework it. Reworking late 
liberal state politics means exposing their contingencies and contradictions, as well 
as reaching for ways in which political action and agency might be imagined 
otherwise. In this case, that ‘otherwise’ involves privileging space, land and place, 
and entangling theory and practice, knower and known, actor and action through the 
process of place-based pedagogy. I now turn to describe how ambiguity and 
indeterminacy enabled this critical practice at both Dechinta and Akitsiraq and what 
this meant for my own attempt to locate post-liberal forms of agency.  
6.3 Acting ambivalently and indeterminately  
The moral asymmetries across which ethnography works and the discursive 
complexity within which it works make any attempt to portray it as anything more 
than the representation of one sort of life in the categories of another impossible to 
defend.  
(Geertz, 1988:144) 
Is it even possible to talk about post-liberal or place-based forms of agency 
from my own location in the liberal university? Do Dechinta’s participants’ efforts at 
enacting alternatives ‘count’ or are they always assimilated? This final section deals 
with the qualities and logics of action at work at Dechinta. First, I talk about the 
difficulties of trying to imagine a post-liberal from of agency from my own location 
in higher education. Similarly, I discuss some of the difficulties faced by participants 
in doing the same thing while working in partnership with southern universities. I 
then move on to describe the roles of ambiguity and ambivalence at Dechinta and in 
Northern higher education more broadly. I argue that these distinctly unliberal forms 
of action enabled participants to navigate some of the tensions I have described here.  
This chapter describes efforts at articulating forms of political agency and 
action differently from the late liberal context of the Canadian North. Sometimes 
these forms feel fleeting or intangible. This results both from liberalism’s prevalence, 
and also from the contradictions and frustrations of reaching for non-liberal forms of 
agency from my own liberal academic contexts using the form of a thesis. I shared 
176 
 
this problem in common with the research participants, and discuss at length in the 
conclusion. One of its implications is that, as Elizabeth Povinelli argues, when we 
are looking for things that are otherwise or alternate to late liberalism, those things 
might be excluded from liberal terms of success and existence – the same terms that 
regulate intelligibility in academia (Povinelli, 2011:31-32). One of the terms 
Povinelli is particularly concerned with is the demand for temporal endurance – the 
idea that if it ends, it has failed. If we conceive of the relations of modes of agency as 
relational, however, the slippage of one into the next does not signal a failure to 
exist, but a necessity of existence, and sometimes a refusal to exist in the dominant 
terms. Again, this requirement for recognition aligns with the chronotope of late 
liberalism.  
I have told stories in this chapter in order to capture this sense or feel of the 
otherwise where simple descriptions or statements would not. I have also told stories 
because stories can maintain multiple and sometimes conflicting truths and logics. 
For example, in the stories above, both juridical and place-based versions of reality, 
including agents and actors, are equally ‘true’ and ‘real’. Both are in operation, with 
their own (often contradictory and incommensurable) limits, possibilities and effects, 
in everyday life at Dechinta. This is characteristic of the project, which brings 
together forms of agency which are ontologically mutually exclusive. Dechinta is 
made up of different forms of reality. These forms or realities nonetheless exist 
together and in relation to each other in the project. While the “two ways” were 
centred around objects they were not yet fully articulated. That is, nobody really 
knew what a ‘bush university’ or ‘Inuit lawyer’ was or might be. The continued 
operations of Dechinta, then, were made possible and practiced by Dechinta’s 
participants as ambivalence, ambiguity, uncertainty, indeterminacy, impossibility, 
absurdity and paradox. Ambivalent and uncertain action contrasts with the centrality 
of strategy and instrumentality to liberal action I described in the previous chapter. 
The various components of indeterminate or ambivalent action are not necessarily 
separable, knowable or distributed in linear time.  
In the first instance, and in a very practical way, a degree of ambiguity and 
ambivalence enables components of action, and actors themselves, to come together 
177 
 
when more clarity and certainty would result in refusal or conflict. For example, the 
Akitsiraq Law School Society, the Government of Nunavut and the Government of 
Canada all had very different hopes and incentives for “making Inuit lawyers”, as 
well as different ideas about what this actually meant (see Chapter 5). A certain level 
of ambiguity therefore allowed them all to work together on the project. The 
ambiguity of ‘North’ and its relation to Indigeneity functions similarly. In a 
conservative reading of this ambiguity Northern education projects are liberal 
political coalitions, like in issue-based politics, and function by allowing actors with 
otherwise competing aims to come together around a common cause. These 
coalitions involve strategic, autonomous, goal-oriented individuals. Or, recognizing 
the power differential between Indigeneity and the Canadian state, their participants 
could be understood as “tempered radicals”: “individuals who identify with and are 
committed to their organizations and also to a cause, community or ideology that is 
fundamentally different, from and possibly at odds with the dominant culture of 
those organizations” (Meyerson and Scully, 1995:586). They do so, Meyerson and 
Scully argue, through a type of “ambivalence” which functions not as a weakness or 
lack, but as a strength and possibility. Meyerson and Scully recognize the risks of 
assimilation and exclusion, and as such their account gets closer to what is happening 
in Northern education. Like the liberal coalition, however, tempered radical actors 
are once again strategic individuals and their agency and action look a lot like the 
latently liberal form I described in the final section of the previous chapter.  
What I want to stress here instead is the ontological heterogeneity of 
Northern education and of Dechinta Bush University especially. At Dechinta 
different types of actor (the bush and the professor), existing in different modes of 
reality and social order (place and the institution), as well as different modes of 
knowing – i.e. different units of reality and components of agency – are coming 
together in action, with transformative possibilities and effects (described below). 
This is not a coalition in the liberal sense because its parts – the parts whose 
relationships matter - are not subsumed within a single, liberal order. Nor is it merely 
tempered radicalism (although it is partly that) because, again, its parts are not only 
strategic, autological and individual actors. It is not even easily articulated within a 
more post-structuralist approach: Butler’s “subversive drag,” for example, is 
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ambivalent and ambiguous, but it is also neatly reduced to discourse and 
performativity as the stuff of reality. Instead, at Dechinta, agency occurs at a nexus 
of highly diverse elements, operating within competing logics, but nonetheless in 
relation to each other. Ambiguity and ambivalence are central to making this 
possible.  
This ambivalence and ambiguity also held together two different modes of 
action and agency – one embodied in the settler state and the other in the Indigenous 
philosophy described in this chapter. Once again, had their relationship been more 
fully articulated or interrogated, they might not have held together: in their most fully 
articulated and bounded forms, as in the resurgence paradigm of decolonization (see 
Chapter 3), the two are mutually exclusive (Alfred, 2005). But participants put aside 
questions of their precise relationship and its possibilities, in favour of practicing and 
enacting both. This was both facilitated by and resulted in recurrent ambiguity and an 
absence of clarification and certainty. It was also facilitated by and resulted in 
ambivalence and positioning on both or neither side of the debate. In these ways it 
was indeterminate with no defined or known goal or outcome of activities. It was 
also often contradictory and multiple, involing variety of sometimes competing 
relationships between liberal and non-liberal forms of life and action and their own 
variations. When I first began the research, I asked the organizers of the projects a lot 
of questions about the relationship of Indigenous and juridical legal or university 
knowledge, but they rarely had an answer for me. In a conversation with an Akitsiraq 
leader, I asked whether and how “students discussed the relationship between Inuit 
and Canadian law?” She replied “I suppose so – that sort of thing must have gone on 
in the corridors”, but it was not a formal part of the program. She expressed 
bafflement and scepticism that I was looking for any fixed version of this 
relationship. The Law School Society didn’t provide one. It assumed the possibility 
and left open a lot of ambiguity and uncertainty in order simply to practice both Inuit 
and juridical law.  
Dechinta was more explicit about the experimental dimension of its activities, 
articulating itself as a formal research project into the possibilities for synthesizing 
bush and university pedagogy. On-site, I also experienced a very immediate sense of 
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its creators having simply thrown together a bunch of elements in the bush to see 
how they worked themselves out. I myself was one of these elements: not fully 
prepared for or understanding of bush life, for example, but having to navigate it in 
my position as facilitator nonetheless. Part of this was to do with limited resources – 
it was not possible to streamline or optimize lots of elements in advance. But part of 
it was also due to its principles of self-governance of the community and 
spontaneous interactions with the land: part of the point of the project was that it 
could not all be worked out in advance. And, of course, part of it was due to its 
participants having different ideas about what it is for. Once again, then, despite an 
analysis of the contradictions between bush and university knowledge being part of 
the Dechinta curriculum, the project assumed it was possible to practice them both at 
once, and went on to do so – leaving the question of whether and how they might co-
exist open, and posed in multiple different ways. In this way Dechinta, like Akitsiraq, 
maintained contradiction, paradox and even impossibility (the joining of the 
opposites of bush and university, Inuit and lawyer), in practice through ambiguity, 
ambivalence and indeterminacy.  
The effects of this are multiple. This ambiguity enables Dechinta’s very 
existence in the ways I describe above. It also exposes the fundamental 
contradictions and violence in the conditions of that existence, as well as potentially 
reworking some of the objects around which ambiguity is maintained. By insisting 
that the liberal narrative is related to Indigenous alternatives, the projects also expose 
some of the specific ways in which it operates. It exposes not only liberalism’s 
contingencies, as I described in the last section, but often also its violence and 
absurdities. I described above how at Akitsiraq instructors were similarly forced to 
make Southern and settler law make sense in relation to Indigenous law or the 
Northern context. Sometimes this meant showing its role in colonization (and the 
abuse, suicide and poverty present in the daily lives of students), or admitting it does 
not make sense at all and falls short of fulfilling its own logics.  
Another effect of illuminating the differences between European private 
property and Indigenous stewardship was to show the colonizing relationship 
between these two ways of thinking about relationships with land. In Inuit law there 
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is no tradition of private property or ownership as exclusivity. The land cannot be 
owned like a ‘resource’. People are stewards, not owners, and the land has its own 
agency and authority. Similarly, at Dechinta, we discussed the Dene concept of ‘de’ 
– land which both governs and includes people. People are self-consciously co-
constituted with land (as Legat describes in the first section of this chapter). These 
two different accounts of relations to land, embodied in two forms of law, enact two 
different forms of subjectivity and agency. In juridical law, the individual, 
autonomous and economic subject is able to own and to control land as property. In 
both Inuit and Dene law, there is no individual separable from the land – subjectivity 
is relational – and the land itself has agency. This exposes the contingency of settler 
forms of government. But it also begins to expose their violence: how these ideas of 
land are interwoven with settler colonialism and how, as I described in the previous 
chapter, engaging or being forced to engage with land in this way follows the logic 
of assimilation and elimination (as Wolfe describes in the previous chapter).  
In all these ways, indeterminacy is integral to what is happening in Northern 
education – both in terms of its effects, and because indeterminate action is at odds 
with the liberal narrative of agency. This action is not only that it is potentially 
disruptive and unsettling to liberal logics of agency, and does not only enable anti-
colonial projects, but it itself refuses liberal logics of action: there is no deliberate 
intention behind it, no goals, no strategic or instrumental action, and actors which are 
at least as significant as human individuals. Of course, there are liberals logics and 
effects of ambiguity too, as I described with reference to coalition and issue-based 
politics above. But these only apply when the components of action are liberal 
subjects. The ontological heterogeneity of Dechinta includes more than these. 
Perhaps more significantly, this non-deliberate form of action, with no intentional 
subject, or subjects without fully articulated intentions, might be accused of not 
looking very agentic at all. Indeed, as Povinelli argues, I cannot, from academia or 
late liberalism more generally, imagine fully a version of agency which does not 




Place, critique and ambiguity do not form a single coherent alternate way of 
imagining or practicing political action. Neither, however, are these three ways of 
thinking about action simply oppositional resistance to liberal narratives. Rather, as I 
have shown, they rework and combine to destabilize and decentre liberal forms of 
agency and to enact and enable other forms of action and agent. Place as agency 
determines daily life, enables human actors, and is a “field of relations,” in which life 
is ordered and occurs (Coulthard, 2010). The practice of critique was the way actors 
intervened in governmental knowledge, exposed its contingencies, and attempted to 
imagine governing otherwise. Dechinta is enabled by and produces a number of 
ambiguities, ambivalences and uncertainties. These three aspects of action at 
Dechinta are not distinct. They were entangled and happen simultaneously in 
moments like reading Walking the Land or setting up out-camp. This entanglement 
and interconnectedness was a consistent feature of life at Dechinta and happened 
through knowledge practices specifically. The accounts of knowledge, spatio-
temporality and ontology in this chapter are the material I engage in Chapter 7 in 
which I further theorize the possibilities for post-liberal agency.   
Read with my discussion of late and latent liberalism in the previous chapter, 
these accounts also illuminate the central image and argument of this thesis: the 
multiplicity and dynamic interrelation of different forms of agency. That is, not only 
are the efforts at articulating non-liberal forms of agency in this chapter all 
interconnected with each other, they also draw on and spill back into the liberal 
forms in the last chapter. It is not simply that a practice looks liberal from one angle 
and otherwise from another (which it does), or that an effort fails and becomes 
assimilated or vice versa (which they do), but that they also enabled and facilitate the 
existence of each other. In the next chapter, I tease these links out further and discuss 
their implications for the problem of liberal agency and the critical and queer 






  One of the most challenging aspects of completing a PhD was, for me, the 
seemingly mundane task of organizing the thesis into a series of discrete and 
cumulative sections. As hard as I tried I could not make any one version of political 
agency belong fully or stay put under any single subheading. I would begin by 
following some thread or moment happening between participants that seemed 
straightforwardly anti-liberal, only to find it slipped back into liberal logics once 
again, or vice versa.  When I tried to categorize accounts of agency, none would fit 
neatly or stay put in any box. Each version of agency kept spilling over the edge or 
leading somewhere else. In fact any individual practice or understanding of political 
action was only made meaningful through its relations with other narratives. I could 
not therefore tell stories only about post-liberal agency. I had to tell them about 
liberal agency too, in order to show their meanings. At the same time I was also wary 
of binaries which meant I did not want to reduce my account to ‘liberal’ and ‘non-
liberal’. Yet I found participants themselves returned to binaries, if always in the 
ambiguous and shifting way I described in Chapter 6. I came to understand these 
challenges as being produced by the multiplicity, relationality and dynamism of the 
forms of agency at work in the field, and of the persistence but also failure of 
thinking about agency through either/or questions.  
In this final chapter I turn to discuss this multiplicity, relationality and 
dynamism, with a particular focus on how it works on ontological and spatio-
temporal levels. I do this in the first two sections with reference to my discussion so 
far and to Northern educators and decolonizing action specifically. Both these 
sections focus on the relations between Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and between the forms of 
agency discussed within them. The structure of Chapters 5 and 6 in particular mirror 
the significance yet ultimate failure of the binary of liberal and post-liberal agency. 
Chapter 5 included accounts of agency aligned with late liberalism, while Chapter 6 
contained accounts which attempted to or did disrupt liberal and state logics. At the 
same time, almost every instance of political action I described in either chapter 
183 
 
could be seen to connect with another instance, often in the other chapter. The 
chapters take on a new meaning when taken together.  
In the first section of this chapter, I argue that these connections show the 
multiple, relational modes of agency at work in the daily lives of participants in 
Northern education. This contrasts with the shape of the decolonization debate which 
presents engaging the late liberal state as an either/or option. Instead, Northern 
educators recognize and practice a range of different forms of action simultaneously. 
This multiplicity of modes of action creates two levels on which agency can be 
located: within any given version, and between multiple versions. It is this latter, 
interstitial location of agency that I am concerned with here. All this means, I 
suggest, that we should ask questions about ‘how’ different forms of political action 
relate at least as often as we ask ‘which’ are the most effective. This applies to 
education, to decolonization and to politics more generally.  
In the second section of the chapter I argue that ontology is one aspect of this 
‘how’. Ontology is, I argue, one way in which agency, multiplicity and relationality 
occur in the context of Northern education. I describe the ontologies of agency at 
work in the chronotopes of late liberalism and of place. I identify interrelations and 
struggles between these multiple ontologies in this thesis. As I showed in Chapter 6, 
ontology is a primary concern of participants. In Northern education, struggles 
occurred not simply or even primarily over big ideas like ‘liberalism’ and ‘the state’, 
but more often over the minutiae of ontology and its practice in daily life.  Most of 
the assertions of agency I encountered in my fieldwork, regardless of whether they 
were liberal or otherwise, took the form of assertions and enactments of particular 
ontologies. I have also chosen this ontological focus because, I argue, it points to the 
significance of ontology in any form of political agency. It also points to the potential 
of ontology and spatio-temporality for reworking the meaning and possibility of 
political action. More specifically I argue that decolonizing political agency and 
action must involve paying attention to liberalisms’ colonizing ontology and spatio-
temporality.  
In the third section I turn to the implications of this discussion for theorizing 
post-liberal agency more generally. I return to the dilemmas and paradoxes for 
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imagining post-liberal agency with which I opened this thesis. How to act against, on 
or in-spite of the terms for agency itself? Anti-colonial Northern educational actors 
point, I argue, to concrete ways of doing just this. One aspect of this is recognition 
that liberal logics of political agency are often latent in unexpected ways, but that 
they can also be inhabited creatively and heterogeneously. Another aspect is, 
crucially, a way of taking paradoxes seriously while not getting trapped by their 
limits and logics – of working from within and reworking Butler’s “paradox of 
subjectivation” (Butler, 1993:15). Conceiving of political agency multiply, 
relationally, ontologically and spatio-temporally offers, I argue, one of navigating 
and reworking the dilemmas that constitute late liberalism. 
7.1 Multiple interrelated forms of action 
In 1990, Mohawk in Oka, Quebec, occupied a sacred burial ground in protest 
against its upcoming development into a golf-course. The provincial police attacked 
the barricade with truncheons, tear gas, flash bang grenades and a bulldozer. Both 
sides fired guns, and a police officer was shot and killed. The national media paid 
close attention, focussing on the warrior-like images of Mohawk wearing bandanas 
to hide their faces and carrying guns. At the opposite end of Canada and throughout 
the rest of the 1990s negotiations between Inuit and the federal government 
intensified resulting in the signing of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement in 1999. 
Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred who was a band council member in Oka at the time 
of the conflict has since denounced the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement as the 
pinnacle of colonial assimilation (Alfred, 2005:27). In our conversations, Inuit in 
Nunavut almost uniformly rejected the violent and confrontational strategies of other 
Indigenous peoples. Inuit repeatedly cited their payment of taxes as evidence of Inuit 
inclusion and Canadianness. Implicit in this assertion is a reference to the 
outsiderness of Status Indians, including Mohawk, who are exempt from taxes.  
Oka is an example of political action against the late liberal state and its 
methods. The Nunavut Land Claim is a case of political action within the late liberal 
logics of decolonization. Participants in each one denounce participants in the other. 
What is the relationship between these two seemingly opposed approaches to 
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Indigenous politics? In Chapter 4 I showed how the decolonization debate articulates 
political action as an either/or problem. To re-cap, the politics of decolonization are 
organized into two paradigms: the ‘liberal’ or ‘constitutional’ and the ‘resurgence’ 
paradigms. These are what James Tully describes as two “options” for “arts of 
resistance and freedom” (Tully, 2000:42). The former, seeking intelligibility, is 
within the dominant “techniques of government”, “the structure of domination as a 
whole,” or the “dominant language of western political thought” (ibid). The latter, 
seeking to evade assimilation, is “against the structure of domination as a whole.”  
The dominant language and structure Tully is talking about here is the late liberal 
settler state. I showed how these ways of thinking about decolonizing politics are 
grounded in two accounts of power which produced two histories of the same events. 
One of these accounts is told in liberal terms, one critical of those terms. I argued 
that a discussion of political agency was necessary in relation to this debate. Taken as 
a whole, the debate seemingly precludes anti-colonial agency because actors are 
faced by erasure on both sides. This left open the question of what sort of agency was 
possible in the face of something that insisted on setting the terms for agency itself. I 
argued that the debate turned on a number of implicit ideas about agency and on its 
associated stakes for actors and action. I showed how making agency central and 
explicit in that debate made visible its contingencies and stakes in a way that took 
seriously but also started to undo the either/or impasse at which it had arrived.  
 
In the rest of the thesis I continued to locate actors in relation to the debate 
and to show how those actors themselves repeated, reworked or refused its terms. 
Actors were aware of and participants in this debate. The education projects I worked 
with are saturated with the decolonization literature and with the people and theories 
within it – the university-building projects are entangled with and woven through 
that debate. Chapter 5 (and the Akitsiraq Law School) aligned more closely with the 
constitutional and late liberal narrative of decolonization; Chapter 6 (and Dechinta 
Bush University) with the resurgence paradigm. John Borrows, the figurehead of 
decolonization within Canadian law, is a returning instructor at, and proponent of, 
Akitsiraq. Glen Coulthard, a parallel leader in the resurgence paradigm, is an 
instructor and creator of Dechinta. Students at each project read the scholarship from 
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each school of thought, and the theory of action from each informs the projects as 
actions in themselves. They are also cognisant of the risks in both directions. 
 
I showed throughout how anti-colonial educational actors did not assume 
they have to choose one or the other type of action. Actors in Northern education did 
not subscribe fully to one form of agency or another. Even though Dechinta and 
Akitsiraq are both weighted towards one or the other, participants actually practice 
and relate both at once – as well as a range of practices within each. They did not 
assume that they are mutually exclusive.  They thought nothing of following, 
simultaneously, two completely contradictory logics of decolonization. They even 
took it for granted that this would be the case. Northern educators did not see their 
own agency as either liberal or otherwise, therefore, but rather located their agency in 
the interstices of these different forms of politics.  
 
 In the same way that the different ways of understanding action do both 
compete with and enable each other, Dechinta and Akitsiraq are linked as projects. 
Participants in each project support and respect each other, and generally perceive 
each other to be allies in the same despite their alignments with opposing theories of 
decolonization. There are tensions between Dechinta and Akitsiraq. Akitsiraq’s 
participants, for example, responded with resistance to my reports that Dechinta’s 
participants employed a warrior-like language of the resurgence paradigm. This also 
echoes some broader east/west, Inuit/Dene tensions that were visible in both projects, 
as I described in the introduction. But there are also strong interpersonal and 
institutional connections between Dechinta and Akitsiraq. They are both involved in 
the campaign for a Northern University, and in a particular section of this which 
opposes a college-led version of this University. They promote each other on social 
media and by word of mouth. A senior Akitsiraq staff member is mentor to several 
Dechinta staff and students. I got my job with Dechinta with the support of an 
Akitsiraq Law School Society member speaking to a Dechinta leader. Multiple 
modes of anti-colonial action are therefore co-existent and co-constitutive not only in 




To take one example of the interconnectivity of forms of action, in the hands 
of different participants and at different moments, “making Inuit lawyers” (Akitsiraq 
Law School Society et al, 2007) variously meant: subverting the power of juridical 
law to give status to non-liberal Inuit ways of being; affirming the authority of law as 
action and lawyer as actor; undermining the universality of law and its exclusion of 
Indigenous peoples by creating an impossible contradiction; and articulating action 
strategically again in the very idea of ‘subversion’. As a practice and concept, 
making Inuit lawyers was neither a straightforwardly liberal nor anti-liberal 
understanding of action. It was both, depending on the exact moment and context, 
but each moment and context and therefore meaning was tied to the another, weaving 
back and forth between ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’, but also between different 
versions of agency within them. Strategy, for example, was an especially recurrent 
conduit. This example illustrates the dynamism and multiplicity of forms of agency 
at work in the field. The example also illustrates a recurrent theme of the thesis: the 
creative ways in which liberal logics of action are inhabited (Mahmood, 2012) and 
the ways those logics themselves adapt locally (Povinelli, 2011) [more on this 
below].  
 
My account here clearly contrasts with the either/or binary of the 
decolonization debate.  Participants’ enactments and relation of multiple forms of 
political agency reframe questions about modes of political action more generally. At 
the heart of the decolonization debate is a ‘which’ question: which form of action can 
fulfill the project and ethics of decolonization? Northern educators show, however, 
that multiple forms of political agency can and do co-exist, co-constitute and 
interrelate. We should therefore also, I argue, be asking ‘how’. How, for example, do 
the shooting at Oka and the signing of the world’s largest land claim agreement in 
Nunavut relate as two very different moments of Indigenous relations with the late 
liberal settler state? Reframing the problem of decolonization in this way furthers our 
understanding of it and points to theoretical and substantive directions for future 




My aim is not to say that multiplicity is the ‘right’ or only approach to 
decolonization. As I said in Chapter 4, there is also value in the binary approach, 
particularly in its certainty and lines of accountability. As I have said throughout, 
agency operates differently everywhere and it is impossible to transplant any single 
account from one context to the next. Nonetheless I do see the ways in which I have 
reframed the problem in this chapter as generating clear lines of enquiry (but not 
answers) for those concerned with decolonization and settler-colonialism more 
generally. Anti-colonial scholars and activists may, as I have here, learn more about 
their own specific contexts by recognizing the possibility of multiplicity and asking 
‘how’ questions as well as ‘which’ questions. Those scholars and activists might also 
find concrete strategies as well as understanding in relations between forms of 
political action. 
 
The multiple relational forms of agency at work in the Canadian North do 
more than simply enable each other (although this enabling is important). 
Participants also, I have shown, located their own agency in between forms – in the 
in-betweens and relations themselves. I have found Margot Weiss’s analogy of 
“circuits” of power to be helpful in articulating the implications of this interstitial 
location of agency (Weiss, 2011:22). Circuitousness is just one of many analogies 
that could capture the ways in which agency works in the context. I am using it to 
draw out the significance of the dynamic relationality I encountered, not to theorize 
that relationality as always circuitous. What I find particularly resonant in Weiss’s 
account is the emphasis she places on the productive and effective potential of the 
circuit itself, not just of its parts. Weiss uses circuits to conceptualize the relationship 
between the practices of BDSM and neoliberalism. She documents the ways in which 
BDSM practices and neoliberalism are “imagined as isolated and opposed,” whereas 
in fact they are connected by the same circuits of “affect and effect” and power 
(Weiss, 2011:7, 22). Those connections have “productivity,” “functionality” and 
“effects” in themselves (Weiss, 2011:7). The circuits are agential. Weiss uses the 
circuit to relate big and small as co-constituted (“capitalism and performance,” 
“public and private,” or as “socioeconomic and subjective,” neoliberalism and 
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BDSM [ibid]), which could certainly stand in for the relationship of Northern 
education and the late liberal settler state.  
 
What I want to do here, however, is extend the circuit analogy to describe the 
relationships between different sorts of action and different conceptions of agency 
that I encountered in my fieldwork. Forms of political agency associated with the 
resurgence and constitutional paradigms are certainly “imagined as isolated and 
opposed” (ibid). Agency flows between those forms of anti-colonial political action, 
and their relationships are functional and effective. Their relations themselves are, I 
suggest, agential. This occurs in the same way the story I have told travels between 
chapters 5 and 6 – and its meaning and implications are derived from the relations of 
both. For example, a form of agency is articulated within the organization of daily 
time and space around the chronotope of place, but anti-colonial action happens 
between this and the spatio-temporalities of the university, as do disruptive effects 
for governmental knowledge in making it appear contingent and malleable (I 
described all this in Chapter 6).  
 
There are two levels of thinking about agency in this account. There is a 
version of agency both within any given articulation, and also between articulations. 
Even then, ‘within’ is not really possible: after all, the possibility of organizing a 
project around place is facilitated by the resources and legitimacy of the state and 
university, while (on a much bigger scale) those things were themselves originally 
conceived in opposition to Indigeneity, and so-on. As Anne-Marie Mol says, “this 
multiplicity does not come in the form of pluralism. It is not as if there were separate 
entities each standing apart in a homogeneous field” (Mol, 2002:85). Rather, the 
story I have told in this thesis shows the co-constitution of what Mol calls ‘entities’ 
(forms of agency) and their concurrence with what she calls the ‘field’ (late 
liberalism).  Unlike the professionals who appear in Mol’s research, participants in 
the current project self-consciously enact these relations and concurrence.  
 
My point here is not simply to reiterate that there were multiple hard to pin 
down versions of agency at work or liberal and alternative accounts of agency are 
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messy and heterogeneous. Nor is my point to create a theory of agency as circuitous, 
although this might prove a fruitful future line of thought. Rather, my point is that 
even between seemingly opposed and competing accounts of agency, there are often 
relations. These relations are often mutually enabling. Chapters 5 and 6 therefore 
contain a variety of ways in which agency might be called ‘liberal’ or ‘non-liberal’. 
Each way is followed by some different depth or limit, making both chapters 
fragmented and incomplete. Read together, however, those depths, limits and 
incongruities turn out to be moments at which liberal or non-liberal forms of agency 
interact. In those moments some practice or understanding is transformed, enables 
another practice, or breaks down into the other way. More than this, however, 
participants located their agency in these interconnections themselves. The 
relationality of different forms of agency does more than simply enable those 
different forms. The relations themselves might also be sites or moments of agency. I 
now turn to examine how this relationality and multiplicity occurs on the levels of 
ontology and spatio-temporality.  
7.2 Ontologies of agency  
Anthropology is the science of the ontological self-determination of the 
world’s peoples… [anthropology’s mission is] the permanent decolonization of 
thought 
 
(de Castro, 2003) 
 
In describing “ontological self-determination” Viveiros de Castro (2003) 
recognizes that a people’s voice, reality and agency are in part enacted (or erased) 
along with their specific ontology. To some degree my methods and approach align 
with this ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology. Certainly, like de Castro, I encountered 
the co-existence of multiple ontologies and their attendant realities, and I did so 
ethnographically. Like de Castro, I also recognize the politics of whose ontology is at 
work at any given moment. The participants in Northern education are striving for 
something that could be called “ontological self-determination” (ibid). In this section 
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of the thesis, however, I do more than politicize ontology. I also do the reverse and 
argue that the different forms of political action at work in Northern education each 
have their own ontology. I argue that the relations between forms of agency that I 
have described thus far often occur on the level of ontology and they occur in spatio-
temporalities in particular. In making these arguments I aim to illuminate the 
ontological contours of a possible post-liberal agency, as well as the potential of 
ontology for post-liberal forms of action.  
 
In chapters 5 and 6 I identified several moments when Northern education 
actors deliberately assert one ontology over another ontology, as well as more 
moments when multiple ontologies occur together in daily life at Dechinta and 
Akitsiraq. An ontology is a version of what is or what can be real – a version of what 
reality is made up of. Ontology is therefore about power in the sense that it is 
conditions of possibility for existence of certain realities including agents and 
agencies.  For example, in Chapter 6 I described how at out-camp elders and 
instructors asserted reflexively a relational place-based ontology over a liberal 
institutional university one, and how the university one would intrude or clash 
especially in times of time-pressure. In Chapter 5 I described how in the Akitsiraq 
classroom, instructors attempted to impose a rationalist liberal ontology and failed in 
the face of students saturated in an entirely different one – or attempted to value a 
more holistic, intuitive, creative one only to be told by students that they want “the 
real stuff”. These types of assertion and struggles were central and recurrent aspect 
of what individual actors were doing at any given moment and in each of the various 
ways they conceptualize their educational and political projects.  
A product (and perhaps condition) of these activities across the stories I have 
told is therefore ontological heterogeneity. Even within a single project or a single 
actor’s actions, multiple ontologies (aligned with multiple forms of agency, see 
below) were both recognized and operating in practice along with attendant effects, 
limits and possibilities. This is true also of the broader fields of Northern education 
and Indigenous politics, which cobble together an uncomfortable and contradictory 
range of ontologies. Sometimes, as in policies around cultural relevance, state actors 
make attempts to make this difference commensurable as ‘culture’. In everyday life, 
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however, I found that people most often bring together a variety of different realities 
and ways of conceiving of reality. 
This ontological heterogeneity in itself is interesting and striking in an 
anthropological sense, but I am concerned primarily in the specificity of relations 
within it, its cumulative effects, and its meanings for the problem of agency in late 
liberalism. A pluralistic or cosmopolitan reading might say that this is 
multiculturalism in action – but clearly these ontologies are not equally related nor 
entirely divisible. As I showed in Chapter 3, participants might claim and aim to be 
asserting a place-based or Indigenous version of reality, but the institution and 
ontology of the university kept reworking that assertion into its terms. Here we see 
the force of liberalism and its implications for agency on an ontological level. We 
also see liberalisms co-existence and interactions with alternate ontologies (I do not 
mean to imply external or separable by ‘alternate’ – alternate is more a way that they 
are imagined). I would also describe this thesis as ‘ontologically heterogeneous’ in 
that I have followed research participants in bringing all sorts of bits and pieces of 
different realties together to tell a story, or multiple stories.  
Returning to the logics and practices of agency through the lens of ontology, 
more features of the struggles in Northern education become visible. As I described 
in Chapter 2, agency in late liberalism is autological. Autological action involves an 
autonomous actor who is separate from and prior to a deliberate action which is 
oriented to a future goal or outcome. In autological action, reality is organized along 
a linear progressive temporality with parts that are fixed and universal. This also has 
implications for epistemology, or how that reality can be known (important in a 
teaching and research context). Liberal logics suggests that given actors are fixed and 
pre-discursive, that they can know and be known objectively, and that knowledge 
itself can also be fixed and held like an object.  
 
This late liberal ontology was especially visible in Chapter 5, in which I 
described how participants in the Akitsiraq Law School attempted to capture and 
redeploy tools of the settler state to their own ends of decolonization and self-
determination – by building capacity, making Inuit lawyers, and seeking legitimacy. 
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I described how this was understood and practiced, variously: as subverting state 
resources and as reworking a discursive entity, as well as simply empowering 
Indigenous and Northern people with skills and expertise. Participants subverted 
state and university funding and legitimacy by securing it in its own terms and then 
using it to underpin and enable Indigenous knowledge and wellbeing. They drew on 
constitutional decolonizing theory – which recognizes the state as a fluid and 
discursive entity – to rework the state from within and to write Indigenous voices 
into its constitution.  
 
I absolutely do not want to undermine the political potential or ethics (or any 
kind of ‘rightness’) of this way of conceiving of political agency and action. 
Informed by constitutional scholars and actors, it was often theoretically grounded 
and nuanced. It often refused an essential account of either Indigenous authenticity or 
the state: both were understood as able to be changed and potentially made 
commensurable. And it was consistently strategic and instrumental, rarely buying 
fully into the late liberal logics it engaged. As Saba Mahmood (2012) argues, 
recognizing the complexity of liberalisms in this way is one of the effects of 
centering agency rather than politics or resistance. Another effect is my creation of 
an image of actors who engage the dominant terms of action intentionally and who 
are not passive victims of those terms. I do, however, want to show that underlying 
this complexity and the intentionality of actors is a persistently liberal ontology of 
agency: that the very idea that ‘tools’ are ‘redeployed’ to Indigenous ‘ends’, draws 
on and enacts a particular form of reality. Of course, it was not reducible to these 
logics: in their specific empirical contexts and practices capacity-building, lawyer-
making and legitimacy-seeking had effects and logics that went beyond its 
reproduction. But the ontology of late liberal agency was nonetheless persistent 
throughout – itself a remarkably adaptive logic, reconstituted repeatedly to underpin 
a range of different events, values and relationships.  
 
This autological ontology was present again, albeit less obviously, in Chapter 
6. In Chapter 6 I described how participants in Dechinta Bush University attempted 
to resist the liberal state narrative of decolonization, and to enact alternate forms of 
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Indigenous agency and self-determination. On one hand, when fully theorized by 
professors and books, and legitimized within higher education, this was made 
intelligible within late liberal terms once again, and justified within the same 
autological instrumental logics of the Akitsiraq Law School. On the other, however, 
moments of disruption did emerge – not around a coherent critique of liberalism, but 
on an ontological level, between different versions and accounts of reality and its 
components. The efforts to combine the bush and the university led to conflicts 
around who or what would determine daily life between participants, especially 
when two governing temporalities rubbed up against each other. These conflicts 
exposed ontological inconsistencies and undermined the supremacy of liberal logics 
and actors. But it was not simply that two ontologies were competing – neither would 
have been possible without the other, and these effects would not have occurred 
without both combined together in these ways.   
I now turn briefly to the spatio-temporality of the liberal ontology, as the 
participants themselves did around the chronotope of place, and which emerged 
repeatedly as a site of struggle. As I said in Chapter 6 and as is documented by 
anthropologists and political theorists, the chronotopes of late liberalism and place 
are at odds, and their specificities have resulted in a colonizing relationship (see 
Chapter 6 for a full discussion of Bakhtin’s “chronotope” [Bakhtin, 1982:84] and 
settler and Indigenous spatio-temporalities [Ingold, 2000; Basso, 1996]). The liberal 
chronotope ties a progressive, linear temporality to a homogenous, static notion of 
space – and privileges time over space. This chronotope rationalizes colonization and 
underpins autological action and agency. The place-based and Indigenous 
chronotope privileges space and makes both spatiality and temporality relational and 
contingent. As Vine Deloria Jr argues “...a singular difficulty faces peoples of 
Western European heritage in making a transition from thinking in terms of time to 
thinking in terms of space”(Deloria Jr 2003:62; see Chapters 1 and 6 for further 
discussion). At sites of colonization, these two sets of spatio-temporal logics 
interrelate, and the former reorganizes the latter. Whereas Bakhtin’s (1982) 
chronotopes were closed circuits, at Dechinta and Akitsiraq they can be seen to 
interact and as fragmented. It was never my intention going into this research that 
space and time would play such central roles, but no thesis about either of these 
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projects could avoid them. I feel compelled to center them here because the actors in 
my project do – and, having done so, because they illuminate and problematize some 
crucial aspects of the problem of agency.   
When these chronotopes are centered, objects and ideas can be seen to travel 
between them, and agency appears differently within each. For example, Indigeneity 
understood in the liberal chronotope appears, in Akitsiraq’s interactions with the 
state, as a static and temporally defined object. When Indigeneity is constituted in the 
chronotope of place, however, it is a spatial and relational happening. Because both 
involve the same word, conceived in two different realities, ambiguity becomes 
possible again. Dechinta, understanding Indigeneity around place, can appeal to state 
funding related to the same word conceived liberally. Dechinta participants might be 
fully aware of this difference, but strategically exploit it. (Strategic exploitation links 
back to autological action here again in another “circuit”). 
 
Similarly, by intervening in governmental knowledge on this ontological 
level, both Dechinta and Akitsiraq were often able to side-step full endorsement or 
rejection of something called ‘the state’ or ‘liberalism’ as wholes. Instead, they 
variously engaged and reworked the logics of these larger concepts in micro spatio-
temporal and ontological practices. Conversely, centering time, space and their 
relations has also enabled me to point out where liberal logics persist despite claims 
to reject them. ‘De’-colonization and ‘re’-conciliation, for example, sit linguistically 
with the same linear, temporal logics and realities of the settler colonialism that these 
movements are attempting to resist, and from which space is (in many contexts) 
absent. The ontological multiplicity and struggles I encountered in my fieldwork 
therefore pointed to anti-colonial and anti-liberal forms of political action. They also 
pointed to ways of situating and understanding existing practices in relation to the 
late liberal chronotope of which they are part.  
 
Centering ontology in this way illuminates new corners and possibilities of 
the politics of decolonization not only between logics of action, but within them. The 
authentic Indigenous subject and culture in the resurgence paradigm can be seen 
sometimes to have the same fixed, essential, temporal qualities of that in settler-
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colonialism. As I argued in Chapter 5, even “self-conscious cultural traditionalism” 
(Alfred and Corntassel, 2005:611) or strategic essentialism (Spivak, 1990), still 
assume a liberal subject who can act strategically. Even when resurgence scholars 
assert the spatial and dynamic natures of Indigeneity, they sometimes fix the nature 
of the state through a liberal ontology again. That is, they understand the state as 
always, everywhere inherently colonial and as an actor with intention in itself.  
Conversely, the constitutional approach avoids these problems with a discursive 
ontology of both the state and Indigeneity but in doing so risks neutralizing and 
dehistorisizing the state as and infinitely malleable tool once again. Malleable, that 
is, by an Indigenous actor who is separable and instrumental in her engagement with 
the state. Even the most nuanced approaches, like Henderson’s (1994) treaty-
federalism and Ladner’s (2009) multiple legal orders, still seem to assume an 
autonomous individual, capable of standing outside those orders or moving between 
by rational choice and will. This last point is a recurrent theme from my fieldwork: a 
liberal way of choosing the non-liberal. The ontology and chronotope of liberal 
agency have therefore crept into both paradigms, even in the moments that they 
denounced it.  
 
My aim here is not to analyze any single approach to decolonization but to 
show that centering ontology and spatio-temporality helps situate any approach in 
relation to its broader late liberal and settler colonial contexts. Ontology and spatio-
temporality are lenses and questions through which we might extend our 
understanding of colonization, decolonization and liberalisms. Late liberal and 
settler-colonial ontologies and spatio-temporalities are aligned and intersecting. 
Studies of this alignment and intersection, such as the current thesis, are necessary 
for understanding both late liberalism and settler-colonialism. For those concerned 
with acting against liberal or colonizing versions of politics, ontology and spatio-
temporality also offer practical sites of intervention into governing logics, as they did 
for participants in Dechinta.  In the next section I consider the implications of all this 
for imagining post-liberal agency more broadly.  
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7.3 Imagining post-liberal agency  
In this final section of the thesis I return to the theoretical problem and 
literature with which I began the thesis. The account I have given in this thesis offers, 
I argue, a way of understanding, navigating and reworking the dilemmas for political 
agency that characterize late liberalism. These problems arise when we attempt to 
imagine agency beyond its liberal heritage, or to act against liberalisms when 
liberalisms set the conditions for action itself. These dilemmas are, as I described in 
Chapters 1 and 2, five sets of related ways of understanding and responding to liberal 
agency: as heterogeneous and/or persistent, as mythological and/or creating effects, 
as inescapable and/or incommensurable with existing alternatives, from within 
and/or against and as resistance and/or positive action. Most of this thesis has been 
concerned with how Northern educators navigate these either/or questions in 
multiple, relational and dynamic ways, as well as on the levels of ontology and 
spatio-temporality. In this section, I argue that the account I have given shows a path 
through the paradoxes of liberalisms more generally, and that this path neither fully 
refuses nor fully buys into the logics and risks of these five problems. This is what I 
call ‘post-liberal agency’. I begin by discussing each of the five dilemmas in turn. 
Each dilemma is, I suggest, reworked by the multiple, relational and ontological 
forms of agency I described in the sections above. I conclude by discussing their 
combined implications for researching and theorizing liberalisms and agency more 
broadly. 
First, I have shown throughout the thesis that liberalisms are both diverse and 
persistent. This matters because, beyond simply being inaccurate, articulating 
liberalism as a single homogenous whole buys into its universal narrative and risks 
further totalizing it. On the other hand, treating liberalism as endlessly adaptable 
might miss its iteration across contexts, and as such also miss its weight and 
significance. Similarly, if we treat liberal narratives of political agency as 
deliberately malleable, as some actors in the constitutional paradigm do, then we 
repeat liberal voluntarism and autology (see Chapter 5 for more on creeping 
voluntarism, or Tully [2005] for an example of this approach to liberal democracy). 
These risks are the stakes that are attendant to how we conceptualize liberalism. 
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These stakes are, I have argued, the implications of that conceptualization of 
liberalism for the meaning of political agency. From my reading of the 
decolonization debate in Chapter 4 onwards, I have shown in this thesis that 
contestation over politics and history is often a contestation over forms of agency, 
and that making agency central and explicit can further and reframe such debates. I 
have shown that this contestation is in part a product of the simultaneous 
heterogeneity and persistence of liberal narratives of political agency. I have also 
argued that the ambiguity, ambivalence, multiplicity and dynamism I have described 
in the thesis are all ways of recognizing liberalisms’ heterogeneity and repetition 
simultaneously. For example, I described in Chapter 6 how taking multiple or 
uncertain positions in relation to liberalisms, whilst insisting in the importance of 
those relations in general, enables actors to simultaneously engage liberalisms’ 
varied realities and expose their contractions.    
Second, liberal narratives of agency are mythological and theoretical but they 
also create effects and exist, somehow, in practice. In some ways, autological 
versions of agency are lies. They misrepresent all the complexities and contingencies 
of subjectivity that we know of thanks to scholars like Foucault (1982:77). In other 
ways, liberalisms do set the terms for action and action does happen in liberal ways. 
Many actors, myself included, experience liberal agency on a psychosocial level, 
despite an intellectual rejection of the logics of liberal action. This was clear from the 
accounts of participants in this project who drew repeatedly on liberal autology even 
when attempting to articulate some other form of agency. The liberal constitution of 
my and their very subjectivities is part of what makes liberal logics of agency latent.  
Judith Butler’s “performativity” which Butler set out in Gender Trouble 
(1990) and elaborated further in Bodies that Matter (1993), captures this problem. 
Possibilities for political agency are, in the account I have given in this thesis, 
brought into being performatively in words, events, environments, processes and 
their relations. I have showed throughout the thesis how participants in Northern 
education identified and enacted these possibilities in their daily lives. Yet imagining 
post-liberal agency, talking about it and claiming it are not necessarily enough to 
bring post-liberal agency into being. Participants’ hopes and dreams for anti-colonial 
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action did not always match up with the realities which they recognized were 
operating around them. Narratives of ‘choosing’ to perform agency ‘deliberately’ 
rely on liberal autology once again. Choosing to enact a particular reality assumes a 
subject prior to reality and able to act rationally and strategically towards a particular 
future-goal. I returned repeatedly to this tension when it comes to theorizing post-
liberal agency throughout the thesis.  
I described in Chapter 3 how Butler rejects this “wardrobe” reading of 
performativity (Butler, 1993:21). It is not, she says, that “there is a ‘one’ who is prior 
to gender, a one who goes to the wardrobe of gender decides with deliberation which 
gender it will be today” (ibid). When it comes to discussing political agency rather 
than gender, however, it is precisely this wardrobe-like experience that is under 
scrutiny. I can argue against the idea that we can simply choose to perform our 
realities. I can reject the idea rationally. But I cannot deny my or participants’ 
experiences of something that feels like liberal choice. Nor can I deny the pull of 
ideas and experiences of liberal choice in the world. In fact, the idea that I can reject 
an idea rationally suggests that I can stand outside its logics. I have argued, however, 
that I myself and perhaps most others cannot get outside these logics. I address the 
problem of the ‘outside’ in point three below. Here, I mean to emphasise both the 
persistence and the circularity of this logic. This circularity is significant because it is 
generated by and illuminates the persistence and latency of liberal narratives of 
agency. This is precisely what I described in the third section of Chapter 5, when I 
discussed the logics of strategic action. This circular logic is also, however, a 
potential theoretical dead-end. Once again, we need some way of engaging the 
significance of this problem but not repeating its limiting logics.  
This engagement is possible, I have suggested, in the very tensions and 
relations between understandings, articulations and existing realities of agency. In 
my reading, performativity is in part a theory of the relationality of language 
(broadly understood) and reality. Butler calls this relationality the “of performativity” 
and locates “agency” explicitly within that iterability (Butler, 1990: xxiv). Similarly, 
Foucault locates critique in the “the complex interplay between what replicates the 
same process and what transforms it” (Foucault, 1997:58). In this line, 
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transformation occurs not in the simple selection and enactment of desired realities 
but in the careful and discursively embedded relation of what is real and what is 
possible. This relation is part of what I have sought to document in this thesis. I have 
shown that the relations between the real and the possible can be multiple and can be 
ontological – and that these multiple and ontological relations can in turn be sites of 
agency and further effects. I have shown that the actors engaged in this thesis 
understand and navigate their own agency in these ways deliberately and reflexively. 
These relations are further complicated, however, when it is agency in particular that 
is in question. This is because the meaning of agency is so closely bound up in the 
meanings and operations of possibilities and realities themselves. These 
complications include the performative challenge of imagining forms of agency that 
resonate with but do not repeat liberal narratives of agency. They also include the 
challenge of identifying markers of possibility and reality that do not align with the 
spatio-temporal logics of late liberalism – and of doing this from within an academia 
that is governed by liberal terms of intelligibility (Povinelli, 2011). I have not 
resolved these tensions here but I have identified them and shown that they do not 
need to be resolved in order to be engaged and navigated in practice on the ground.  
Third, the poststructuralist theory with which I have been working has 
resolutely rejected the possibility of an “exteriority” (Foucault, 1978:95) or outside 
(Walker, 1992) or “prior” (Butler, 1993:21) of power, discourse or modernity. This 
rejection cautions against attempting to articulate wholly non-liberal or alternative 
forms of political agency outside of liberal logics. It also means that scholars, like 
myself, are always already embedded within liberal logics themselves. Similarly, 
critics of essentialist versions of authentic Indigeneity reject the idea of a single 
knowable Indigeneity ‘prior’ to colonialism or ‘external’ to colonial influences (St 
Denis, 2007:34-51). Ideas about pure authentic Indigeneity (Indigenous people 
‘outside’ of liberalisms) may in this line be colonizing ideas. The idea of pure 
authentic Indigeneity echoes logics of racial purity and are mobilized to disempower 
Indigenous people within liberal systems of power (for example Indigenous rights 
are legally void when the exercise of those rights yield financial profit, because profit 
is deemed unauthentically Indigenous [Shaw, 2008]). For these reasons, as well as 
due to the limits of my own location which I describe below, I have identified and 
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articulated aspects of post-liberal agency that are embedded within late liberalism, 
not ‘after’ it. I have also been concerned centrally with liberalisms, not Indigeneity.   
Yet at the same time a full rejection of the possibility of actual existing 
alternatives to liberalisms risks totalizing liberalisms again. Many of the Indigenous 
participants in the current thesis spoke in a matter-of-fact way about the existence of 
other ways of being than liberal ways. To deny the truth of this speech would be to 
further deny and erase Indigenous difference in my account. Further, it is claims to 
incommensurable differences that are truly threatening to liberal orders. As Elizabeth 
Povinelli describes, late liberalism is precisely the form that “liberal governmentality 
has taken as it responds to crises in the wake of” challenges of difference (Povinelli, 
2011: 25). Late liberalism works to make claims to difference commensurable within 
its own logics, through mechanisms such as cultural recognition (Povinelli, 2011: 
319–34). By insisting that there is no non-liberal perspective, I would be buying into 
this relentless drive to make alterity commensurable or to erase it (see Cruikshank 
[2006] and Nadasdy [1998: 25–43] for similar arguments regarding academic 
knowledge more generally). Nonetheless, I myself am embedded in liberal contexts 
and, as I have shown, am as such am indeed unable to get outside them. This point 
speaks to the limits of the current thesis. It also highlights the tensions and challenges 
of imagining post-liberal agency from academia and the West. These tensions and 
challenges intensify between post-structuralist theory and Indigeneity in particular in 
the ways that I have described here.   
Fourth, liberalisms are paradoxical. I have been concerned specifically with 
the paradox faced by actors seeking to act against or in-spite of liberal logics of 
action and therefore to act against the terms for action itself. I have called this a 
problem of ‘erasure or erasure’ in the settler-colonial context. The ‘erasure or 
erasure’ problem occurs when anti-colonial actors risk reinscribing the state or being 
assimilated by it on one hand, or being excluded from what counts as political action 
on the other. Judith Butler calls this problem “the paradox of subjectivation” (Butler, 
1993:15). Audre Lorde calls it “the master’s tools” and “the master’s house” (Lorde, 
1984). These differently articulated and located versions of the problem all threaten 
to close down possibilities for agency. They are, I have argued, theoretical traps. Yet 
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I have shown that they are also everyday realities for many people, including both 
participants in this thesis and myself. The current thesis speaks to this fourth 
dilemma, combined with fifth, most often and in the most depth. As such I discuss 
the implications of the current thesis for the two jointly after introducing the fifth 
below.  
Fifth, scholars and activists have turned to ‘resistance’ over agency or even 
freedom because it seems impossible to articulate a positive version of agency 
without doing so in liberal terms. Resistance, however, is a negative, binary way of 
conceptualizing politics which always re-centers that which is being resisted. 
Resistance delineates a narrow set of possibilities for action. Certainly resistance or 
even ‘acting against’ are only parts of what the participants in this thesis understood 
themselves as doing. Rarely, in fact, did they report their actions to me in this way. 
Nonetheless, as I said in Chapter 1 I do not want to dismiss the necessities and 
strengths of the politics of resistance, particularly given the potential unknowability 
of alterity from academia. Rather, I want to draw attention to the implications of this 
binary thinking which characterize modernity and which haunts efforts to act 
otherwise to modernity, including to liberalisms. Throughout the thesis I have 
returned repeatedly to the binaries of liberalisms/otherwise and 
colonization/decolonization. I have encountered many others, including 
Indigenous/settler and bush/university.  Again, binary thinking seems to present a 
trap for imagining agency beyond liberalism. Imagining agency ‘against’ liberalisms 
extends the significance and centrality of liberalisms by always defining agency in 
relation to them. Yet refusing or blurring lines of opposition risks blurring lines of 
action and accountability and, once again, it may be impossible to escape fully binary 
logics.  
It is these closely related fourth and fifth dilemmas that the current thesis 
addresses most often and in most depth, although it necessarily engages the previous 
three dilemmas in doing so. I have been concerned consistently with these paradoxes 
and binaries, along with the problems they present for imagining post-liberal agency 
and the ways they might be navigated in practice. This is where the crux of the thesis 
is located. I have learned from participants’ own concerns and ways of engaging 
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these problems that imagining post-liberal agency must involve some way of relating 
to these binaries and paradoxes. Post-liberal narratives of political agency must 
somehow recognize the stakes and weight of those paradoxes and dichotomies 
without becoming fully defined or trapped by them. Similarly, theorizing post-liberal 
agency means neither fully rejecting nor fully accepting autological, juridical and 
linear-progressive versions of political action.  
The post-liberal modes of political agency I identify and articulate in this 
thesis all involve attempting to relate to the binaries and paradoxes of liberalisms in 
these ways. I believe this is where the current thesis makes a key theoretical 
contribution. I have identified two related ways of working within or reworking the 
‘erased or erased’ problem.  These are the two foci of my discussion in the previous 
two sections of this chapter: forms of agency which are multiple, relational and 
dynamic and forms of agency which operate on ontological and spatio-temporal 
levels. Both these versions of agency recognize the significance of the five either/or 
questions described above. They both also, however, refuse to be fully determined by 
the either/or posing. They potentially engage or rework liberal logics of action 
without either simply repeating or opposing them.  
One of the central functions of the multiple or ontological versions of agency 
I described above is that they often expose the contingencies of liberal narratives of 
political agency in practice, without outright dismissing them. Instead, highlighting 
and working from points of tension potentially enables a loosening and reworking of 
the knots of agency within late liberalism (this echoes Foucault’s [1997] critique, see 
Chapter 6). Conceiving of agency in these ways often also relates ambiguously or 
ambivalently to the binary of liberalisms/anti-liberalism. As I described in Chapter 6, 
ambivalence and ambiguity run disrupt the rationality of autological action, without 
entirely rejecting it. Ambiguity and ambivalence also enable ways of being which 
would be excluded were the paradoxes of liberalism to be ‘resolved’ in any certain or 
fixed way. Ambivalence and ambiguity are, for these reasons, worthy sites of further 
investigation when it comes to theorizing post-liberal agency (Breeze [2014] 
similarly calls for and begins a sociology of ambivalence).    
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In order to see and theorize agency in these ways I had to disaggregate 
‘politics’ from ‘agency’ and ‘liberalisms’ from ‘oppression’. This thesis 
demonstrates the potentials of this disaggregation and of centering agency in this set 
of concerns. Even if our ultimate concern is resisting or transforming oppression, 
beginning always with an opposition or with a political goal often masks everyday 
forms of agency. This is especially true when it comes to looking for forms of 
agency which do not align with the autological equation of political action with 
goals. In this project, beginning with agency has shown that actors inhabit liberalism 
in multiple and reflexive ways. They are not simply duped or oppressed. Nor, once 
again, are liberal logics of action a single homogenous entity. This account was 
further facilitated by approaching agency as articulated and occurring locally, in situ 
and in practice. Again, this disaggregated and empirical approach is crucial even if 
our ultimate goals are (ambitiously) to overturn liberalisms’ dominance in defining 
political agency and/or to theorize agency beyond the specific. This is because it is in 
these ways that we can see where liberal narratives of agency break down as well as 
how they are being contested and reworked. In these ways the current project begins 
with and affirms Saba Mahmood’s call for conceptualizing agency empirically and 
apart from agency, politics and resistance (Mahmood, 2012:22).  
The thesis also demonstrates, I believe, the potential of researching agency in 
this way when it comes to navigating the paradoxes and binaries of liberal forms of 
agency in particular. Mahmood’s approach can, as I have shown here, negate what 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick calls “paranoid” critical theory (Sedgwick, 2003:123, 123-
152). Paranoid critical theory also operates around binaries, such as that of 
subversion and hegemony. Similarly, Louis McNay notes “the dichotomous logic of 
domination and resistance” (McNay, 2000:155). These binaries have a homogenizing 
effect for those events contained within their brackets. Saba Mahmood’s insistence 
that critical theorists research agency explicitly and empirically is one way, I have 
shown, to address Sedgwick’s critique of critical theory. By engaging political 
agency centrally, locally and in practice this thesis has created an account of agency 
that is far from homogenizing of liberal or other forms of political action.   
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 Overall, the account I have given in this thesis offers one way of navigating 
if not resolving these five related problems. That is, I propose one way of theorizing 
post-liberal agency. Each of the five problems above contains one or more either/or 
questions for thinking about political agency in relation to liberalisms. Locating 
agency in the interstices of multiple relational forms avoids having to answer these 
questions definitively, but also recognizes their continued importance in limiting and 
enabling forms of political action. Ontology and spatio-temporality cut across all five 
problems, further illuminating and articulating each. Again, as I described in the 
previous section, ontological and spatio-temporal interventions offer ways of relating 
to liberalisms that are neither fully determined by nor outside of liberal narratives of 
action.  
I want to close this section by re-emphasizing that what I am proposing here 
is not a single momentary snapshot of multiplicity or a single ontological practice. I 
am arguing that agency might be found in the ongoing and simultaneous process of 
interrelation itself and in the interstices of multiple modes of political agency. I am 
arguing that this multiplicity is not a plurality because its parts are not discrete and 
separable. Instead, its constituent forms of political agency are co-constituted, 
fragmented, unbounded and inseparable. At the same time I am not suggesting that 
merely the fact of interrelation is agentic. Rather, the specifics of this interrelation 
matter greatly. In this thesis I have followed interrelation between autological and 
alternate accounts of political action and between multiple ontologies and spatio-
temporalities – all of which made meaningful, in this thesis, in their settler-colonial 
and anti-colonial contexts.  
Conclusion 
The shape of the problem this thesis addresses, as I have outlined in five 
stages above, is not unique to liberalisms. Liberalisms are particularly significant in 
discussing agency, because agency is historically understood in liberal terms in the 
West.  However, Judith Butler’s paradox of subjectivation refers to gender, while 
Audre Lorde’s master’s house is racism and/or academia. These agency problems 
take a similar, if not equivalent, shape to that faced by those who seek to act against 
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liberalisms and the settler-colonial state. Of course, gender, race, liberalisms, 
colonialism and the state are all entangled. This is part why the problems they 
present for political agency present similar dillemas. For these reasons, the current 
thesis also offers ways into rethinking and relating to the binaries and traps that 
constitute other modes of power and action – multiply, relationally, ontologically and 
spatio-temporally.  
In my reading, the critical and queer accounts of agency I reviewed in 
Chapter 2 all dealt with iterations of this problem and shape. They also offered their 
own paths through in the contexts they were dealing with. For example, in Gender 
Trouble, Butler (1990) suggests subversion, parody and drag are ways of relating to 
the gender binary whilst also unsettling it. Foucault suggests critique (1997:28-30) 
and techniques of the self (Foucault, Rabinow & Faubion, 2000:223) are ways of 
reworking existing truths from within and working on the conditions of one’s own 
existence. Cvetkovich (2012) suggested de-medicalizing mental illness, Weiss 
(2011) suggested race-based BDSM play, Halberstam (2011) suggested failure, and 
so-on. See Chapter 2 for a full review. In these ways, critical and queer theorists have 
long been concerned with imagining forms of politics beyond oppression and 
resistance. My aim here is to add a new account, a new path, and a new set of 
possibilities to this literature and set of concerns. 
In my account this path and these possibilities are emerging in terrain of 
struggle that constitutes late liberalism specifically. I have argued that late liberalism 
is in part characterized by struggles not only over difference, with which Povinelli is 
concerned, but specifically over differences as to what counts as political action 
itself. In my account anti-colonial struggles are both central and peripheral to this 
terrain. These struggles are part of driving liberalisms’ adaptations by motivating 
local neoliberal orders to adapt in this way. But they are also at its edges where it 
breaks down, becomes nonsensical or is challenged. The current project is a 
contribution to our understanding of liberalism at this moment in time, and the limits 
and possibilities that are emerging with it.  
Finally, I have shown that liberal narratives of agency operate around specific 
ontologies and spatio-temporalities in everyday practice. This line of inquiry has 
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potential for further understanding liberalisms, as well as seeking ways to resist or 
transform them. Ontology is a matter of who or what can exist. To some degree, I 
have argued, so is agency. Actors and the realities in which they can act must exist. 
But in my account ‘too much’ of any given kind of existence sometimes closes down 
possibilities for agency. It seems that the instability and meetings of multiple realities 
might prove productive sites for further investigation and political action. This is true 
both in ontologically messy daily realities and in research, like this thesis, that seeks 
to take those realities seriously. 
Imagining post-liberal agency is one way in which we might begin the task of 
locating and expanding possibilities for political agency or agency beyond its liberal 
heritage. I have done this through empirical research, in the settler-colonial Canadian 
North, and in the university. These are especially compelling but by no means the 
only sites for investigating post-liberal political agency. Imagining post-liberal 
agency is a way of taking seriously both the persistence and the heterogeneity of 
liberalisms. It is a way of conceptualizing action as more than resistance to 
liberalisms but not necessarily a complete refusal of them either. Post-liberal agency 
is a way of seeing not only the ways in which the paradox of subjectivation presents 







This thesis is an account of participants’ attempts to build new universities in 
the Canadian Arctic, to work with older universities in the South, and to intervene in 
academic knowledge and the roles of that knowledge in government and 
colonization. It is also an account of my own engagements with emerging Northern 
higher education and my navigation of the global and local academic communities 
and institutions of which I am part. The stories I have told in this thesis show, in my 
reading, that the university is a nexus of intersecting colonial and liberal political 
rationalities and practices. Both of these rationalities are widely recognized as 
governing logics of higher education institutions. The neoliberalization of higher 
education and the roles of universities in colonial power are both objects of large 
bodies of scholarship (Williams, 2013; McGettigan, 2013; Brown & Carasso, 2013; 
and Canaan & Shumar, 2008). The current thesis reaffirms these critiques and 
extends them through the Canadian North.  
Additionally, the thesis shows that these liberal and colonial logics intersect. 
It shows that this intersection occurs in the daily realities of university life, including 
in research and in pedagogy it (I have borrowed the word “intersection” from 
Kimberle Crenshaw [1989:140]). In Chapter 6 I described, for example, how 
decolonizing pedagogy at Dechinta meant reworking the linear-progressive 
temporality around which late liberalism operates. In Chapter 2 I described how I 
also tried to resist those same temporalities in the research and writing processes, and 
how in doing so I sometimes undermined my own authority as a liberal subject in the 
university.  Further, the everyday practices I describe throughout, especially those of 
anti-colonial actors in the North, point to some ways in which academic actors might 
begin to challenge this intersection from within it. The task of decolonizing research 
is ongoing (Smith, 1999; Barker, 2000; Davis, 2000). The question of what forms of 
action are possible against universities’ neoliberal logics is right now being 
formulated.  The intersection I have identified here means that these two struggles 
are connected. This means that those concerned with liberalisms must be concerned 
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with colonialism, and vice versa. Further, their co-operations in the university are 
more than the sum of their parts.  
More than simply identifying the problem, however, I take participants’ 
practices as indicators of possible modes of action. In particular, I suggest, scholarly 
ethical agency can be theorized as multiple, relational and spatio-temporal. 
Throughout the thesis I have described how I followed participants in combining and 
relating the multiple modes of action at work in the field I worked in. I have not, for 
example, blindly reproduced a universalizing, representative and linear-progressive 
thesis. I have highlighted my resistance to these norms. Nor, however, have I fully 
shunned these conventions. Sometimes, perhaps, I have felt unable to escape them. 
At other times I have chosen to engage them to demonstrate my own legitimacy or 
that of the topic I am dealing with. I have learnt much from participants in how to do 
this. I have learned how to be slippery, subversive, strategic and ambiguous, to work 
with multiple ontologies, and to maintain contradictions. Conversely, I have learned 
from participants the value of conventions that I had previously dismissed as 
techniques of voice, existence and action. Like them I have also seen and not escaped 
the tenacious and chameleon capacity of liberalisms in the most unlikely corners, 
including my own work. I have followed participants in looking for possibilities 
created in this relational multiplicity of ways of acting, rather in one line of action or 
another.  
My own actions and reflections have, as I have described, involved persistent 
uncertainty, anxiety and movement between one interpretation and another. My aim 
in describing this experience is more than simply transparency. It is also in this 
experience and oscillation that I locate my own ethical agency:  between one 
orientation to a practice and another, between convention and alterity, between 
optimism and pessimism. That is, my ethical and agential practices were not in doing 
things differently or in a bid for recognition and legitimacy, but in my constant 
juggling and relating of both these aims. This was not always deliberate and 
strategic. Often, when I thought I had got a hold on one, it morphed again into the 
other. My honesty can be read, for example, as a serious attempt to be ethically 
accountable and to expose myself. It could also be read, however, as yet another bid 
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for safety and legitimacy. It might function in both these ways, and neither might be 
possible without the other.  
I wish I could stand fully behind everything I have done in order to produce 
this thesis. I am not talking about some dark secret here. I am talking about working 
with Indigenous people and communities in order to gain a PhD and to understand 
political agency more broadly. I have not resolved the tensions of working as a white 
researcher in Indigenous contexts, especially when that work is motivated by reasons 
that reach beyond those contexts. I have not shaken the sense that some of the stories 
I have told here are not my place to tell, or would be told far better by the people 
they involve. I do see many white researchers producing sensitive, radical and 
important work in and with Indigenous communities. This work serves Indigenous 
communities and many others. I hope some these things might be said about my own 
work.  
Even the best of this work, however, contributes to the overrepresentation of 
white voices, perspectives and people in academia and in authoritative knowledge 
production more generally. This includes the production of knowledge about 
Indigenous people specifically and also about the world more generally. It also 
includes the production of authoritative knowing subjects, amongst whom I would 
certainly count people with doctorates. One of the many things I have done in 
producing this thesis, therefore, is to contribute to this problem. It is an 
uncomfortable thought that my work with Indigenous communities will be, in part, 
directed towards making me comfortable in this particular way. While I do believe 
the current thesis produces valuable knowledge of multiple kinds, I do not know if I 
would do it all over again. I still believe, however, that it is important for non-
Indigenous researchers and non-Indigenous people more generally to learn from 
Indigenous people and to talk about decolonization. I have also now experienced the 
enormity and uncertainty of the task of working out how to do this. I have attempted 
to take one small step in this direction, but I suspect that the path towards this goal is 
not a linear one and might be littered with mistakes and regrets.  
I want to end this Epilogue and the thesis as a whole with a call for further 
inquiry. I believe wholeheartedly that as academics and as people we need to 
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examine the possibilities for political agency that might be opening up in the shifting 
terrain of higher education and late liberalism. We need to ask this question in 
established institutions like my own, in newly imagined or created universities like 
those I worked with for this thesis, and in the terrain of struggle of which they are 
both part. We need, in my view, to explore further the links between struggles inside 
and outside of the university which, I have argued, are connected by liberal logics of 
politics. I have shown that the everyday practices of higher education constitute 
particularly productive, but by no means exclusive, grounds from which to ask these 
questions and make these connections. I do not mean to dismiss the more pessimistic 
atmosphere that, in my experience, characterizes much of academia at the moment. I 
think this trend reflects the ways in which the possibilities for political agency are 
narrowing rapidly and violently. This narrowing sometimes feels overwhelming. 
Nonetheless I am keen to find ways in which we might be optimistic about the 
situation. I take the current thesis as indicative that there is emerging hope and 
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